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      1Montesquieu, De l’Esprit des Lois (Paris, 1961).  As should become clear during the course of the Article, I do not
believe that constitutional protections always should be less searching in relation to smaller polities.  The quotation from
Montesquieu is notable insofar as it suggests that the appropriate scope of constitutional protections might be related to
the size of the polity. 
      2See Barron v. City of Baltimore,  32 U.S. 243 (1833).  The only exceptions are the Fifth Amendment’s grand jury
requirement, the Seventh Amendment civil jury requirement, the Second Amendment, and the Third Amendment. 
      3See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
      4See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995), discussed infra.
      5 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 580 (1992) (Establishment Clause).  See infra Part I.B.3.
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“In a large republic, the common good is sacrificed to a thousand considerations; it is
subordinated to various exceptions; it depends on accidents.  In a small republic, the
public good is more strongly felt, better known, and closer to each citizen; abuses are
less extensive, and consequently less protected.”1  
INTRODUCTION
M
any constitutional principles apply to more than one level of government.  For
example, virtually all  Bill of Rights guarantees, which long were understood to
limit only the federal government, have been applied  to the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment under the doctrine of incorporation.2  Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal
protection clause, which by its terms applies only to States, has been “reverse incorporated” against
the federal government.3 “Multi-level” constitutional principles can be found outside the contexts
of incorporation and reverse incorporation, as well.  For example, the Court has held that a
constitutional principle of representative democracy that prohibits the federal government from
augmenting Article I’s qualifications for Congress also applies to the States.4 
The conventional wisdom is that such multi-level constitutional principles apply identically
to all levels of government.  Thus, the Court has held that incorporated Bill of Rights guarantees
apply “with full force to the States.”5  Similarly, when reverse incorporating, the Court has
articulated the doctrine of “congruence,” under which Equal Protection applies identically to the
      6See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 226 (1995) (announcing the principle of “congruence
between the standards applicable to federal and state racial classifications”).
      7See U.S. Term Limits, 505 U.S. at 820.
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federal and sub-federal polities.6   And the principle of representative democracy limiting Congress
was applied identically to the states.7  In short, today’s doctrine virtually always utilizes what might
be called a categorical “One-Size-Fits-All” approach to those constitutional principles that apply to
more than one level of government.
The Article’s thesis is that this categorical One-Size-Fits-All approach is problematic because
the different levels of government – federal, state, and local –  sometimes are sufficiently different
that a given constitutional principle may apply differently to each level.   This Article critically
examines an alternative approach to One-Size-Fits-All that it dubs “Tailoring.”  Tailoring refers to
the possibility, though not the requirement, that a constitutional provision may apply differently to
different levels of government.  Tailoring thus would permit a situation where the federal
government could regulate in ways unavailable to the sub-federal polities as a matter of
constitutional law.  Conversely, states or localities other times might be permitted to regulate in ways
that the federal government could not.  Finally, Tailoring holds out the prospect that states and
municipalities may be sufficiently different that constitutional principles also should be Tailored as
between them.  For example, states may be more similar to the federal government than to
municipalities in some respects such that a constitutional limitation might forbid the federal and state
governments, but not  municipalities, from regulating in a particular instance.
This Article does not ask  whether any particular constitutional provisions should be
Tailored.  It instead  considers the antecedent question of whether Tailoring is a plausible technique
to consider.  An affirmative answer does not commit a person to the conclusion that any particular
      8515 U.S. 200 (1995).
      9This was the rule announced in Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
      10See Metro Broadcasting Inc. v. FCC, 497  U.S. 547, 564-65 (1990).
      11Adarand, 515 U.S. at 224 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976)).
      12Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227.
      13Id. at 249  (Stevens, J., dissenting).  See infra Part III.B.1 for further discussion.
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Constitutional provision should be Tailored, but uncovers a new set of doctrinal options for
consideration. In the end, the Article concludes that the One-Size-Fits-All approach should be
softened from a categorical requirement to a rebuttable presumption.  
Although Tailoring at first  might sound completely outlandish, it is not  wholly unfamiliar
to American constitutional jurisprudence.  As the Article shows, numerous Justices have argued that
particular constitutional provisions apply differently to different levels of government –  including
Justices Holmes, Cardozo, Jackson, Harlan, Fortas, Powell, Stewart, Stevens, Blackmun, Ginsburg,
Rehnquist, and Thomas.  Consider, for example,  Justice Stevens’ dissent in the case of Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena.8  Prior to Adarand, state affirmative action programs were subject to
strict scrutiny9 whereas federal programs only  had to satisfy intermediate scrutiny under the rule
announced in Metro Broadcasting.10  The Adarand majority announced the principle of
“congruence” – the requirement that “[e]qual protection analysis in the Fifth Amendment area is the
same as that under the Fourteenth Amendment”11 – to reverse Metro Broadcasting.12  Justice
Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, argued in dissent as follows:  
The Court’s concept of ‘congruence’ assumes that there is no significant difference between
a decision by the Congress of the United States to adopt an affirmative-action program and
such a decision by a State or a municipality.  In my opinion that assumption is untenable.
It ignores important practical and legal differences between federal and state or local
decisionmakers.13    
In short, Justices Stevens and Ginsburg contended that the constitutional principle of equal
protection should be Tailored, and criticized the doctrine of “congruence” for adopting what this
      14See infra Part III.B.2.
      15See infra Part III.B.4.
      16514 U.S. 779 (1995).
      17Id. at 845 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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Article terms a One-Size-Fits-All approach.
Moreover, though not conceptualized as instances of Tailoring, several contemporary
doctrines in fact vary in their application depending on what level of government they apply.  For
instance, although equal protection proscribes the federal and state governments from conditioning
the right to vote on property ownership, certain local governments are allowed to utilize such voting
requirements.14  Similarly, although the dormant commerce clause prohibits states from adopting
protectionist measures that discriminate against sister-states, no such anti-protectionism principle
has been reverse incorporated against the federal government.  Consequently, Congress can authorize
protectionist regulations that states cannot.15  As this Article explains, such variances are best
understood as instances of Tailoring, not as simply odd and discrete exceptions to ordinary
constitutional law.
Although Tailoring’s sensitivity to the differences among different levels of government is
not unknown to American constitutional law, the Court ignores such considerations most of the time.
This inattentiveness has led to troubling legal analysis.  Consider the plurality opinion in the case
of U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton.16  At issue was the constitutionality of an amendment to the
Arkansas State Constitution that provided term limits for Arkansas’ federal representatives.  The
amendment was passed by a ballot initiative that won nearly 60% of the popular votes and that
carried every congressional district in the State.17 The plurality nevertheless struck it down on the
ground that the amendment  violated the “fundamental principle of our representative democracy”
that “the people should choose whom they please to govern them,” a principle that the Court had
      18395 U.S. 486 (1969).  The plurality noted that this was the “most important[]” consideration in its rationale.  See
514 U.S. at 806.
      19Id. at 820.
      20Id.
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identified in the earlier case of  Powell v. McCormack.18  
This reasoning is paradoxical: how can it be that  fundamental democratic principles required
that the Court strike down an amendment that had been adopted by the direct vote of a majority of
Arkansas’ citizens?  The plurality arrived at this puzzling rationale by reflexively invoking a One-
Size-Fits-All jurisprudence that disregarded the differences between which level of government
(federal or State) was acting.   The “fundamental principle of our representative democracy” that “the
people should choose whom they please to govern them” was a thoroughly sensible principle for the
Court to rely upon in Powell, where a majority of citizens in New York’s 18th Congressional District
had voted for Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. and members of Congress sought to keep Powell from
taking his seat.  After all, the additional qualifications for Representatives that Congress sought to
impose in Powell interfered with the choice that had been made by those who lived in Powell’s
congressional district –  the people whose preferences mattered in respect of selecting their
representative for Congress. The plurality in Thornton gave no real thought to the significance of
which level of government was imposing the limit on who could sit for Congress, asserting  simply
that “the source of the qualification is of little moment in assessing the qualification’s restrictive
impact.”19  This was the plurality’s predicate for  concluding “we believe that state-imposed
qualifications, as much as congressionally imposed qualifications, would undermine . . . the right of
the people to vote for whom they wish.”20  
This reasoning is specious. That “the source of the qualification is of little moment in
      21Id. (emphasis supplied).
      22See U.S. CONST . ART. I, §2, cl. 2 (qualifications for Representatives); U.S. CONST . ART. I, §3, cl. 3 (qualifications
for Senators).
      23The dissent made this point.  See id. at 877 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  I do not mean to suggest that there are no other
plausible grounds for overturning the Arkansas amendment, but only that the plurality’s self-described “most important[]”
argument, id. at 806, is unavailing.
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assessing the qualification’s restrictive impact”21 bears no relation to the question the Court was
considering: the relevance of Powell’s democratic principle to Thornton.  Qualifications for who can
sit for Congress are not per se unconstitutionally undemocratic – indeed, the Constitution itself sets
qualifications.22 The pertinent consideration for purposes of basic democratic principles is who
imposes them.  In Powell, additional qualifications were imposed by people who were not part of
the political community democratically entitled to select its  representative for Congress; the
Congressmen who sought to bar Powell from sitting did not reside in New York’s 18th Congressional
District.  That is why the additional qualifications interfered with the fundamental democratic
principle that the choice of the relevant political community must be respected.  In Thornton, by
contrast, a majority of voters in every congressional district in Arkansas had voted for  additional
qualifications – term limits –  that applied only to them.  Because term limits reflected the choice
of the relevant political community, overturning the Amendment cannot legitimately be justified on
the basis of fundamental democratic principles.23  Thus, “the source of the qualification” is of
decisive moment in assessing whether it is violative of, or instead consistent with, fundamental
democratic principles.  The plurality’s fatally flawed rationale is part and parcel of a One-Size-Fits-
All approach, which, by definition, ignores differences between the federal and state governments.
The problematic plurality reasoning in Thornton helps illustrate a crucial larger point.  The
greater openness to Tailoring that this Article advocates is not important simply because many
Justices over the past hundred years have called for Tailoring ( which they have)  or  because several
      24As this Article shows, virtually no legal scholars have given attention to Tailoring either.  After this Article was
written, I learned of an excellent piece, since published, that considers what I call “tailoring” in the particular context
of religious liberty.  See Richard C. Schragger, The Role of the Local in the Doctrine and Discourse of Religious Liberty,
117 HARV. L. REV. 1810 (2004).  I also have published  a short piece that examined  tailoring in the context of the
establishment clause.  See Mark D. Rosen, Establishm ent, Expressivism, and  Federalism, 78 CHICAGO-KENT L. REV.
669 (2003).
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constitutional doctrines already reflect the logic of Tailoring (which they do); although these two
observations should help smooth feathers ruffled by the mere notion of Tailoring by showing that
Tailoring is by no means foreign to contemporary doctrine, they do not on their own explain why
Tailoring should figure more prominently in our constitutional analysis.  Rather, as an analysis of
Thornton suggests, and as this Article will try to demonstrate, the legal community should be more
open to Tailoring because systematically ignoring the differences among the different levels of
government, as current doctrine does, leads to troubling consequences.24
 Sensitivity to what level of government is acting  – the conceptual core of Tailoring –  is
critical because the different levels of government are  sufficiently dissimilar that a particular
limitation as applied to one may have very different repercussions when applied to another.  It turns
out that, among other things, a categorical One-Size-Fits-All approach thwarts many of federalism’s
potential benefits.  Sometimes One-Size-Fits-All hamstrings the federal government, subjecting it
to constraints that are sensible for states or municipalities but not for our country’s central
government.  Other times, One-Size-Fits-All chokes off the benefits of  federalism by unnecessarily
subjecting sub-federal polities to strict and uniform limitations that make sense only in respect of
the federal government.
In short, constitutional analysis ignores at its own peril what level of government is acting
because the different levels of government systematically vary in important ways.  Ignoring these
differences simplifies constitutional analysis, to be sure –  but at a cost.   There is no reason to
8
believe as an a priori matter that the cost is smaller than the administrative costs of developing more
complex doctrine that takes account of systemic cross-polity differences.  The desirability of tailoring
constitutional doctrines to each polity requires an understanding of the opportunity costs of refusing
to do so, as well as the administrative costs of Tailoring.  This Article aims to identify both types of
costs.
The Article is in five parts.  Part I begins by formally defining One-Size-Fits-All and
Tailoring.  It shows that both within and outside of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court
virtually always adopts One-Size-Fits-All.  Part I’s analysis also clarifies  Tailoring’s precise
relationship to the incorporation controversy and to contemporary black letter doctrine.  Although
Tailoring has important applications outside the contexts of incorporation and reverse incorporation
(as shown by Thornton, for instance), Tailoring’s significant implications in respect of incorporation
and reverse incorporation merit such a clarification.  Among other things, Part I shows that deciding
the merits of Tailoring does not simply replay the incorporation debate of the 1950's and 1960's.
Indeed, Tailoring is fully consistent with selective incorporation, what emerged as the doctrinal
winner of that debate.
Part II shows that although today most multi-level constitutional principles are doctrinally
treated as One-Size-Fits-All, the Supreme Court has not made much of an effort to justify such an
approach.  Part II argues that the Court’s arguments for a categorical One-Size-Fits-All doctrine are
unconvincing.  Part II then surveys several scholars’ attempts to justify the contemporary One-Size-
Fits-All approach.   Part II concludes that there are two reasonably strong defenses for the status quo,
but that they are pragmatic rather than theoretical justifications.  As such, they do not support a
categorical One-Size-Fits-All doctrine.  Pragmatism invites consideration of the benefits and costs
9
of alternatives to a One-Size-Fits-All approach and holds out the prospect that deviations from One-
Size-Fits-All sometimes might be legitimate.
The Article’s next two parts explain why Tailoring is a plausible doctrinal option that should
be forthrightly considered, not dismissed out-of-hand by a categorical One-Size-Fits-All approach.
Part III provides a quasi-precedential argument that is designed to show that Tailoring is not as
foreign to American jurisprudence as may first appear.  Part III’s analysis is not (and cannot be) fully
precedential, of course, because contemporary doctrine is One-Size-Fits-All, as shown in Part II.
Nonetheless, it is instructive to understand that Tailoring has been propounded by a line of
distinguished Supreme Court Justices for more than 75 years; that Tailoring already is found in
several constitutional doctrines; and that some non-constitutional federal law reflects the logic of
Tailoring as it distinguishes among the federal, state, and sub-state governments.  This “precedent”
collectively suggests that doctrinal sensitivity to what level of government is acting – Tailoring’s
conceptual core – already can be found in American law.  Tailoring thus is not as novel as it might
first appear.
Part IV identifies five  respects in which the different levels of government might be
sufficiently different to justify Tailoring.  First, each level is susceptible to distinctive political
malfunctions.  Second, as a result of each level’s  particular geographical scope, identical restrictions
may have systematically different consequences across the different levels of government.   Third,
because there are divergent exit costs across the different levels of government, there might be
systematic variations with regard to whether and to what extent competition among polities can
generate efficient and diverse public goods.  Fourth, identical restrictions can have very different
consequences vis-a-vis democracy since each level of government requires a different number of
10
people to garner a majority and thereby translate its preferences into law.  Fifth, and finally, each
level of government may have certain distinctive responsibilities. 
Part IV explains that whether any or all of these differences justifies Tailoring a given
constitutional principle ultimately turns on what is best characterized as pre-constitutional, political
commitments.  Interestingly, however, a broad array of competing approaches to ordering social life
that often generates conflicting policy prescriptions – including public choice theory, law and
economics, Robert Nozick’s political philosophy, Ely’s process theory,  multi-culturalist theorists
Will Kymlicka and Charles Taylor, and  Rawlsian political thought – finds one or more of these
distinctions sufficient to support Tailoring.  While Part IV does not take a position on the ultimate
merits of these contested approaches to ordering social life, it does make the following point:  the
fact that many competing methodologies converge on the conclusion that Tailoring sometimes might
be desirable counsels that constitutional doctrine should be responsive to potential differences among
the various levels of government.  This is the predicate for concluding that today’s categorical One-
Size-Fits-All approach is unwise. 
Part V completes the Article’s pragmatic analysis of Tailoring by considering Tailoring’s
potential costs.  Although none gives rise to the conclusion that Tailoring is per se undesirable,
several are  very real countervailing considerations that are relevant to  determining whether a
particular constitutional provision should be Tailored.  In conjunction with the conclusions of Parts
III and IV, these potential costs to Tailoring suggest that contemporary doctrine should be modified,
but not totally abandoned:  One-Size-Fits-All should be downgraded from a categorical requirement
to a rebuttable presumption.  The recognition that Tailoring generates costs also heightens awareness
of the subjectivity  that invariably is involved in the choice between One-Size-Fits-All and Tailoring;
      25See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Equal Protection Incorporation, 88 VA. L. REV. 951, 968 (2002) (“Incorporation of
the Bill of Rights is one of the few great success stories of modern constitutional law.  Judges and constitutional scholars
almost universally agree that, whatever else it does or does not do, the Fourteenth Amendment makes most of the
provisions of the Bill of Rights applicable to the states and their subdivisions.”)
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trading-off between Tailoring’s potential benefits and costs is a determination that is not susceptible
to purely rational decisionmaking on account of the fact that Tailoring’s potential benefits and costs
are  incommensurable.   A short conclusion follows.
I.     ONE-SIZE-FITS-ALL AND TAILORING IDENTIFIED
This Part introduces a simple jurisprudential model that permits a precise definition of
Tailoring.  This Part shows that the contemporary doctrine, within Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence and more generally, is overwhelmingly of the One-Size-Fits-All character.  
Importantly, Part I’s model also precisely clarifies Tailoring’s relationship to the doctrines
of selective and reverse incorporation. Elucidating this relationship is important for three reasons.
First, although Tailoring has significant applications throughout constitutional law, it has extensive
relevance to Fourteenth and Fifth Amendment jurisprudence.  Second, the clarification rebuts the
misconception that advocacy of Tailoring is an invitation to revisit the incorporation controversy of
the 1950s and 1960s, a hard fought battle in which a clear victor has emerged.25  It is not, for
Tailoring is consistent with selective incorporation.  Third, putting Tailoring into jurisprudential and
historical perspective shows that Tailoring is less radical than it may sound at first.  Tailoring is best
understood as an alternative mode of selective incorporation that can realize many of the pragmatic
benefits of the contemporary doctrine  while shedding the doctrine’s theoretically unjustifiable and
unnecessarily cramping aspects.
A.     A Simple Jurisprudential Model.  Tailoring and One-Size-Fits-All are best understood
in relation to a simple jurisprudential model that identifies the character of constitutional doctrine
      26I developed this model in an earlier article.   See Mark D . Rosen, The Radical Possibility of Limited Community-
Based Interpretation of the Constitution, 43 WM . &  MARY L. REV. 927, 983 (2002).
      27E.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER , PLAYING BY THE RULES: A  PHILOS OP HICA L EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION
MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 102-04 & 104 n.35 (1991); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Econom ic Analysis ,
42 DUKE L. J. 557  (1992). 
      28Rosen, supra  note 18, at 623.
      29Id. at 623.
      30See Mark D. Rosen, Multiple Authoritative Interpreters of Quasi-Constitutional Federal Law:  Of Tribal Courts
and the Indian Civil Rights Act, 69 FO R DH A M  L. REV. 479, 490 (2000).
      31Id. at 490-91 & nn.42-50. Perhaps counterintuitively, identification of the Goal frequently is not what happens first
in time during the interpretive process. Once the G oal is identified, however, it affects subsequent doctrinal development.
Id. at 490 n.43.
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at any given point in time.26 The model builds on the commonly appreciated distinction between
“rules” and “standards.”27 Standards are legal edicts that describe the trigger of legal consequences
in “abstract terms that refer to the ultimate policy or goal animating the law.”28 Rules, by contrast,
are legal edicts that “describe the triggering event with factual particulars or other language that is
determinate within a community.”29
Now to the model. Constitutional provisions typically take the form of standards that require
active interpretation to identify concretely the actions that are required, permitted, or proscribed in
particular circumstances. The interpretive process can be usefully conceptualized as involving three
steps. Although the steps do not necessarily correspond to the chronology of the constitutional
provisions’ doctrinal development,30 identifying them is useful because they provide a means for
comparing legal doctrine.
First, the constitutional provision can be identified with a general “Goal,” by which I mean
a broad-stroke description of what the provision attempts to accomplish. The Goal sets the
parameters within which subsequent doctrinal development occurs.31 For example, the Goal of the
Fourth Amendment has been identified as protecting various “personal and societal values” including
      32Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177, 182-83 (1984). Although people typically view the contemporarily
understood Goal as inevitable, the Goal almost always is a non-axiomatic translation of the constitutional provision. That
is to say, a different Goal (or Goals) plausibly can be ascribed to the constitutional provision (and, frequently, have been,
as an historical matter) . Rosen, Of Tribal Courts, supra  note 29, at 490 & n.45.
      33See id. at 490 & n.46.
      34Cf.  Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 56, 57 (1997) (“Even when general
agreement exists that the Constitution reflects a particular value or protective purpose . . . the norms reflecting purposes
such as these are too vague to serve as rules of law; their effective implementation requires the crafting of doctrine by
courts.”).
      35California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 , 211 (1986) (emphasis added).
      36This process of utilizing case law to make standards more concrete is not logically necessary; some say, for
instance, that it does not occur in French law. B arry Nicholas, Introduction to the French Law of Contract, in CONTRACT
LAW TODAY : ANG LO-FRENCH  COM PA RISONS 7, 9-10 (Donald Harris & Denis Tallon eds., 1989).  It is, however, an
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a “right to privacy.”32 
The second step in the process is the creation of a “Legal Test” to determine whether the
identified Goal is met.33 This second step occurs because the Goal inevitably is too abstract, and
consequently, unworkable for the judiciary’s institutional needs of having a shorthand method for
decision making that identifies as legally relevant only a subset of the infinite facts that characterize
any given circumstance.34 The test almost always includes one or more “Standards.” For example,
the Supreme Court has translated the previously mentioned Fourth Amendment Goal into a Legal
Test composed of several Standards that ask whether “the individual manifested a subjective
expectation of privacy in the object of the challenged search” and whether society is “willing to
recognize that expectation as reasonable.”35 This Legal Test helps to particularize the Goal, but by
deploying Standards such as “expectation of privacy” and “reasonable,” it still leaves ample
uncertainty as to what concretely satisfies it.
Step three describes what occurs to the Legal Test’s Standard over time. As the Standard is
applied over a series of cases, it almost always becomes increasingly rule-like. This occurs because
cases, by their nature, are disputes that involve particular facts. As the cases are decided they become
showcases of what, as a concrete matter, the Standard requires.36 Step three’s product is best
accurate depiction of what happens under the United States’ common law method of constitutional adjudication. Strauss,
supra  note 202, at 877-906.
      37See Oliver, 466 U.S. at 177.
      38Id. at 209-10 (quoting Ciraolo , 476 U.S. at 211 (emphasis added)).
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               MODEL OF CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE
                            1.     Constitutional Provision
                    9
     2.               Goal  
                    9
    
LEGAL TEST                             3.              Standard
                                                  9
                            4.        Rulified Standard
identified as a “Rulified Standard.” For example, do people have a “subjective expectation of
privacy” in open fields? The Court has said no.37 In curtilage surrounded by a high double fence? Not
from a naked-eye observation made from an aircraft, according to the Court.38 
This simple model of interpretation can be graphically depicted as follows in Figure One:
FIGURE ONE
As we shall see, this simple model provides clarity with regard to the multifarious approaches
to understanding the constitutional limitations applicable to States that Justices have advocated since
the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.
B.     Four Approaches to Importing Constitutional Principles.  The issue of Tailoring arises
when a federal constitutional guarantee applies to more than one type of government (for example,
federal and state).  We first must be attentive, therefore, to the threshold question of what levels of
government are regulated by the Constitution.  There are five possible ways that a constitutional
      39One example is the Fourteenth Amendment’s citizenship  Clause, which the Court has held applies to both the State
and federal governments.  See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500 (1999).  For purposes of Tailoring, a provision that
explicitly references both the federal and state governments and provides different explicit directions to each does not
count.  See, e.g., U.S. CONST . ART. I (selection of Senators).  The doctrinal op tion of Tailoring that is this Article’s
subject does not arise if the Constitutional text already differentiates between different levels of government.
      40For example, the First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the  free exercise thereof . . .” U.S. CONST . AMEND. 1, § 1, cl. 1 (emphasis supplied). The First, Sixth, and
Seventh Amendments also explicitly address only the federal government.   
      41 32 U.S. 243  (1833).
      42See id. at  249-50. Chief Justice Marshall reasoned that the States each had established constitutions that defined
and limited their state governments, whereas the United States Constitution was designed to define and limit the powers
of the federal government, except where it explicitly applied to the States (as in Article I, section 10).   The Chief Justice
wrote that “Had Congress which proposed the amendments engaged in the extraordinary occupation of improving the
constitutions of the several states by affording the people additional protection from the exercise of power by their own
governments in matters which concerned themselves alone, they would have declared this purpose in plain and
intelligible language.  Id. at 250; see also id. at 247 (the Constitution’s “limitations on power . . . are naturally, and, we
think, necessarily applicable to the government created by the instrument,” and not to “distinct [state] governments,
framed by different persons and for different purposes”).
      43See U.S. CONST ., ART. I, §§9-10.
      44See U.S. CONST ., AMEND MENT XIV.
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principle might limit two or more levels of government.  First, a constitutional provision might
explicitly apply to several levels of government.  As it so happens, virtually none do.39 The bulk of
the United States Constitution applies by its terms only to the federal government.  For example,
many of the Bill of Rights by their terms address only the federal government,40 and the  landmark
case of Barron v. City of Baltimore41 famously held in 1833 that none of the Bill of Rights applied
to the sub-federal polities.42  Conversely, the provisions at the end of Article I apply by their terms
to the States, but not to the federal government.43
Barron’s rule unquestionably continued to be the law up to the adoption of the Civil Rights
Amendments.  The new amendments by their terms contained many new limitations on States.  But
what precisely was the requirement of “due process” and the curb that states not impinge on the
“privileges or immunities” of their citizens?44  And what relationship did these new limitations bear
to the constitutional constraints that applied to the federal government? 
 The jurisprudential model introduced above helps to distinguish four plausible approaches
      45302 U.S. 319 (1937).
      46That decision was Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904).  In fact, Kepner involved construction of federal
legislation applicable to the Philippine Islands that incorporated virtually all of the  Bill of Rights’ guarantees.  See id.
at 123-25.  The Kepner Court chose to construe this  statutory language in the same manner that it would have interpreted
the constitutional language.  Id. at 124-25.  Palko accordingly treated the constitutional question to have been settled  in
Kepner.  Palko, 302 U.S. at 323. Though Palko’s approach in this regard is beyond reproach, Kempner  could have
resolved the question before it differently.  Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that a twentieth century statute applicable
in Indian country that incorporates language of the Bill of Rights can be construed differently than the Bill of Rights.
See Rosen, Of Tribal Courts,  supra note 29, at 487.  
      47Palko, 302 U.S. at 322-23.
      48Id. at 323.
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to identifying constitutional limitations on the States in circumstances where the constitutional
limitation explicitly applies only to the federal government (and, mutatis mutandis, when exporting
to the federal government constitutional principles that by their terms apply to the States).  All four
approaches, we shall see, have been advocated by Justices at different points in time.  Two have
commanded majorities, and one is the current black letter law. Importantly, the four approaches also
are paradigms for the interpretation of those multi-level constitutional principles that are not
connected to either the Fourteenth or Fifth Amendment due process clauses.
1.     Fundamental Fairness.  The four approaches are best appreciated in relation to
a concrete constitutional guarantee.  Let us take the Fifth Amendment’s double jeopardy clause.  At
issue in Palko v. Connecticut45 was the constitutionality of a state statute that gave the government
the same right of appeal as the criminal defendant.  The Palko Court recognized that an earlier
Supreme Court decision46 had held that the protection again double jeopardy “was not confined to
jeopardy in a new and independent case” but “forbade jeopardy in the same case if the new trial was
at the insistence of the government and not upon defendant’s motion.”47  This principle meant that
a federal statute allowing the government a right of appeal from a conviction would violate  double
jeopardy.48   
The question presented in Palko was whether there is such a guarantee in state courts.
      49Id. at 323.
      50Id.  Justice Cardozo’s choice of the word “general” is significant, for he noted later in the Palko opinion that certain
constitutional rights were treated differently.  See infra Part I.A.3; see also Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 85
(Black, J., dissenting) (“[i]mplicit in this statement . . . is the understanding that some of the eight amendment do  apply
by their very terms.”).
      51Id. at 328 (internal quotation omitted).
      52See, e.g.,Jerold H. Israel, Selective Incorporation: Revisited, 71 GEO . L. J.  253, 257, 291 (1982).
      53See id.
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Writing for the Court, Justice Cardozo considered appellant’s argument that “[w]hatever would be
a violation of the original bill of rights (Amendments 1 to 8) if done by the federal government is
now equally unlawful by force of the Fourteenth Amendment if done by a state.”49  Justice Cardozo’s
answer was short and simple:  “There is no such general rule.”50  The question instead was what was
required by the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause, and that was answered by asking
whether the challenged practice “violate[d] those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which
lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions?”51  (The Court answered “no.”).  The Palko
Court’s method has been dubbed the “Fundamental Fairness” approach,52 and it commanded a
majority of the Supreme Court for nearly the first hundred years after the Fourteenth Amendment’s
enactment.53  
The following chart  illustrates this interpretive approach:
      54The Fourteenth Amendment’s privileges or immunities clause was not a doctrinal option due to the Court’s ruling
in the Slaughterhouse Cases.  See infra at 18 and following.
      55I include the term “necessarily” because it is always possible that the identical Goal, Standard, or Rulified Standard
could be imputed  to two d ifferent constitutional provisions.  The Court identified this possibility in the 1908 case of
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).  The Court stated that “it is possible that some of the personal rights
safeguarded by the first eight Amendments against national action may also be safeguarded  against state action . . . ”
Continued the Court, this was“not because those rights are enumerated in the first eight Amendments, but because they
are of such a nature that they are included in the conception of due process of law.”  Id. at 99.   The Court’s language
can be represented by the model as follows: although 1.S does not = 1.F, it is possible that  2.S = 2.F.
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Figure 2: Illustration of “Fundamental Fairness”
Model of Constitutional Doctrine Doctrine applicable to the Federal
Government
Doctrine Applicable to the State
Government, Approach 1 (Fundamental
Fairness): 
1.Constitutional Provision
           9




2.    Goal
           9
2.F:  “A man shall not be brought into
danger of his life for one and the same
offense more than once.”  Kepner, 195 U.S.
at 126.
2.S: makes certain that state procedures do
not violate those fundamental principles of
liberty and justice.
3.    Standard
           9
3.F:  No person can be “again tried for the
same offense.” Id. at 130.
3.S: Is the policy “so acute and shocking
that our polity will not endure it?”  Palko,
302 U.S. at 328. 
4.     Rulified Standard 4.F:  Government cannot appeal an
acquittal.
4.S: State can appeal from an acquittal.
Let the numbers (1, 2, 3, 4) represent each step in the jurisprudential model’s representation of
doctrinal development.   “F” signifies “federal” doctrine, and “S’ signifies “State.”  Under the first
approach, the constitutional language applicable to the States is “Due Process,” not “double
jeopardy.”54  In the model’s representation,
 1.S  1.F,
 2.S does not (necessarily55) = 2.F,
         3.S does not (necessarily) = 3.F, and
4.S does not (necessarily) = 4.F.
The different levels of government are governed by different constitutional language, and the legal
tests need not converge at any of the steps of the development of the two doctrines. 
In short, under the fundamental fairness approach, there necessarily is incongruity at the first
      56See, e.g. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 113-14 (1908)(assuming that a jury instruction allowing juries to
draw negative inference from a failure to testify would have violated the Fifth Amendment if administered in federal
court, but holding that such an instruction did not violate  the due process limitation that applied to the States); Maxwell
v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900) (holding that a state statute providing for 8 rather than 12 person jury was not
unconstitutional, despite the fact that the Sixth Amendment required 12 person juries in federal court); Betts v. Brady,
316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942) (holding that the due process clause was “less r igid and more fluid” than the Sixth
Amendment); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U .S. 25, 27 (1949) (holding that due process did not include the Fourth
Amendment’s exclusionary rule for illegally seized evidence).
      57For example, it was held that due process prevented states from taking private property for public use without
payment of just compensation, See Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1896), protected against “arbitrary
intrusion by the police,” see Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949), and sometimes required representation by
counsel. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).   For a  full discussion, see Israel, Selective Incorporation Revisited,
supra note 51, at 284.
      58332 U.S. 46 (1947).  Though not completely free from doubt, Justice Black’s dissent appeared to adopt the position
that all doctrinal details developed in the federal context applied equally to the States. See Id. at 86 (Black, J., dissenting)
(“Nothing in the Palko opinion requires that when the Court decides that a Bill of Rights’ provision is to be applied to
the States, it is to be app lied piecemeal.  Nothing in the Palko opinion recommends that the Court apply part of an
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step of analysis, and there can be complete incongruity at all steps (as was the case in Palko).
Fundamental Fairness thus was a legal regime in which the federal and sub-federal governments
frequently were subject to different constitutional limitations.56  Under Palko, for example, state
prosecutors could appeal acquittals whereas federal prosecutors could not.  States were subject to
a host of constitutional limitations under the fundamental fairness regime, but the touchstone was
what “fundamental fairness” required, not what limitations applied to the federal government.57 
2.     Total Incorporation.  A second plausible approach is the polar opposite of
Fundamental Fairness: to conclude that the language of the Fourteenth Amendment makes applicable
to the States all doctrines that were developed in the federal context.  In the model’s representation,
this would mean as follows:
 1.S = 1.F
 2.S = 2.F
         3.S = 3.F, and
4.S = 4.F
This is an example of what this Article identifies as a “One-Size-Fits-All” approach.  This was the
method famously advocated by Justice Black in the 1947 case of Adamson v. California.58  In the
amendment’s established meaning and discard that part which does not suit the current style of fundamentals.”).   Justice
Murphy’s dissent in Adamson attributed this position to Justice Black, when  he stated that he was “in substantial
agreement with the views of” Justice Black with only “one reservation and one addition,” addressed the question of
doctrinal details.  Id. at 124 (Murphy, J., dissenting).  The first sentence, which purports to specify the aspects of the
Black dissent with which he concurred, states “I agree that the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights should be carried
over intact into the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment.”  Id. (emphasis supplied).  The word “intact” is best
understood as referring to doctrinal details.  Commentators have understood Black’s dissent to encompass absorption
of both all Bill of Rights guarantees as well as all doctrinal details. See, e.g., Israel, Selective Incorporation Revisited,
supra note 51, at 257 (“The total incorporation position holds that the fourteenth amendment incorporates all of the B ill
of Rights guarantees and thereby applies those guarantees to state action in the same manner that they are applied to the
actions of the federal government.”) (emphasis supplied).
      59See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 392 U.S. 947, xx (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Israel, Selective Incorporation
Revisited, supra note 51, at 257.
      60See Israel, supra note 51, at 286-90.
      61See id. at 118-19 (Bradley, J., dissenting).   Justice Bradley argued that arguing that the privileges or immunities
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment included “the right of habeas corpus, the right of trial by jury, of free exercise of
religious worship, the right of free speech and a free press, the right peaceably to assemble for the discussion of public
measures, the right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures . . .” Id.  A subsequent opinion authored by
Justice Bradley raises questions as to whether he believed that the Fourteenth Amendment applied all Bill of Rights
protections against the States.  For a  complete d iscussion, see Israel, Selective Incorporation Revisited, supra note 51,
at 257 & n. 20. 
      62Interestingly, notwithstanding the decision in the Slaughterhouse Cases, in five subsequent cases the Court was
presented with arguments that the Fourteenth Amendment’s privileges or immunities clause made various bill of rights
protections applicable against the States. See In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 448 (1890); McElvine v. Brush, 142 U.S.
155, 159  (1891); O’Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 363 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581,
582 (1900); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).  The majorities reaffirmed Slaughterhouse in all these cases,
though  Justices Field, Harlan, and Brewer wrote  dissenting opinions in several of them, arguing that the Fourteenth
Amendment made the rights “enumerated  in the earlier Amendments” app licable against the states.  See, e.g., O’Neil
v. Vermont, 144  U.S. at 370  (Harlan, J., dissenting). (Justice Field and the first Justice Harlan penned dissents in O’Neil
v. Vermont.  See id. at 363  (Field, J., dissenting); id. at 370 (Harlan, J., dissenting, joined by Brewer, J.).  The first
Justice Harlan also wrote dissents in Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 605-17 (1900) (Harlan, J ., dissenting), and in
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. at 114-27 (Harlan, J., dissenting)).    In the 1908 case of Twining v. New Jersey , 211
U.S. 78 (1908), the Court acknowledged that several Justices long had espoused the view that the privileges or
immunities clause made the Bill of Rights applicable against the States, but declared that it was “not profitable to
examine the weighty arguments in its favor, for the question is no longer open in the Court.” Id. at 98. 
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Fourteenth Amendment context, the Court and commentators have dubbed this position “total
incorporation.”59 Although four Justices embraced this approach in Adamson, total incorporation
never commanded a majority of the Court.60  The functionally identical  approach was advocated by
Justice Bradley in the Slaughterhouse Cases, where he appeared to argue that the Fourteenth
Amendment’s privileges or immunities Clause made the Bill of Rights provisions applicable against
the States.61  However, the Slaughterhouse majority famously narrowed the scope of the privileges
or immunities clause in such a way that it could not serve this role,62 and Slaughterhouse is still good
      63See Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 274 (1960) (per curium) (Brennan, J., joining).
      64Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884) (holding that the grand jury right does not apply against the States).
      65See Minneapolis & St. Louis R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 , 217 (1916) (holding that the Seventh Amendment’s
civil jury trial right does not apply against the States).
      66See JOHN E. NOWAK &  RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CON STITU TION AL LAW  431(6 th ed. 2000).
      67See Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, 499 U .S. 1, 35 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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law.  In short, neither the privileges or immunities clause nor due process has ever been interpreted
to effectuate total incorporation.
3.     Selective Incorporation.  The third approach is illustrated by the contemporary
doctrine widely known as “selective incorporation” (though I soon shall suggest that this terminology
be slightly altered).  Whereas total incorporation contemplates that the Fourteenth Amendment
makes all Bill of Rights guarantees applicable against the States, not all Bill of Rights provisions
necessarily apply under selective incorporation.63  For instance, advocates of selective incorporation
have not campaigned for overturning long-established precedent holding that neither the Fifth
Amendment’s grand jury requirement64 nor the Seventh Amendment’s civil jury guarantee apply to
the States.65  Virtually all other Bill of Rights guarantees, however, have been held to be applicable
against the States under selective incorporation.66  And where a guarantee applies, so do all doctrinal
details that were developed in the federal context.
In practice, selective incorporation is not very different from total incorporation. Although
the selective incorporation decisions typically continued to ask whether a particular constitutional
guarantee was required under “fundamental fairness,” they applied the test far more liberally than
the Court had done during the “fundamental fairness” era.   Justices embracing selective
incorporation have concluded that the Constitution’s specific enumeration of a guarantee is virtually
conclusive evidence that the guarantee is “fundamental.”67  Moreover, where a guarantee is
incorporated against the States, the selective incorporation approach makes all doctrinal details that
      68395 U.S. 784 (1969).
      69See supra at p. 15.
      70Benton, 395 U.S. at 794.
      71Id. at 795.
      72Id. (emphasis supplied, internal quotation omitted).
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have been developed in the federal context applicable against the States, as well.  For these reasons,
the contemporary doctrine of selective incorporation is almost indistinguishable in practice from total
incorporation. 
The case of Benton v. Maryland,68 which reversed the Palko decision analyzed earlier,69
illustrates the contemporary doctrine of selective incorporation.  Benton revisited the question of
whether and to what extent the Fifth Amendment’s protection against double jeopardy applied to the
States.  The majority wrote that “this Court has increasingly looked to the specific guarantees of the
(Bill of Rights) to determine whether a state criminal trial was conducted with due process of law”70
and quickly  concluded that “[t]he fundamental nature of the guarantee against double jeopardy can
hardly be doubted”71 – in effect, that 1.S equals 1.F.  The Court then asserted that “[o]nce it is
decided that a particular Bill of Rights guarantee is fundamental to the American scheme of justice,
the same constitutional standards apply against both the State and Federal Governments.”72 The
analysis proceeds as follows for those constitutional guarantees that are deemed to apply against the
States under today’s doctrine of selective incorporation:
 1.S = 1.F
 2.S = 2.F
         3.S = 3.F, and
4.S = 4.F
Selective incorporation thus utilizes a “One-Size-Fits-All” approach for every constitutional
      73Even before selective incorporation’s adoption in the 1960s, the Court employed a One-Size-Fits-All approach in
its interpretation of many First Amendment guarantees beginning in the 1940s.   In 1943, for instance, the Court noted
“the special relationship of the Fourteenth Amendment to the rights of freedom of speech, press, and religion guaranteed
by the First.  We have repeatedly held that the Fourteenth Amendment has made applicable to the states the guaranties
of the First.”  Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 162 (1943). The Court went on to hold in that case that
“[a]llegations of fact sufficient to show deprivation of the right of free speech under the First Amendment are sufficient
to establish deprivation of a constitutional right guaranteed by the Fourteenth . . .” Id.  
This One-Size-Fits-All approach consistently drew dissents. See, e.g., Jeannette (Frankfurter dissent); Barnette,
319 U.S. at 647 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). The dissenters had the better of the argument.  The majority that embraced
One-Size-Fits-All with respect to the First Amendment rested their position on precedent.  See, e.g., Jeanette , 319 U.S.
at 162 .  The case law, however, hardly constituted  precedent for a One-Size-Fits-All approach.  The One-Size-Fits-All
Justices relied heavily on Justice Cardozo’s opinion in Palko, which stated that “the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment may make it unlawful for a state to abridge by its statutes the freedom of speech which the First Amendment
safeguards against encroachment by the Congress, or the like freedom of the press, or the free exercise of religion, or
the right of peaceable assembly.”  Palko, 302 U.S. at 324 .   Cardozo came to this conclusion, however, by means of a
fundamental fairness methodology, not a One-Size-Fits-All rationale that willy nilly resulted in the adoption of all
doctrinal details. Justice Cardozo wrote in Palko that the First Amendment guarantees “that are valid as against the
federal government by force of the specific pledges of particular amendments” were “valid as against the states” not
because they were enumerated in the Bill of Rights, but because they “have been found to be implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty, and  thus, through the Fourteenth Amendment, become valid as against the states.”  Palko, 302 U.S. at
324-25; see also id. at 326-27 (the Fourteenth Amendment “absorbed” the freedoms of “thought and speech” due to  the
“belief that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed,” not because such freedoms were specified in
the Bill of Rights). This rationale means that the general principles cross over to the State context, but it does not speak
to doctrinal details. Notwithstanding its tenuous grounding in precedent, a One-Size-Fits-All approach vis-a-vis many
First Amendment guarantees was securely in place during fundamental fairness’s heyday, twenty years before the
incorporation revolution.
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guarantee that is deemed to apply to the States.73   One-Size-Fits-All is the current black letter
doctrine in both selective incorporation and reverse incorporation.
4.     Tailoring: A Variant on Selective Incorporation.  The fourth and final doctrinal
approach is a variant of selective incorporation.  Like selective incorporation, the fourth approach
acknowledges that a guarantee’s specific enumeration in the Bill of Rights is strong evidence that
the guarantee is sufficiently fundamental to be applied against the States.  Unlike the contemporary
doctrine, however, the fourth approach contemplates that the doctrinal details developed in the
federal context might not all transfer over to the States.  In short, under this final approach,  
 1.S = 1.F
 2.S = 2.F, but
         3.S does not necessarily = 3.F, and
4.S does not necessarily = 4.F.
      74See infra Part II.A.  Justices Holmes, Jackson, Harlan advocated a similar approach, as will be discussed below.
See id.
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This is an example of what this Article dubs “Tailoring.”
Many Justices have advocated this fourth doctrinal approach, including Justices Fortas,
Stevens, Ginsburg, Powell, Rehnquist, and Thomas.74  In so doing, however, the Justices have not
clearly distinguished their method from the contemporary doctrine of selective incorporation.
Understanding this fourth possibility suggests that it is useful to distinguish between two types of
“selective incorporation:” (1) selective and undifferentiated incorporation and (2) selective and
differentiated incorporation.  Consistent with ordinary usage, “selective” refers to the fact that not
all Bill of Rights principles carry over to the States.  “Undifferentiated” means that where a given
principle is imported, all doctrinal details come along with it.  “Differentiated” incorporation refers
to a methodology that rejects the unreflective importation of all doctrinal details, though it does not
mean that the doctrinal details necessarily differ across the different levels of government.  
To summarize, selective and undifferentiated incorporation is a One-Size-Fits-All doctrine
that reflects contemporary black letter law.  Selective and differentiated incorporation, by contrast,
is an example of Tailoring, and it has not been adopted by a majority of the Court.
It is useful to graphically compare the four approaches.  Figure 3  arranges them, from left
to right, on the basis of increasingly equivalent treatment of the different levels of government:
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Figure 3: Four Approaches to Construing the 14th Amendment
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C.     One-Size-Fits-All Outside of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Although the Fourteenth
Amendment’s due process clause is the most frequently used doctrinal conduit for exporting
constitutional principles developed in the federal context to the States, it is important to bear in mind
that not all multi-level constitutional principles spring from the due process clause.  For instance,
the principle identified by the Supreme Court in the Thornton decision – that additional
qualifications for Congress violate a fundamental democratic principle – was not tied to the
Fourteenth Amendment. 
Whether a multi-level constitutional principle should be One-Size-Fits-All or Tailored
accordingly arises outside the context of incorporation.  As is the case with incorporation, the Court
virtually always opts for One-Size-Fits-All.  This is true of exports that originate from the  federal
      75526  U.S. 489, 500 (1999).  
      76See infra at Part II.A.
      77United States v. American Library Association, Inc., 123 S. Ct. 2297, 2303  (2003) (internal quotation and citations
omitted).   
      78123 S. Ct. 2297 (2003).
      79See id. at 2301-04.
      80See id. at 2314 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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side as well as the state side.  To illustrate the former, it was held in Thornton that additional
qualifications created by States are equally as problematic as those created by Congress.  With regard
to state exports, the Court in Saenz v. Roe75 held that the right to travel, which until then had been
applied only against the States, applied in identical measure to the federal government.76 
The Spending Clause is another doctrinal context where the Court has chosen One-Size-Fits-
All over Tailoring.  Though “Congress has wide latitude to attach conditions to the receipt of federal
assistance in order to further its policy objectives,” it “may not induce the recipient to engage in
activities that would themselves be unconstitutional.”77  The question for present purposes is whether
the measure of what is unconstitutional potentially varies depending upon what level of government
decides upon the regulation.  The answer is “no” under One-Size-Fits-All, and “yes” under Tailoring.
To illustrate, consider the recently decided case of United States v. American Library
Association.78  The Child Internet Protection Act (CIPA) required public libraries to use Internet
filters as a condition for the receipt of federal subsidies.   Filters are to prevent minors from obtaining
access to harmful materials.  Due to technological limitations, however, the filters block access to
materials that are neither harmful to children nor to adults.79  Moreover, there are alternatives to the
filters that could accomplish CIPA’s goal of protecting minors without blocking access to the non-
harmful materials.80  
Six Justices analyzed the statute with a One-Size-Fits-All jurisprudence.  The question for
      81See id. at 2303 & n. 2 (“we must ask whether the condition that Congress requires would be unconstitutional if
performed by the library itself”(plurality, internal quotation and citation omitted)); 2320 (“The question for me, then,
is whether a local library could itself constitutionally impose these restrictions . . .”) (Souter, J., dissenting, joined by
Ginsburg, J.).  The major difference between these Justices’ analysis was as follows:  while the p lurality concluded that
using the filters was analogous to a library’s collection decision, which is subject only to ra tional basis scrutiny, see id.
at 2306-07, Justice Souter (joined by Justice Ginsburg) believed the filters more akin to a library’s decision to refuse
certain patrons access to materials it already had in its collection, a censorship decision triggering strict scrutiny that
filtering technology could not satisfy.  See id. at 2320-2322; id. at 2321 (“The proper analogy therefore is not to passing
up a book that might have been bought; it is either to buying a book and then keeping it from adults lacking an acceptab le
‘purpose,’ or to buying an encyclopedia and then cutting out pages with anything thought to be unsuitable for all
adults.”).
      82Id. at 2312-13 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Justices Souter and Ginsburg, by contrast, believed these libraries’ activities
to have been unconstitutional.
      83Id. at 2313 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
      84Id.; see also id. at 2314-15 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
      85Id. at 2318 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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them was whether a local public library could have constitutionally decided to install the filters.81
Justice Stevens expressly rejected the methodology embraced by the plurality and the Souter and
Ginsburg dissents and instead adopted what this Article dubs Tailoring.  Stevens “agree[d] with the
plurality that it is neither inappropriate nor unconstitutional for a local library to experiment with
filtering software as a means of curtailing children’s access to Internet Web sites displaying sexually
explicit images.”  Stevens accordingly “agree[d] with the plurality that the 7% of public libraries that
decided to use such software on all of their Internet terminals in 2000 did not act unlawfully.”82   But,
continued Justice Stevens,  “[w]hether it is constitutional for the Congress of the United States to
impose that requirement on the other 93%, however, raises a vastly different question.”83  That is
to say, a local library’s decision to install an Internet filter implicates the Constitution differently than
the federal government’s requirement that local libraries install such filters.  The federal act
“operates as a blunt nationwide restraint” whereas the library’s decision is a decision by the locality
that can be tailored to fit local circumstances.84  Thus, whereas Justice Stevens agreed that a local
library’s decision to install filters is constitutional, he concluded that Congress’ indirect imposition
of a nationwide requirement was not.85 
      86The plura lity quoted language from South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U .S. 203 (1987), that was intended by the  plurality
to suggest that the question already had been decided.  See American Library, 123 S. Ct. at 2303 & n.2.  However, the
choice between One-Size-Fits-All and Tailoring was not an issue that was decided in that case.  Although the linguistic
formulation of Dole’s unconstitutionality prong more readily lends itself to One-Size-Fits-All than to Tailoring, that alone
is not appropriately treated as deciding the question, particularly in view of the strong functionalist reasons Justice
Stevens offers as to why an identical regulatory decision made by different levels of government might have very
different constitutional implications.
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Justice Stevens’ dissent thus spotlights the choice between One-Size-Fits-All and Tailoring
that inheres in Spending Clause doctrine.   Neither the plurality nor Justice Souter explained their
selection of One-Size-Fits-All.86  Nor did they explain why Justice Stevens’ approach was mistaken.
It is not important for present purposes to consider which approach is correct, but to see that the
contemporary doctrine reflects an One-Size-Fits-All approach.  As will be shown in the next Part,
the Court’s failure to provide a justification for One-Size-Fits-All in the Spending Clause context
is characteristic of the Court’s tendency to reflexively adopt One-Size-Fits-All as if there were no
alternative.
II.     THE (ULTIMATELY) PRAGMATIC GROUNDS FOR ONE-SIZE-FITS-ALL
This Part II shows that the few justifications that the Supreme Court has  offered for One-
Size-Fits-All are inadequate. When the Court shifted from fundamental fairness to selective
incorporation, it did not appear to appreciate that a choice had to be made about whether the
imported principles were going to be One-Size-Fits-All or Tailored.  The factors that led to the
rejection of fundamental fairness in favor of selective incorporation did not likewise counsel the
adoption of One-Size-Fits-All over Tailoring.   Outside the context of incorporation, the Court also
has neglected to provide adequate justifications for  its selection of One-Size-Fits-All over Tailoring.
As this Part II explains, the Court’s unreflective adoption of One-Size-Fits-All probably is the
outgrowth of a highly intuitive, but largely inaccurate, conception of constitutional rights.  In the end,
      87U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 820 (1995).  For more d iscussion of Thornton, see infra Part
IV.D.1.
      88See Anderson v. Roe, United States Supreme Court Amicus Brief, 1998 WL 798866, *8*-*11(noting that
“Congress has considered and acted on a question affecting the freedom of interstate migration–  a freedom that has
special structural characteristics and is in important respects a right of national citizenship, as to which Congress stands
in a different relation to individual citizens than do the legislatures of the several States” and arguing that federal
regulations accordingly  should be subjected to lower level scrutiny)(emphasis supplied).
      89526 U.S. 489, 500 (1999).
      90See Anderson v. Roe, United States Supreme Court Amicus Brief, 1998 WL 798866, *8*-*11.
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there are several strong justifications for One-Size-Fits-All, but they are pragmatic considerations
rather than categorical imperatives.  They accordingly do not justify today’s doctrine of categorical
One-Size-Fits-All.  
A.     The Disappointing Search for a Justification.   Outside of incorporation, the Court’s
justifications for treating multi-level constitutional provisions as One-Size-Fits-All have amounted
to no more than ipse dixit.   In Thornton, the case concerning the constitutionality of term limits, the
Court merely asserted that “the source of the qualification is of little moment in assessing the
qualification’s restrictive impact.”87 In Saenz v. Roe, the Court answered the United States
government’s argument that the right to travel should be Tailored as between the federal and state
governments88 with the unresponsive rejoinder that “the protection afforded to the citizen by the
Citizenship Clause of [the 14th A] is a limitation on the powers of the National Government as well
as the States.”89  This is unresponsive because the U.S. government conceded that the right-to-travel
limited the federal government, arguing only that the doctrinal details might vary as between the
federal and state governments because “Congress stands in a different relation to individual citizens
than do the legislatures of the several States,”90 and the Court’s explanation constitutes absolutely
no justification whatsoever for rejecting Tailoring in favor of One-Size-Fits-All.  Only by failing to
appreciate the distinction between selective and undifferentiated incorporation, on the one hand, and
selective and differentiated incorporation, on the other, can the Court’s response in Saenz be
      91See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995) (internal quotation omitted).  For further
discussion of Adarand, see infra Part III.B.1.
      92This is not surprising, for it is widely appreciated that the Court has offered scant justification for selective
incorporation itself, much less for having chosen one form of selective incorporation over another. See Israel, Selective
Incorporation Revisited, supra note 51, at 301 (“the Court has yet to offer a full-fledged exposition of the doctrine’s
underlying justifications”); Henry Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CAL. L. REV. 929,
934 (1965) (“[i]t does seem extraordinary that a theory going to the very nature of our Constitution and having such
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misconstrued as a justification for the doctrine that the Court embraced.
Although the question of whether a multi-level constitutional principle should be One-Size-
Fits-All or Tailored clearly arises outside the context of incorporation – as seen, for instance, in
Thornton and in Saenz – outside the Fourteenth Amendment this question arises only on a right-by-
right basis that readily can escape scrutiny.  Incorporation, by contrast, is a high profile, trans-
substantive doctrine where the question of whether multi-level principles should be Tailored
repeatedly occurs.  For these reasons, it may be thought that solid justifications for One-Size-Fits-All
can be found in the incorporation case law, and that the caselaw outside of incorporation implicitly
relies on those justifications when it reflexively selects One-Size-Fits-All.  
Case law in the incorporation context, however, has not been more illuminating.  When the
Supreme Court recently replaced a Tailored equal protection doctrine with the One-Size-Fits-All
doctrine of “congruence” in the Adarand case over Justices Stevens and Ginsburg’s dissent that
urged continuation of Tailoring, the majority simply asserted that “[e]qual protection analysis in the
Fifth Amendment area is the same as that under the Fourteenth Amendment.”91 
The paucity of recent justifications cannot be explained by the presence of a definitive
justification for One-Size-Fits-All that was delivered in an earlier incorporation decision.  The
justifications the Court offered for rejecting fundamental fairness and adopting selective
incorporation do not go to the question of whether the Bill of Rights principles that are imported
through the portal of the Fourteenth Amendment are One-Size-Fits-All or Tailored.92 Consider three
profound effects for all of us should be carrying the day without ever having been explicated in a majority opinion of
the Court.”); see also Dorf, Equal Protection Incorporation,  supra note 24, at 969 (“As a matter of principle, there is
much that is wrong with the argument that the enumeration of a right in one of the first eight amendment requires its
application against the states”).
      93To quickly summarize several of the major textual critiques: (1) substantive due process is oxymoronic; see Dorf,
supra note 24, at 969; (2) attributing such substantive meaning to the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause makes
the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause redundant (insofar as such substantive protections already apply to the federal
government via the B ill of Rights) , id. at 969; (3) and “[i]t would be extraordinarily strange for a Constitution to convey
such specific commands in such a round-about and inexplicit way” as through the due process clause.  Adamson v
California, 332 U.S. 46, 63 (1946) (Frankfurter , J., concurring).  
      94 See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68-123 (Black, J., dissenting).  Further, it has been argued that there is
historical evidence to suggest that some of the Fourteenth Amendment’s framers intended that the privileges or
immunities clause would  authorize Congress to compel the States to abide by the bill of rights.   See M ICHA EL KENT
CURTIS , NO STATE SHA LL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMEND MENT AND  THE B ILL OF RIGHTS 81-82 (1986).  
      95To the extent the historical evidence supports the view that the privileges or immunities clause was intended to make
the bill of rights applicable to the States, the evidence supports total incorporation, not selective incorporation.  See
Israel.
      96  See, e.g., John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L. J. 1385, 1387 -88
(1992)(arguing that privileges or immunities Clause was an equality-based, rather than a substantive-based, constitutional
protection:  “The main point of the clause is to require that every state give the same privileges and immunities of state
citizenship-the same positive law rights of property, contract, and so forth-to all of its citizens.”); see also DAVID P.
CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 1789-1888, at 342-51 (1985)(same).
In any event, all these scholars’ understandings of the privileges or immunities clause remain mere theoretical inquiry
for so long as the Court’s early holding in the Slaughterhouse Cases remains good law.
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possible justifications: text, history, and precedent.  Textually, neither “due process” nor “privileges
or immunities” answers the question: “due process” is a phrase that hardly appears to refer to the
notion that Bill of Rights principles apply to the States,93 and even though the privileges or
immunities clause may be a more plausible candidate than due process for incorporating the Bill of
Rights,94 the privilege or immunity clause’s  language does not speak to whether the doctrinal details
developed in the federal context  (steps 3.F and 4.F) should be applied to the states.  Historically,
even if there is  evidence to support the view that the framers intended the privileges or immunities
clause to incorporate the bill or rights95 – what is an issue of enduring dispute96 – the evidence is
silent as regards the question of whether steps 3.F and 4.F were intended to transfer to the States.
(The absence of textual and historical guidance in resolving the choice between One-Size-Fits-All
and Tailoring is not surprising.  The doctrinal details found at steps 3 and 4 constitute the
      97See Fallon, Implementing the Constitution, supra note 33, at 57, 61-67.  The Religious Freedom Restoration Act
is a rare exception.
      98History is most likely to be  illuminating vis-a-vis Steps 3 and 4 in respect of categorical Legal Rules.  Consider
the rule that the federal government is categorically prohibited from requiring state executive officials to apply federal
law.  See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997).  A showing that the federal government actually did exercise
such powers vis-a-vis states in the past would be relevant to determining whether a categorical rule comports with
original understanding. 
      99See Israel, supra note 51, at 302-03. (“It may seem strange that a doctrine that resulted in the overruling of so many
decisions has been justified  by reference to prior precedent, but several Justices have offered precisely that justification
for the selective incorporation doctrine.”).  Once selective incorporation was established, the Court openly acknowledged
that its adoption had necessitated the abandonment of precedent.   See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 793-95 (1969)
(“Palko’s roots had thus been cut away years ago.  We today only recognize the inevitable.”).
      100See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 346-47 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring) (describing fundamental
fairness approach as the “view that a guarantee of the Bill of Rights that is made applicable to the States by reason of
the Fourteenth Amendment is a lesser version of the same guarantee as applied to the Federal Government . . .”)
(emphasis supplied); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1964) (holding that Court had “rejected the notion that the
Fourteenth Amendment applies to the States only a ‘watered-down,’ subjective version of the individual guarantees of
the Bill of Rights”).
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implementation of constitutional norms, which typically falls to courts, not legislatures.97  Most of
the time, therefore, text and historical understandings are unlikely to shed light on the doctrinal
details of steps 3 and 4.98)  Finally, as regards precedent, the champions of selective incorporation
could hardly have grounded their position on the earlier decided case law, which created the
fundamental fairness regime that selective incorporation disassembled.99  Precedent accordingly
could not have been the basis for selecting One-Size-Fits-All instead of Tailoring.
B.     The “Watering-Down” Thesis and the Structure of Rights. The Court has offered one
justification in the incorporation context specifically aimed at defending One-Size-Fits-All: that
doing otherwise would lead to  “watered-down” constitutional rights.100  Although the Court never
went beyond this assertion to explain the theory behind it, I suspect that these words resonate with
the intuitions of many.  I shall dub this the “watering down” thesis.  This section unpacks the thesis’
unanalyzed assumption that the scope of a right defined in relation to limiting the federal government
automatically carries over to other levels of government.  It suggests that the watering down thesis
is premised on a conception of constitutional rights that is widely held but largely inaccurate as a
      101See Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights are not Trumps: Social M eanings, Expressive Harms, and Constitutionalism,
27  J. LEGA L STUD. 725, 727-78 (1998) [hereinafter “W hy Rights are not Trumps”]; see also Frederick Schauer and
Richard H. Pildes, Electoral Exceptionalism and the First Amendment, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1803, 1809-19 (1997).  Jeremy
Waldron has responded that although many people hold the view that rights are categorical trumps and attribute that
notion to Dworkin, Dworkin himself does not hold such a view.  See Jeremy Waldron, Pildes on Dworkin’s Theory of
Rights, 29 J. LEGA L STUD. 301, 306 & n. 22 (2000); but see Richard H. Pildes, Dworkin’s Two Conceptions of Rights,
29 J. LEGA L STUD. 309 (2000) (responding that such a categor ical trump conception is reflected in Dworkin’s early
writings).  Regardless of what Dworkin’s precise conception of rights might be, Waldron does not  dispute Pildes’ claim
that  Dworkin’s work has “played an important role in fueling” the widespread view in contemporary political culture
that constitutional rights are categorical trumps.  See Pildes, Dworkin’s Two Conceptions,  29 J. LEGA L STUD. at 311;
Waldron, 29 J. LEGA L STUD. at 306 & n. 22. 
      102Pildes, Why Rights are not Trumps, supra note 100, at 727-28.
      103See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, The Heterogeneity of Rights , 6 LEGA L THEORY  269, 271(2000) (defining a “right,
simpliciter” R as meaning that “R provides a shield against all interferences with any conduct C that constitutes an
exercise of R.”).
      104See Pildes, Why Rights are not Trumps, supra note 100, at 727-728 (showing that this categorical understanding
of rights as trumps is held by Michael Sandel, Allan Hutchinson, Charles Taylor, and Seymour Martin Lipset).
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purely descriptive matter.  A more sophisticated conception that more accurately explains
constitutional rights in this country undermines the assumption on which the watering down thesis
rests.
One influential conception of rights, frequently associated with Ronald Dworkin, views rights
as categorical trumps enjoyed by individuals as against majoritarian preferences.101  On this view,
rights carve out spheres of immunity from governmental regulation so that individuals may engage
in the  activities that rights protect.102  A similar conception is present in those who speak of
constitutional rights as being “rights, simpliciter” that guarantee that certain privileged conduct can
occur.103  Much language in the Court’s opinions is consistent with this conception of rights, and this
conception is widely held.104
It quite naturally follows from this conception that the sphere of immunity a right creates
should be equally impregnable by all levels of government.  After all, if rights create spheres of
immunity from regulation, it would contradict the very concept of a right to allow any level of
government to regulate matters within this realm. Such conceptions of rights thus readily lead to
      105Matthew D . Adler, Rights Against Rules: The Moral Structure of American Constitutional Law, 97 MICH . L. REV.
1, 13 (1998).  Richard Pildes has advanced a similar conception of rights.  See Pildes, Why Rights are not Trumps, supra
note 100, at 729-30 (discussed below in text).
      106See Johnson v. Texas, 491 U .S. 397 (1989).
      107Matthew D . Adler, Personal Rights and Rule-Dependence: Can the Two Coexist?, 6 LEGA L THEORY  337, 344
(2000).
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One-Size-Fits-All.  I suspect that this understanding of rights underlies the watering down thesis,
though I admittedly cannot prove it since the Court has done nothing more than to assert the thesis.
 I also imagine that such a view, whether explicit or unstated, undergirds the intuition held by many
that One-Size-Fits-All is the only intelligible approach to incorporation.   
A competing conception of constitutional rights views rights as “shields against particular
[governmental] rules.”105  Such “rights-against-rules” do not guarantee that particular conduct can
occur, but guarantee only that conduct cannot be regulated by certain forms of governmental action.
For instance, while the government may not proscribe the “desecrat[ion] [of a] . . . state or national
flag,”106 the identical flag burning activity can be prohibited “pursuant to a rule against arson, assault,
the destruction of government property, pollution, or some other such rule that was not targeted at
speech.”107  The Constitution thus does not guarantee a state of the world in which a person can burn
an American flag.  It only guarantees that the proscription will not assume a form that singles out
the expressive activity of flag-burning.  Burning a flag hence is not a “right, simpliciter,” but a
“right-against-rule.”
Jurisprudential scholars who analyze the structure of rights concur that both types of rights
– rights simpliciter and rights-against-rules – are found in American law.  For example, the
Constitution’s ban on slavery is a “right[] not to have certain states of the world exist rather than [a
      108Dorf, Heterogeneity, supra note 102, at xx.
      109Matthew Adler, the strongest proponent of the rights as “rights against rules”  thesis, acknowledges this.  See
Matthew D. Adler, Rights, Rules, and the Structure of Constitutional Adjudication: A Response to Professor Fallon, 113
HARV. L. REV. 1371, 1374-75 (2000).
      110See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113 HARV. L. REV.
1321, 1325 (2000); Dorf, Heterogeneity, supra note 102, at (agreeing that “rights as rights against rules is a plausible
first-order approximation of much Supreme Court doctrine”).
      111Pildes,Why Rights are not Trumps, supra note 100, at 729.
      112Id. at 729.
      113See Pildes,Why Rights are not Trumps, supra note 100, at 736-742.
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] right[] not to be judged by certain kinds of rules”108 and accordingly creates a right, simpliciter.109
The flag burning case, by contrast, creates a right-against-rule.110  The jurisprudential dispute thus
is one of degree rather than kind.
As a purely descriptive matter, most constitutional rights in the United States fit the structure
of a right-against-rules.  “[G]overnments can infringe even the most fundamental rights if its
justifications are sufficiently ‘compelling’ and the means used are the least restrictive available.”111
 As such, “[r]ights are not general trumps against appeals to the common good” or creators of
spheres of immunity from government regulation that guarantee a certain state in the world, but
instead are “better understood as channeling the kinds of reasons government can invoke when it acts
in certain arenas.”112  This structure of rights explains  the widespread reality that Congress and the
States can regulate such constitutionally protected matters as speech and abortion.113 Constitutional
rights of the right-against-rule form do not categorically remove matters from majoritarian politics,
but simply condition regulation on the presence of better-than-ordinary reasons for regulating and
better-than-ordinary line-drawing when actually undertaking the regulation.  Constitutionally
permissible regulations of speech and abortion are difficult to reconcile, by contrast, with the
conception of rights as creating spheres of immunity from regulation.
Importantly, the right-against-rules conception does not ineluctably lead to the watering-
      114Id. at 739 ; see also Schauer and Pildes, Electoral Exceptionalism , supra note 100, at 1814-1819 (similar).
      115Id.
      116See Mark D . Rosen, Our Nonuniform Constitution: Geographical Variations of Constitutional Requirements in the Aid of
Community, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1129, 1152-56 (1999). 
      117See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 739, 759 (1974).
      118See Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980) (upholding Air Force regulation requiring members of the service to
obtain approval from commanders before circulating petitions on Air Force bases).
      119 See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 837-38 (1976).
      120For more on this, see Rosen, Our Nonuniform Constitution, supra note 115, at 1152-56.
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down thesis in the way that the rights simpliciter conception does. To the contrary, the right-against-
rules structure provides prima facie support for Tailoring.  Here is how.   Once it is understood that
rights invite special types of justifications, the question arises as to what types of justifications
suffice to justify regulation.  It has been argued that “context” plays a “crucial role” in determining
what justifications suffice.114  Government creates different “institutional space[s],”115 and arguments
that are sufficient to justify regulation in one context might not be satisfactory in another. 
This seems right.  Such an approach helps explain pockets of constitutional doctrine that are
inexplicable under a categorical rights-as-trumps approach.  For example, military officials are part
of the federal government, and they are governed by the First Amendment.116  Yet they are permitted
to proscribe speech that is merely “intemperate, . . . disloyal, contemptuous and disrespectful,”117
enact prior restraints,118 and to ban private citizens’ political speech119 – regulations that would not
be permissible for other governmental actors.   How is it possible that identical constitutional
language – in this case, “free speech” – can mean different things in respect of different
governmental actors?  Theoretically indefensible under a categorical rights-as-trumps account, such
regulations are comprehensible under a right-against-rules conception: context matters, and the
institutional space known as the military has institutional characteristics very different from general
society that accordingly may permit justifications for regulation that impermissible elsewhere.120  In
fact, this is the precise rationale that the Supreme Court has provided for the unusual constitutional
      121Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 759 (1974) ; see also Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U .S. 503, 507 (1986) ("Our
review of military regulations challenged on First Amendment grounds is far more deferential than constitutional review
of similar laws or regulations designed for civilian society").
      122Parker, 417 U.S. at 758.
      123See, e.g., Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (speech);  Vernonia School District 47J
v. Acton 515 U.S. 646  (1995)(search and seizure), discussed in  Rosen, Our Nonuniform Constitution, supra note 115,
at 1159-61.
      124See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987)(adopting prison-specific First Amendment doctrine); see also
Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 407-10 (1989). 
      125See Rosen, Our Nonuniform Constitution, supra note 115, at 1142-47, 1152-56 (dubbing variations at 3.F. “re-
standardizing” and variations at 4.F “tailoring”).
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doctrines that apply to the military: the Court has explained that ‘the different character of the
military community and of the military mission requires a different application of  [constitutional]
protections’121 and that “fundamental necessit[ies]” of the military “may render permissible within
the military that which would be constitutionally impermissible outside it.”122 
The understanding that many constitutional rights are rights-against-rules whose justifications
for regulation frequently are context-sensitive explains several other pockets of oddly performing
constitutional doctrine found in American law that are instructive to Tailoring. Like the military,
public school officials are permitted to regulate speech and to conduct searches in ways that mill run
government employees cannot.123  The same is true of prison officials.124   In all these contexts,
identical constitutional language requires different things of different government officials.  In the
military, military officials are members of the federal  government, and the doctrines that apply to
the military differ at levels 3.F and 4.F.125  Sometimes, that is, 
      126For example, at a time when government regulations interfering with the free exercise of religion were analyzed
under heightened scrutiny, the Court adopted a far more deferential reasonableness test when analyzing military
regulations – a variation at the level of 3.F and thereafter at 4.F.  In Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986), the
Court ruled that instead of requiring restrictions affecting religious practice to be justified by a compelling governmental
interest (as was required by the then-applicable test of Sherbert v. Verner, 374U.S. 398, 406 (1963)), the Court held that
the military only had to show that its regulations were “reasonabl[e] and evenhanded[].”  Goldman, 475 U.S. at 509-10.
The Court forthrightly acknowledged that it the military was being subjected to a different legal test than applied to other
levels of government, stating that  “[o]ur review of military regulations challenged on First Amendment grounds is far
more deferential than constitutional review of similar laws or regulations designed for civilian society.”  Id. at 507.
      127For example, the Court applied a far more deferential legal test to school administrators than applies to virtually
all other government officials in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).  Unlike the strict
standard of review ordinarily applied to the censorship of “potentially sensitive topics” and unacceptable viewpoints,
the Hazelwood Court determined that school officials were “entitled to regulate the  contents” of  school newspapers “in
any reasonable manner.”  Id. at 270.  In the language of this Article’s model, 3.S.3.F and 4.S.4.F.    As with military
law, the Court has justified these variations on the basis of the unique institutional characteristics of public schools.  The
Court wrote that public schools must have the power to “refuse to sponsor student speech that might reasonably be
perceived to advocate drug or alcohol use, irresponsible sex, or conduct otherwise inconsistent with the shared values
of a civilized social order” or that “[o]therwise, the schools would be unduly constrained  from fulfilling their role as a
principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values . . . ” Id. at 272 .  See generally Rosen, Our Nonuniform
Constitution, supra note 115, at 1159-61.
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3.F(mill run federal actors) 3.F(military), and/or 
4.F(mill run federal actors) 4.F(military).
126 
Public schools are a form of local government, to which the Fourteenth Amendment applies, and the
doctrines that apply to school officials also sometimes differ at the third and fourth levels of doctrine.
Sometimes, that is,  
3.F(mill run federal actors) 3.S(public school officials), and/or 
4.F(mill run federal actors) 4.S(public school officials).
127  
In short, the constitutional doctrines that apply to the military and to public schools
demonstrate that the doctrinal details of levels 3 and 4 do not invariably apply to all forms of
government.  Such variations are readily explainable as the natural consequence of the fact that these
different types of governments (military, the schools) constitute different institutional contexts.
Insofar as the doctrines associated with constitutional rights determine the types of reasons that
provide a predicate for governmental regulation of the protected rights, it is not surprising that what
constitutes a justifiable reason for regulation will vary from institutional context to context.
      128Schauer & Pildes, Electoral Exceptionalism , supra note 100, at 1816.
      129Id. at 1824.
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Consequently, what is constitutionally permissible may vary from institutional context to context,
as well. 
The role of institutional context in determining what justifications suffice to support
regulation is not limited to the unusual doctrines that govern the military and public schools.
Frederick Schauer and Rick Pildes have argued at length, for example, that mainstream First
Amendment jurisprudence comprises multiple highly context-specific doctrines.  Looking first to
the political institution of elections, they note that 
elections are already highly structured spheres, including regulations that would be
impermissible in the general domain of public discourse.  There are limits on what voters
are permitted to express at the ballot box; mandatory disclosure obligations on the identity
of political speakers; content-based regulations of electoral speech, ranging from mundane
constraints like electioneering near polling places to more dramatic ones, like selective bans
on contributions from some speakers . . . 128
They then argue that such doctrinal “exceptionalism” is not unique to elections but in fact is
generally characteristic of the First Amendment’s political speech doctrine.  They conclude that
“[a]ll regulations of political speech are thus already measured by domain-specific, institution-
specific, sometimes media-specific, and generally context-specific First Amendment principles –
rather than some undifferentiated, ‘general’ First Amendment rule.”129 
All this has critical consequences for Tailoring.  Tailoring is just another example of the
context-sensitize application of those constitutional principles that are best characterized as rights-
against-rules.  The predicate for Tailoring constitutional guarantees to the different levels of
government is that each level may constitute a sufficiently different institutional context such that
doctrinal variations at the levels of 3 and/or 4 are legitimate.  Whether any particular doctrine is
      130See Adler, Rights Against Rules, supra note 104, at 7; Dorf, Heterogeneity, supra note 102, at 272 & n. 14.
      131Professor Fallon has suggested that “not all rights fit this framework at all,” Fallon, As Applied, supra note 109,
at 1366 , though he seems to concede that most rights are either rights simpliciter or rights-against-rules.
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appropriately Tailored vis-a-vis any particular level of government is inevitably highly context-
specific, and accordingly falls outside of this Article’s scope.  As Part IV  discusses, however,
several generic considerations suggest that the federal, state, and local levels of government are
sufficiently different such that the possibility of doctrinal variations at the levels of 3 and 4 as among
these different levels of governments deserves serious consideration. 
This analysis thus demonstrates the weakness of the watering-down thesis with respect to
constitutional rights best characterized as rights-against-rules.  The possibility that different levels
of government are sufficiently different to require different justifications for regulating rights is what
makes the unstated assumption that doctrinal details need apply equally across all institutional
contexts wrong vis-a-vis such constitutional rights.  On the other hand, the watering-down thesis is
valid as against constitutional rights that fit the pattern of a right, simpliciter.
Consequently, it is important to distinguish constitutional rights that fit the structure of a
right, simpliciter from those that constitute a right-against-rules.  Commentators concur that both
forms of rights are found in American constitutional law.  There also is considerable agreement as
to the rights that comprise each structure; for instance, that the Thirteenth Amendment’s ban on
slavery creates a right, simpliciter.  Several have suggested that torture is another.130  Given the fact
that there is not a unity structure to constitutional rights, but that they can assume two different
forms,131 it seems likely that in most cases “whether a right should be conceptualized as a right-
against-rules or as a right, simpliciter, turns principally on substantive considerations about the
      132Dorf, Heterogeneity, supra note 102, at 272.  It accordingly is not surprising that there are disagreements on both
positive and normative grounds as to which pattern particular rights fit.   See, e.g., Fallon, As Applied, supra note 109,
at 1366 (citing as an example of “rights that do  not fit the rights-against rules paradigm” that “a criminal or civil
defendant always has a right to procedural due process” and noting that “although this right could possibly be represented
as a series of rights against particular rules that violate due process, or as a right against putative general rules authorizing
criminal and civil proceedings insofar as they fail to preclude due process violations, more would be lost than gained
by so attenuated an account.”).
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particular right, rather than any deep fact about the structure of rights.”132  If this is correct, as I think
it is, the unreflective watering-down thesis is fatally undermined.  Determining whether a
constitutional right is a right, simpliciter, whose content necessarily is uniform vis-a-vis all polities,
or a right-against-rules, for which a sufficient justification for regulation might vary across different
institutional contexts, requires a highly particularized right-by-right analysis.  The claim that
variations across contexts constitute a watering-down of constitutional rights is not compelling. 
C.     Plausible Justifications for Selective Incorporation and their Relation to One-Size-Fits-
All. Having surveyed in the last section several rationales for selective incorporation that do not
justify the adoption of One-Size-Fits-All instead of Tailoring, this section identifies two
justifications for selective incorporation that have been identified by the Court and commentators
that are relevant to the choice between One-Size-Fits-All and Tailoring.  The justifications identify
pragmatic benefits of One-Size-Fits-All.  Pragmatic justifications, however, by their nature invite
the taking account of competing  considerations and hence typically give rise to non-categorical
rules.  So too here: the justifications examined below give rise to a defeasible presumption of One-
Size-Fits-All, but they do not support a categorical One-Size-Fits-All mode of selective
incorporation.  These justifications fully carry over to those contexts outside the Fourteenth
Amendment when courts must determine whether a multi-level constitutional principle is to be
Tailored or One-Size-Fits-All. 
1.     Limiting Judicial Discretion.  Much of selective incorporation’s success was due
      133See Israel, supra note 51, at 286-90.
      134See id.; see also Dorf, supra note 24, at 968-69.
      135Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 35 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Dorf, supra
note 24, at 971 (noting that “those values that find their way into the constitutional text are likely to be the ones most
fundamentally embraced by the American people.”).
      136See Fallon, Implementing the Constitution, supra note 33, at xx.
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to justifiable dissatisfaction with the fundamental fairness regime that preceded it.  Many decisions
under fundamental fairness were criticized as  subjective and unpredictable.133 Justices sought a
method for cabining judicial discretion,134 and incorporation held out promise in this regard because
the Bill of Rights terms of “free speech” and “search and seizure” are unquestionably more specific
than “fundamental fairness.”   
Limiting judicial discretion in this fashion is sensible.  Selective incorporation in effect
means that guarantees specified in the Bill of Rights are presumptively assumed to apply against the
States (in contrast to being categorically presumed to apply, as under total incorporation).
“Fundamentality” still is the touchstone under selective incorporation for determining whether a
given Bill of Rights guarantee applies to the States, and surely there is good sense in concluding that
“what is important enough to have been included within the Bill of Rights has good claim to being
an element of ‘fundamental fairness.’”135 
Is it the case, however, that the doctrinal details developed vis-a-vis the federal government
invariably have good claim to being an element of fundamental fairness as well?  The answer
depends upon the structure of the constitutional right that is at issue: “yes” as regards a right,
simpliciter, but “not necessarily” with regard to a right-against-rule.  With regard to the latter, the
particular legal rule that is utilized to implement a constitutional principle is a function of a host of
contingent factors,136 many of which conceivably could vary across different levels of government.
There is no good reason for categorically presuming that the Legal Test itself is “fundamental.”
      137I say “presumptively” because  under selective incorporation, in contrast to total incorporation,  it is not the case
that all bill of rights principles apply to the States.
      138See Israel, supra note 51, at 310-11.
      139See id. at 310-13.
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It might be responded that even if the doctrinal details at steps 3 and 4 are not themselves
“fundamental,” One-Size-Fits-All still has the great virtue of limiting judicial discretion.  This is
true, but the important question is “at what cost?”  Judicial discretion would be curtailed if all
constitutional doctrine were replaced by a single, simple legal rule.  No one would advocate such a
position because the costs of limiting judicial discretion in this fashion would be too great; doctrinal
complexity is necessitated by the complex competing interests among which constitutional doctrine
must mediate.  Selective incorporation’s check on judicial discretion is justifiable only because it
is sensible to conclude that general principles constraining federal powers found in the Bill of Rights
are (presumptively) fundamental and, accordingly, (presumptively137) applicable to the States.  If the
same cannot be said about the doctrinal details that were developed in the federal context, then we
cannot be so certain that the benefits of limiting judicial discretion in this regard are worth the costs,
identified in Part IV, of foregoing the option of Tailoring.
In short, though limiting judicial discretion is a very real benefit, it is a pragmatic
consideration that is not a categorical trump.  The interest in limiting judicial discretion may well
justify a presumption of One-Size-Fits-All, but it cannot justify a categorical rule of One-Size-Fits-
All.  
2.     Judicial Administration.  A second justification for selective incorporation is that
it facilitates judicial administration.138  It was very difficult for States to know what was
constitutionally required of them under fundamental fairness because the Court refused to generate
broadly applicable legal principles.139  Instead, the Court’s holdings were highly context specific.
      140See Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 471-73 (1942)(holding that due process required assistance of counsel only when
“special circumstances” indicated that counsel was necessary to ensure a fair trial).
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For example, the Court held that whether  disallowing a criminal defendant in state court from
having an attorney violated fundamental fairness turned on such fact-specific variables as the
severity of the imposed sentence and the defendant’s capacity to defend herself.140  This offered
States precious little guidance. The selective incorporation adopted by the Court – that is, of the One-
Size-Fits-All variety – had the benefit of making an already-developed and readily ascertained body
of doctrine applicable to the States.  State officials accordingly had a ready body of constitutional
doctrine to consult that told  them what the Fourteenth Amendment required.  
Similar to the benefit of limiting judicial discretion, facilitating judicial administration is a
very  real good but is only one among many considerations that informs constitutional doctrine.  A
single rule applicable to all governmental actions would be the simplest to administer, but it  would
come at too great a cost to concerns of fairness, democracy, and so forth.  For this reason, the
pragmatic consideration of judicial administration does not support a categorical rule of One-Size-
Fits-All.  On the other hand, it does strongly counsel against wholly jettisoning the One-Size-Fits-All
framework.  
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
* * * * *
To conclude, except with regard to constitutional rights that qualify as rights, simpliciter,
there are no principled justifications for a categorical One-Size-Fits-All rule.  There are, however,
two powerful pragmatic justifications for One-Size-Fits-All: limiting judicial discretion and
improving judicial administrability. Parts III and IV will show, however, that there are powerful
countervailing considerations that may justify Tailoring in some cases.  Taken together, this Article’s
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analysis suggests that contemporary doctrine should be modified as follows: today’s One-Size-Fits-
All doctrine should be downgraded from a categorical requirement to a rebuttable presumption.
III.     A QUASI-PRECEDENTIAL ARGUMENT:  THAT TAILORING IS NOT UNKNOWN TO AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE
Though One-Size-Fits-All is the dominant doctrinal paradigm today, Tailoring is not absent
from American jurisprudence.  Tailoring has been advanced by Justices Holmes, Jackson, Harlan,
Fortas, Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens, Ginsburg, and Thomas.  Moreover, several contemporary
constitutional doctrines reflect the logic of Tailoring, though they are not typically  conceptualized
in that way.  Further, a very recent decision of the Court  was decided on a rationale that reflects the
institution-sensitive logic that underwrites Tailoring.  Finally,  many statutory rules vary in their
application depending upon the level of government that is being regulated.  The fact that Tailoring
already is part of our juridical landscape should cushion concern about this Article’s argument: the
quasi-precedent for Tailoring makes clear that the Article does not seek to introduce a wholly foreign
element of constitutional analysis, but instead advocates a willingness to expanding a methodology
already present in American law.
A.     Early Influential Support for Tailoring.  Though the federal government and the States
generally were subject to different constitutional limitations during the era of Fundamental Fairness,
the opinions in those cases did not generate particularly searching rationales for the differential
treatment as between the federal and state governments.  One-Size-Fits-All treatment was not then
deemed to be a serious option on account of the fact that the federal and state governments were
deemed to be governed by different constitutional language.  Virtually all cases decided during the
      141See supra note 72.
      142268 U.S. 652 (1925).
      143Id. at 672 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
      144Interestingly, in a takings case decided three years before Gitlow that was written by Justice Holmes, Holmes “drew
no distinction between takings by state and federal governments.” Israel, Selective Incorporation,  supra note 51, at 286
& n. 264 (discussing Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922 )). Nor did Holmes explain why he was
willing to treat the state and federal governments interchangeably in Mahon.  See Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415.  There are
several possible explanations as to  why Holmes took divergent approaches with takings and free speech.  Perhaps he had
a theory that justified different treatment of the two.  Perhaps the majority for whom he was writing in Mahon demanded
this approach.  Or perhaps it was not clear to him in the earlier opinion of Mahon that case law from the federal context
need not necessarily seamlessly transfer over to the States.  I shall not pursue these possibilities further here.
46
Fundamental Fairness era accordingly are not examples of Tailoring.
However, even during the heyday of Fundamental Fairness, the Court utilized an approach
virtually indistinguishable from “selective and undifferentiated” incorporation vis-a-vis many First
Amendment guarantees.141 One-Size-Fits-All was a serious doctrinal contender – indeed, it won the
day in this context –  sparking dissents that generated the most sophisticated judicial expositions to
date concerning the logic of Tailoring.  Justice Holmes penned one of the first of these in the 1925
case of Gitlow v. People of the State of New York.142  The case concerned a free speech challenge to
a state statute that criminalized the advocacy of anarchy, and the majority applied the doctrines
developed in the federal context without explanation or justification.  Justice Holmes criticized this
in his dissent, writing as follows:
The general principle of free speech, it seems to me, must be taken to be included in the
Fourteenth Amendment, in view of the scope that has been given to the word ‘liberty’ as
there used, although perhaps it may be accepted with a somewhat larger latitude of
interpretation than is allowed to Congress by the sweeping language that governs or ought
to govern the laws of the United States.143 
This text-based argument was all that Holmes had to say on the matter, but the message was clear:
the principle of free speech might apply differently to the States than it applies to the federal
government.144
      145343 U.S. 250 (1952).
      146Id. at 294 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
      147Id.
      148Id. at 294-95 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (emphasis supplied).
      149See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 181 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).  
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The next significant discussion of Tailoring appears in Justice Jackson’s dissent in
Beauharnais v. People of the State of Illinois,145 which famously upheld a State’s group libel statute.
Jackson’s analysis focused on the different institutional characteristics of the federal and state
governments and hence works well with a right-against-rule conception of constitutional rights.
Jackson argued that the state and federal governments are meaningfully different in respect of
determining what activities are constitutionally permitted to each: “The inappropriateness of a single
standard for restricting State and Nation is indicated by the disparity between their functions and
duties in relation to those freedoms.”146  He then proceeded to explain why the federal and state
governments are differently situated as regards the regulation of libel:  
Criminality of defamation is predicated upon power either to protect the private right to
enjoy integrity of reputation or the public right to tranquility.  Neither of these are objects
of federal cognizance except when necessary to the accomplishment of some delegated
power . . . . When the Federal Government puts liberty of press on one scale, it has a very
limited duty to personal reputation or local tranquility to weigh against it in the other.  But
state action affecting speech or press can and should be weighed against and reconciled with
these conflicting social interests.147 
These differences led Jackson to conclude that the First Amendment’s free speech guarantee should
be Tailored to the the federal and state governments: 
For these reasons I should not, unless clearly required, confirm to the Federal Government
such latitude as I think a State reasonably may require for orderly government of its
manifold concerns.  The converse of the proposition is that I would not limit the power of
the State with the severity appropriately prescribed for federal power.148 
Justice Harlan was the next member of the Court to offer a full-blown defense of Tailoring
(or, as he called it, opposition to “jot-for-jot” incorporation of the Bill of Rights149).  His position was
      150For a sample of Justice Harlan’s Tailoring opinions in the criminal context, see Duncan v. State of Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145, 171 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 672 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Ker v. State of
California, 374 U.S. 23, 44 (Harlan, J., concurring); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 14 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting);
Pointer v. State of Texas, 380 U .S. 400, 408 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring); Griffin v. State of California, 380 U.S. 609,
615 (Harlan, J., concurring).
      151See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 505 (1957) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
      152See, e.g., Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 52-53 (1978) (Powell, J.,dissenting) (relying on Harlan’s opinion in Duncan
v. State of Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 , 171 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting)); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 293 (1976)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring) (same). 
      153See Roth, 354 U.S. at 504-05.   For Justice Harlan’s full quotation, see infra at p. 112.
      154New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U .S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
      155Roth, 354 U.S. at 505.
      156Id. at 505-06 (arguing that states should have broader powers to prohibit distribution of books than the federal
government).
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developed over numerous dissenting opinions.150  Roth v. United States151 contains one of his clearest
expositions of Tailoring, and has been relied upon by many subsequent Supreme Court Justices.152
The ideas developed there are not appreciably different from Justice Jackson’s approach in
Beauharnais: Harlan argued that the state and federal governments have different substantive powers
and interests, and therefore that “[w]hether a particular limitation on speech or press is to be upheld
because it subserves a paramount governmental interest must, to a large extent, I think, depend on
whether that government has, under the Constitution, a direct substantive interest, that is, the power
to act, in the particular area involved.”153  
Harlan advanced two additional justifications for Tailoring in his other dissenting and
concurring opinions on the subject.  First, in the spirit of Justice Brandeis’s New State Ice dissent,154
Justice Harlan praised the fact that each State can serve as an independent “experimental social
laborator[y]” that can experiment with “novel techniques of social control.”155  Harlan thought that
there was an  “immense advantage” of having  “separate centers for such experimentation,” and
argued that there was “no overwhelming danger to our freedom to experiment” so long as there was
“no uniform nation-wide” regulation.156  Justice Harlan argued that the possibility of
      157Id.
      158Id. at 506.
      159Id. 
      160 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
      161Id. at  213 (Fortas, J., concurring).
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experimentation, in the absence of severe risk due to the fact that other States can be expected to
legislate differently, was a reason to treat State legislation differently than federal legislation for
purposes of constitutional analysis.157 
Conversely, Justice Harlan argued that there are far greater “dangers to free thought and
expression . . . if the Federal Government imposes a blanket ban over the nation on such a book”
than if a State does because a federal would bar all American citizens from accessing the proscribed
publication.158 A federal ban also destroys “[t]he prerogative of the States to differ on their ideas of
morality.”159 The greater dangers inherent in federal regulation accordingly justify a constitutional
regime under which the federal government would be subject to more stringent constitutional
limitations than States, meaning that States could ban materials that the federal government could
not in Harlan’s view. 
These opinions of Holmes, Jackson, and Harlan are the most sophisticated treatments of
Tailoring in the judicial corpus, and numerous Justices have drawn upon them in their advocacy of
Tailoring particular constitutional doctrines.  For example, in a concurring opinion in Duncan v.
Louisiana,160 Justice Fortas cited to Harlan’s opinions when writing that “[n]either logic nor history
nor the intent of the draftsmen of the Fourteenth Amendment can possibly be said to require that the
Sixth Amendment or its jury trial provision be applied to the States together with the total gloss that
this Court’s decisions have supplied.”161  Justice Powell similarly relied heavily on Harlan’s
arguments when he advocated Tailoring the Double Jeopardy Clause and several Sixth Amendment
      162See Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 52-53 (1978) (Powell, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(“Even if I were to conclude that the Fifth Amendment –  merely by virtue of long, unreasoned acceptance –  required
attachment of jeopardy at the swearing of the jury, I would not hold that the Fourteenth Amendment necessarily imposes
that requirement upon the States. This issue would turn on the answer to the question whether jeopardy's attachment at
that point is fundamental to the guarantees of the Double Jeopardy Clause. );  Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 366, 371
(1972) (Powell, J., concurring) (rejecting the premise “that the concept of jury trial, as applicable to the States under the
Fourteenth Amendment, must be identical in every detail to the concept required in federal courts by the Sixth
Amendment.”); see also Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment) (same); Ludwig v.
Massachusetts, 427 U.S. 618 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) (same).
      163424  U.S. 1, 291 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
      164Id.  Justice Rehnquist quotes extensively from Holmes, Jackson and Holmes to support this proposition.  See id.
at 292-93.
      165122 S.Ct. 2460  (2002).
      166Id. at 2481 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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protections.162   Justice Rehnquist relied on Homes, Jackson, and Harlan when he argued in a
concurrence in Buckley v. Valeo163 that “not all the strictures which the First Amendment imposes
upon Congress are carried over against the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, but rather it is only
the ‘general principle’ of free speech . . . that the latter incorporates.”164   Justice Thomas relied on
the same set of Justices in his concurring opinion in the Zelman decision,165 where he wrote that “in
the context of the Establishment Clause, it may well be that state action should be evaluated on
different terms than similar action by the Federal Government.”166  
Neither Justices Fortas nor Powell nor Rehnquist nor Thomas have advanced the theory
behind Tailoring; their opinions are wholly derivative of the arguments developed by Justices
Holmes, Jackson, and Harlan.  But these opinions of Fortas, Powell, Rehnquist, and Thomas
demonstrate that Tailoring’s logic is not foreign to modern Supreme Court justices.
B.     Contemporary Constitutional Decisions That Reflect the Logic of Tailoring.  There are
other  recent cases in which Justices have accepted the logic of Tailoring.   Some are majority
decisions. Several of these decisions have won the support of liberal Justices.  This shows that
Tailoring is not just a tool of conservative jurisprudence, notwithstanding the fact that to date
      167515 U.S. 200 (1995).
      168This was the rule announced in Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
      169See Metro Broadcasting Inc. v. FCC, 497  U.S. 547, 564-65 (1990).
      170Adarand, 515 U.S. at 224 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976)).
      171Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227.
      172Id. (“Accordingly, we hold today that all racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local
governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.”).
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Tailoring has been advocated primarily by right-leaning Justices. 
A tantalizingly simple lesson emerges from a study of the instances where individual Justices
or the Court has been willing to Size.  Tailoring is invoked when Justices believe that two levels of
government are sufficiently different to merit different constitutional treatment.  To be sure, the
Court has not identified a determinate set of principles to identify when sufficient differences are
present.  Nevertheless, the practical, functional analysis that leads to judicial willingness to engage
in Tailoring is black letter predicate for Part IV’s examination of generic reasons for treating the
different levels of government differently.
1.     Federal Affirmative Action Programs.  One of the most sustained recent defenses
of Tailoring can be found in Justice Stevens’ dissent in the case of Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena.167  The majority opinion in Adarand replaced a rare instance of Tailoring with a One-Size-Fits-
All approach.  Prior to Adarand, state affirmative action programs were subject to strict scrutiny168
whereas federal programs only  had to satisfy intermediate scrutiny under the rule announced in
Metro Broadcasting.169  The Adarand majority identified what it labeled the principle of
“congruence” – the requirement that “[e]qual protection analysis in the Fifth Amendment area is the
same as that under the Fourteenth Amendment”170 – to reverse Metro Broadcasting.171  In its place,
Adarand established that federal and state affirmative action programs are to be analyzed under
identical legal standards.172
      173Id. at 249 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
      174Adarand, 515 U.S. at 224 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976)).
      175See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 249-53 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Indeed, Croson is one such op inion.  See Croson, 488
U.S. at 737 (Scalia, J., concurring).
      176Id. at 250.
      177Id. at 249-50 (internal quotation omitted).
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The principle of “congruence” announced in Adarand accordingly is an example of One-
Size-Fits-All in the particular context of equal protection doctrine.  Justice Stevens, joined by Justice
Ginsburg, dissented with regard to the principle of congruence:
The Court’s concept of ‘congruence’ assumes that there is no significant difference between
a decision by the Congress of the United States to adopt an affirmative-action program and
such a decision by a State or a municipality.  In my opinion that assumption is untenable.
It ignores important practical and legal differences between federal and state or local
decisionmakers.173  
The majority in Adarand relied exclusively on a quotation from the 1976 case of Buckley v. Valeo
in support of its principle of congruence,174 but Justice Stevens demonstrated that the majority
ignored many subsequent decisions in which the Court had found that there were constitutionally
relevant differences between the federal and sub-federal polities with regard to the application of
equal protection principles.175 The Adarand majority was content to rely on what fairness suggests
was insufficient precedent – it was insufficient because there was more recent countervailing
precedent – and did not feel it necessary to engage in a substantive exchange of views with Justice
Stevens’ several arguments as to why the federal and sub-federal governments were sufficiently
different so as to justify subjecting them to different legal tests. 
Justice Stevens provided three arguments against the One-Size-Fits-All approach of the
“congruence” doctrine.  First, as a purely textual matter, the federal government’s “legislative powers
concerning matters of race were explicitly enhanced by the Fourteenth Amendment.”176  Stevens then
provided two arguments as to why the Congress has a “special institutional competence” not enjoyed
by the sub-federal polities with regard to matters of race.177  Quoting from Scalia’s separate opinion
      178Id. at 251(quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 737 (Scalia, J., concurring).   Scalia (and Stevens) thereafter quoted from
the Federalist No. 10: “The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests composing
it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a majority be found of the same party, and the
smaller the number of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within which they are placed, the
more easily will they concert and execute their plan of oppression.  Extend the sphere and you take in a  greater variety
of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the
rights of other citizens . . .” Adarand, 515 U.S. at 251 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis supplied).
      179Id. at 250 )(Stevens, J., dissenting).
      180Adarand, 515 U.S. at 252 (Stevens, J., dissenting).   This is a representation-reinforcement type justification of the
sort developed by Professor Ely.  See JOHN HART ELY , DEMOCRACY AND D ISTRUST and discussed infra at Part IV.A.1(a).
      181426 U.S. 88, 100 (1976).
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in the Croson case, Stevens first explained Congress’s special capability by drawing on Madison’s
famous discussion of factions from Federalist No. 10: 
[R]acial discrimination against any group finds a more ready expression at the state and
local than at the federal level.  To the children of the Founding Fathers, this should come
as no surprise. An acute awareness of the heightened danger of oppression from political
factions in small, rather than large, political units dates to the very beginning of our national
history.178
It is sensible to impose greater review on sub-federal racial classifications than federal
classifications, Stevens argued, because of the greater potential for discrimination that exists at the
sub-federal level.179  Third, Stevens explained that “greater deference [should be given] to the
National Legislature than to a local lawmaking body [because] federal affirmative-action programs
represent the will of our entire Nation’s elected representatives, whereas a state or local program may
have an impact on nonresident entities who played no part in the decision to enact it.”180  
Justice Stevens provided one additional argument on behalf of Tailoring in his Adarand
dissent that did not have any application to the issue in the case.  Stevens quoted dictum from the
majority opinion he authored in Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong181 to the effect that “the two protections
[the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ due process clauses] are not always coextensive.  Not only
does the language of the two Amendments differ, but more importantly, there may be overriding
      182Adarand, 515 U.S. at 253  & n. 8  (Stevens, J., dissenting), quoting Hampton, 426 U.S. at 100.  The remainder of
the quotation reads as follows: “On the other hand, when a  federal rule is applicable to only a limited territory, such as
the District of Columbia, or an insular possession, and when there is no special national interest involved, the Due
Process Clause has been construed as having the same significance as the Equal Protection Clause.” Adarand, 515 U.S.
at 253 & n. 8 (Stevens, J., dissenting), quoting Hampton, 426 U.S. at 100.  While this generally is  descriptively true,
this Article suggests an alternative justification for Tailoring that would support Tailoring in a broader range of
circumstances.  To be completely clear, the point of Part II of this Article is to identify some instances of Tailoring in
contemporary constitutional law not for the purpose of suggesting that Tailoring should be limited to like circumstances,
but to show that Tailoring is not completely unknown to our constitutional jurisprudence.
      183See supra Part III(A). Justice Stevens, however, did not refer to those opinions, nor that of Holmes, in the course
of his dissent in Adarand or his opinion for the Court in Hampton.  Perhaps Justice Stevens did not believe that opinions
concerning incorporation were relevant to the reverse incorporation issues ra ised in Hampton and Adarand.  The analysis
provided in this Article, however, suggests that the incorporation issues addressed by Holmes, Jackson, and Harlin and
the reverse incorporation questions raise the same conceptual question: are the different lvels of government sufficiently
different to justify Tailoring?  It stands to reason that the case law found in one context may be illuminating to the other.
Part IV of this Article shows this to be the case.
      184See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
      185451 U.S. 355 (1981).  This was not the first time the Court had so held .  See Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin
Water Storage District, 410 U.S. 719 (1973).
      186See Ball, 45 U.S. at 371.
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national interests which justify selective federal legislation that would be unacceptable for an
individual State.”182  This rationale is quite close to the justification for Tailoring that was offered
by Justices Jackson and Harlan.183 
I do not mean to suggest that Justice Stevens’ conclusion necessarily was correct in Adarand.
It does seem, however, that the precedential and functional arguments he advanced for treating the
federal and state governments differently from the federal government as regards affirmative-action
programs merited a serious response –  something the majority opinion neglected to provide.
2.     Property-based Franchise.  Continuing with this Article’s review of
contemporary examples of Tailoring, let us turn to the guarantee of equal protection that prohibits
both the federal government and States from conditioning a citizen’s right to vote on property
ownership under the principle of one-person, one-vote.184  The Court held in Ball v. James,185
however, that there  are types of local government that while subject to the Fourteenth Amendment’s
equal protection clause186 are not barred from utilizing a property-based franchise.  This is true, for
      187See id.
      188See, e.g., Lane v. Town of Oyster Bay, 603 N.Y.S.2d 53, 54 (N.Y. App. 1993).
      189See Ball, 451 U.S. at 362-63.
      190See Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289, 297 (1975).
      191 Ball, 451 U.S. at 371.
      192Id. at 371.
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example, of water reclamation districts187 and business improvement districts.188   
In this circumstance, the Tailoring occurs as between “general” state and federal
governments, on the one hand, and “special-purpose unit[s] of government,” on the other.189  With
respect to our model of constitutional doctrine, deviation occurs at levels 3 and 4, such that although
1.S(general government) = 1.S(special-purpose government) and
2.S(general government) = 2.S(special-purpose government),
it is the case that
3.S(general government)  3.S(special-purpose government), and
4.S(general government)  4.S(special-purpose government).
This is an example of Tailoring: although the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause
applies to both general and special-purpose governments (1.S(general government) = 1.S(special-purpose government)),
it applies differently to each.  More specifically, 3.S(general government) is heightened scrutiny,
190 which
under 4.S(general government) includes the requirement of one-person, one-vote.  By contrast, 3.S(special-purpose
government) is the far more deferential requirement that the voting scheme “bear[] a reasonable
relationship to its statutory objectives.”191  The one-person, one-vote requirement simply is not part
of 4.S(special-purpose government).  All that is necessary under 4.S(special-purpose government) is a showing that “the
effect of the entity’s operations on [those with the right to vote] was disproportionately greater than
the effect on those seeking the vote.”192
The Court justified its decision to Tailor equal protection on the basis of the different
institutional characters of the two types of governments.  The Court  concluded that “special-purpose
      193Id. at 363.
      194The dissent does a good job of explaining why.  See id. at 374, 377-85 (W hite, J., dissenting).
      195532 U.S. 451 (2001).
      196Id. at 453.
      197Id.
      198Id. at 454.
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units” of government are sufficiently different from “general” governments to merit different
constitutional treatment.  Because special-purpose units of government “affect[] definable groups
of constituents more than other constituents” it is permissible to allow only those primarily affected
to vote.193  To be sure, it can be exceedingly difficult to distinguish these two categories; Ball in fact
is one such case.194   The important point is that there is precedent supporting the principle that
identical constitutional language may apply differently to two levels of State government when each
level is sufficiently different to merit differential treatment. 
3.     Separation-of-Powers Tailoring.  The Court recently adopted the same
institutionally sensitive analysis with regard to an analogous issue that might be dubbed “separation
of powers” Tailoring:  the question of whether constitutional limitations on the legislature seamlessly
transfer to the judiciary.  The defendant in the 2001 case of Rogers v. Tennessee,195 who had been
convicted of second-degree murder,  appealed on the basis that the victim had died more than a year
and a day after the defendant had stabbed him.  At the time of the stabbing Tennessee unquestionably
had a common-law “year and a day rule,” which precluded conviction of murder unless a victim had
died by the defendant’s act within a year and a day of the act.196  The Supreme Court of Tennessee
abolished the “year and a day rule” and applied a new rule to the defendant,197 upholding the
conviction despite the fact that 15 months had elapsed between infliction of the stab wounds and the
victim’s death.198
The question in Rogers was whether such retroactivity was constitutional.  The Ex Post Facto
      199See U.S. CONST . ART. I, §10, CL. 1  (“[n]o State shall . . . pass any ex post facto Law.”).
      200Rogers, 532 U.S. at 458 ; see also id. at 462 (restating, and not disputing, Justice Scalia’s contention that “there
is no doubt that the Ex Post Facto Clause would have prohibited a legislative decision identical to the Tennessee court’s
decision here”).  
      201378 U.S. 347 (1964).
      202Id. at 353-54.
      203There was a most unusual split in the Rogers decision.  Justice O ’Connor’s majority opinion was joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Souter.  Justice Scalia wrote a dissent that was joined by Justices
Stevens and Thomas and by Justice Breyer in part.  Justice  Breyer also penned a separate dissent.  See id. at 451.
      204Rogers, 532 U.S. at 459.  The Rogers majority was technically correct to the extent that the Bouie Court’s language
was dictum, as the majority held.  Id.   On the other hand, one can hardly imagine a clearer signal of the Court’s
contemporary understanding of a related issue than what can be found in Bouie.  Moreover, Justice Scalia’s dissent
provides a strong argument that this aspect of Bouie was part of the decision’s rationale.  See id. at 469  (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).  In any event, how Bouie’s language is best characterized is not relevant to the wisdom o f the Court’s
methodology in Rogers but instead determines whether the majority followed or overruled precedent – surely an
important question, but not one that will receive further attention here.
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Clause by its terms applies only to State legislatures,199 and the Rogers Court assumed that the
Clause would have been violated if the Tennessee legislature had abolished the year and a day rule
after the defendant had stabbed his victim.200  Language from a 1964 Supreme Court decision
declared that state legislatures and state judiciaries should be treated no differently in this regard; the
Court in Bouie v. City of Columbia201 stated that “[i]f a state legislature is barred by the Ex Post
Facto Clause from passing . . . a law, it must follow that a State Supreme Court is barred by the Due
Process Clause from achieving precisely the same result by judicial construction.”202 Bouie hence
adopted a  One-Size-Fits-All approach to separation of powers as regards the retroactivity of criminal
rules.
Notwithstanding Bouie, the majority in Rogers opted for a rule that treated the state
legislature and judiciary divergently.203  The Rogers Court explicitly rejected the One-Size-Fits-All
approach, referring to it using Justice Harlan’s “jot-for-jot” terminology and stating that “nowhere
in the [Bouie] opinion did we go so far as to incorporate jot-for-jot the specific categories of Calder
into due process limitations on the retroactive application of judicial decisions.”204 The
jurisprudential model developed earlier in the Article facilitates an appreciation of precisely where
      205See Rogers, 432 U.S. at 460 (“T he Ex Post Facto Clause, by its own terms, does not apply to courts.  Extending
the Clause to courts through the rubric of due process thus would circumvent the clear constitutional text.”).
      206Id.
      207This is a fair summary of the rules articulated in Calder that the Rogers Court quotes.  See id. at 456. 
      208Id. at 462 (judiciary can make changes to common law unless it is “unexpected and indefensible by reference to
the law which had been expressed prior to the conduct in issue.”).
      209Id. at 462-63.
      210Id. at 467.
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the doctrines deviate.  To begin, there were differences at Step 1; the Court noted that while the Ex
Post Facto Clause applied to state legislatures, the state judiciary was limited only by the Fourteenth
Amendment’s due process requirement.205   With regard to Step 2, the Rogers Court expressly
concluded that both the Ex Post Facto Clause and due process nevertheless shared the identical Goal,
stating that it was “undoubtedly correct” that “the Due Process and Ex Post Facto Clauses safeguard
common interests – in particular, the interests in fundamental fairness (through notice and fair
warning) and the prevention of the arbitrary and vindictive use of the laws.”206  Deviation also
occurred at steps 3 and 4 in the doctrine, the levels of Standard and rulified Standard: while the
legislature is precluded from making any change in the criminal law subsequent to the criminal act
that works to the defendant’s disadvantage,207 the judiciary is prevented only from making
unforeseeable changes.208   To graphically summarize, 
1.S(legislature)  1.S(judiciary),
2.S(legislature) = 2.S(judiciary),
3.S(legislature)  3.S(judiciary), and
4.S(legislature)  4.S(judiciary).
The Rogers Court then held that because the year and a day rule was “widely viewed as an outdated
relic of the common law,” it “was not unexpected and indefensible” for the Tennessee Supreme
Court to abolish it.209  The Court accordingly upheld the defendant’s conviction.210
The Rogers majority elected to treat the legislature and judiciary differently – what might be
      211Id. at 460.
      212Id. at 461.
      213Id.
      214See supra Part I.B(3).
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termed “Tailoring” along the dimension of separation of powers rather than federalism – due to the
“important institutional and contextual differences between legislating, on the one hand, and
common law decisionmaking, on the other.”211  The Court provided two reasons why the two
institutions were meaningfully different for constitutional purposes.  First, constitutional constraints
on the judiciary could be less strict because courts are less susceptible to “political influences and
pressures” since they  only “constru[e] existing law in actual litigation.”212  Second, because the
judiciary is responsible for the case-by-case development of the law, Calder’s absolute brake on
retroactivity would “unduly impair the incremental and reasoned development of precedent that is
the foundation of the common law system.”213  Whether or not one agrees with the Rogers Court’s
ultimate disposition, the following methodological conclusion is incontestable: the Court justified
its holding by carefully considering the institutional character of each governmental entity.  The
Court refused to reflexively import doctrines developed in the legislative context to the judiciary,
notwithstanding dictum in the Bouie decision that said such a One-Size-Fits-All approach was
appropriate.  
The Rogers Court analysis, and its treatment of Bouie, are precedent for the methodology
advocated in this Article. Bouie was decided in 1964, in the midst of the Court’s ongoing rejection
of “fundamental fairness” and embrace of selective incorporation.  In that era, the conclusion that
a constitutional guarantee  was incorporated invariably was followed by the unexplained
determination that all doctrines developed in the federal context naturally applied to the States in
equal measure.214  Bouie is part of that historical context.  Rogers is a more reflective analysis of
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what precisely is imported from one context to another during the process of incorporation.  The
context- sensitive institutional analysis utilized by the Rogers majority is precisely the sort of
approach that this Article suggests is appropriate in the more usual situation of “federalism”
incorporation.  
To be sure, the Rogers Court’s institution-sensitive analysis  runs up against far less
precedent than Tailoring in the federalism context would, for there have been very few cases that
have considered how constitutional principles transfer across the different branches of government.
The policy reasons for engaging in institutional-sensitive analysis, however, are identical in both
“federalism” and “separation of powers” incorporation: two institutions might be sufficiently
different to justify differential treatment as a constitutional matter.  While adopting the functional
analysis of the Rogers variety in the context of “federalism” incorporation certainly would require
that the Court revisit a methodology of One-Size-Fits-All that it has applied and discussed in many
decisions, this precedent should not foreclose the possibility of Tailoring.  The justifications for a
categorical One-Size-Fits-All approach are deficient (Part II), and there are strong policy reasons to
conclude that Tailoring may be advantageous (Part IV).  Under these circumstances, the Court’s
recent willingness to utilize institutionally-sensitive analysis in Rogers is instructive to “federalism”
incorporation.  Precedent can be honored without ignoring Tailoring’s potential benefits by
downgrading the categorical One-Size-Fits-All approach that characterizes contemporary doctrine
to a rebuttable presumption that could take account of the varying institutional characteristics of the
different levels of government.
4.     Dormant Commerce Clause.    Dormant commerce clause  doctrine also fits the
      215See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986) (“It is well estab lished that Congress may authorize  the States to
engage in regulation that the  Commerce C lause would otherwise forbid.”); see also  New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
144 (1992) (same).
      216See The statement above in text simplifies matters a bit.  There is a virtually per se rule against protectionist state
legislation, not an absolute prohibition.  See Maine v. T aylor, 477 U .S. 131 (1986).  There is no limitation as regards
protectionism whatsoever, however, on federal legislation.  See id. at 138.
      217See Mark D. Rosen, Extra territoriality and  Political Heterogeneity in American Federalism, 150 U. PA. L. REV.
855, 921 (2002) [hereinafter “Extraterritoriality and Federalism”].  This has been the case since the doctrine’s early days.
See Wilson v. The Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829) (Marshall, C.J.)(the question of whether
a state statute is “repugnant to the power to regulate commerce in its dormant state” arises when “congress has passed
no” act).
      218See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
      219See Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451 (2001).
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Tailoring paradigm.  Dormant commerce clause limitations apply only to the States, not Congress.215
Consequently, Congress can enact protectionist legislation whereas States may not.216  This
differential treatment of the States and the federal governments thus fits the paradigm of  Tailoring.
It could be argued, however, that dormant commerce clause doctrine is not an example of
Tailoring.  The dormant commerce clause does not illustrate a judicial determination to treat the
States and federal governments differently, some might say, because the doctrine applies only where
Congress has not acted.217  The dormant commerce clause only limits the States and accordingly does
not fit the Tailoring paradigm.
For some readers, this formal argument might definitively establish Tailoring’s irrelevance
to the dormant commerce clause.  I view the matter differently.  The mere fact that constitutional
language addresses only one level  or branch of government has not prevented migration of the
constitutional principle to other levels or branches of government.  For instance, equal protection
principles have been applied to the federal government despite the fact that the equal protection
clause by its terms applies only to States,218 and retroactivity principles have been applied to the state
judiciary despite the fact that the ex post facto clause applies only to state legislatures.219  If explicit
      220  See Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce
Clause , 84 MICH . L. REV. 1091 (1986).
      221Adarand  Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U .S. 200, 252 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting).  This understanding recalls
John Hart Ely’s representation-reinforcement theory of judicial review, though Justice S tevens does not cite to Ely.  See
infra Part IV.A(1).
      222See Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 767-68, n.2 (1945).
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constitutional language  addressing only a particular level or branch of government does not prevent
the export of constitutional principles to other levels or branches, it follows a fortiori that
constitutional principles lacking an explicit textual basis in the Constitution, such as those found in
dormant commerce clause jurisprudence, in principle could be exported to other levels of
government.  For instance, many have identified the dormant commerce clause with a principle of
non-discrimination,220 and it is quite conceivable that some such principle could be applied to acts
of Congress.  
If this is right, then formal grounds alone cannot explain why dormant commerce clause
limitations have not been exported to the federal government.  The Court and commentators indeed
have provided an explanation that focuses on the different institutional characteristics of federal and
state governments. Concerns that are present when states legislate are absent, or at least are far less
pronounced, when the Congress acts.  The dormant commerce clause “permits Congress to legislate
on certain matters of national importance while denying power to the States in this area for fear of
undue impact upon out-of-state residents.”221  The Congress is differently situated than state
legislatures vis-a-vis the imposition of costs on unrepresented outsiders because Congress is
composed of representatives from all States.222  
Donald Regan, an influential commentators on the dormant commerce clause,  has argued
that the  doctrine is primarily concerned with guarding against “protectionist” legislation that is
designed to “improv[e] the competitive position of in-state economic actors at the expense of their
      223See Elizabeth Anderson and Richard Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L.
REV. 1503, 1553 (2000)(fairly describing Professor Regan’s view that contemporary dormant commerce clause case law
is best rationalized as seeking to counter protectionist legislation) [hereinafter “Restatement”].
      224Regan, Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, supra note 219, at 1113.
      225Anderson & Pildes, Restatement, supra note 222, at 1554.
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out-of-state competitors.”223  “Such behavior,” Regan argues, “has no place in a genuine political
union of any kind” because it is “inconsistent with the very idea of political union.”224 Such
protectionist behavior, it has been argued, “expresses a constitutionally impermissible attitude
toward the interests of other States in the political union.”225  To the extent protectionism in this
sense is the problem addressed by the dormant commerce clause, an institutional analysis suggests
that it is sensible that the doctrine limits only the States.   The centrifugal, nation-shattering impulse
giving rise to protectionist legislation is far less likely to be found in the halls of the national
legislature than in state houses insofar as national legislators are more likely than their state
counterparts to keep the national interest in mind.  Furthermore, parochial tendencies are less likely
to prevail in the national legislature, where the parties who would be injured by protectionism have
representatives to protect their interests.  
In sum, that dormant commerce clause limitations have not migrated from the States to the
federal government is best understood at least partly in institutional terms.  The federal and state
governments are different in ways that make it unnecessary for there to be dormant commerce
clause-type checks on the Congress.  As a result, under the dormant commerce, the federal
government is permitted to do things that the States cannot – yet another contemporary instance of
Tailoring.
5.     Apportionment and other Methods for Enhancing the Political Power of
Numerical Minorities. Many constitutional principles that relate to the weight of each individual’s
      226See U.S. CONST . ART. I, § 3.  Each State has two senators, regardless of population.  “[T]he ratio of over-
representa tion of the least populated state, Wyoming, to the most populous state, California, is just under 70 to 1.”
ROBERT A. DAHL, HO W  DEMOCRATIC IS THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION?  50 (Yale Univ. Press 2001).
      227See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U .S. 533 , 90 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (providing a succinct statement of the
Court’s holding).
      228See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 571-72.
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vote have not migrated from the States to the federal government and visa-versa.  The two levels of
government accordingly are treated differently under the Constitution and are thus additional
contemporary examples of Tailoring.
(a)     Area-Based Apportionment.  The most significant variation between the
federal government and the States concerns the permissibility of apportionment on the basis of
criteria that generate voting districts of unequal populations.  The United States Senate is
apportioned not on a population basis, but on an area-basis.226  The Court has held that every State,
however, must structure its legislature so that all the members of each house represent substantially
the same number of people.227  Indeed, the Court  struck down a state scheme that apportioned one
of its legislative houses on an area-basis akin to the United States Senate.228  
Area-based apportionment hence is yet another  instance where the federal and state
governments are treated differently: it is permissible for the federal government, but not the States.
Indeed, the scope of the deviation is unusually large.  Variation occurs at the first step in doctrinal
development:  the Court in essence  held that the “equal population” aspect of the equal protection
principle does not apply to the federal government, despite the fact that virtually all  other
components of equal protection are reverse incorporated against the federal government.
One might be tempted to conclude that the fact that the federal and state governments are
regulated by different constitutional provisions (the States by the equal protection clause, the federal
government by Article I, § 3, which creates the U.S. Senate) means that area-based apportionment
      229See supra at p. 56.
      230Two  patterns of migration could  have occurred.  First, the fact that so central a political institution as the Senate
does not rely on population-based apportionment could have been relied upon for the principle that American democracy,
and equal protection by extension, does not require the States to have population-based apportionment. See Baker v.
Carr, 369  U.S. 186, 298-300, 308 (1962)(Harlan, J., dissenting) (making this argument). Conversely, the equal protection
principle of population-based apportionment could have been applied to the federal government on the theory that Article
I, §3 was altered by the  later enacted Fourteenth Amendment. Cf. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 65-
66 (1996)(holding that Congress can subject States to suit in federal courts for violation of federal law enacted pursuant
to §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, but not Article I, because the §5 altered the earlier-enacted Eleventh Amendment).
The former is the more likely of the two insofar as the latter would constitute an extraordinary alteration of our country’s
political structure.  On the other hand, powerful normative arguments have been formulated in opposition to area-based
apportionment.  See, e.g., DAHL, HO W  DEM OCRAT IC?, supra note 225, at 46-50; id. at 144-45.
      231Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 573 ; see also Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 , 378 (1963).
      232Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 574.
      233See Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 745-46 (1964) (Stewart, J., dissenting); Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186, 298-300, 308 (1962)(Harlan, J., dissenting).
      234See Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 , 376-77 (1963).
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is not an example of Tailoring at all insofar as there is no constitutional principle common to both
levels of government that is being Tailored.  As explained in relation to the dormant commerce
clause,229 however, such formal differences alone cannot explain the failure of the constitutional
principles to migrate,230 for other constitutional principles that by their terms applied to only one
level or branch of government  have migrated.  Other factors accordingly must account for the
different treatment of the federal and state governments.  The Court repeatedly has rejected the so-
called “federal analogy” as being “inapposite and irrelevant to state legislative districting
schemes,”231 explaining that the federal system was “conceived out of compromise and concession
indispensable to the establishment of our federal republic” and arose from “unique historical
circumstances.”232  It is an open question whether this is  sufficient to justify the differential
treatment.233   In any event, what is relevant for present purposes is not the wisdom of any particular
example of Tailoring, but the fact of Tailoring in contemporary constitutional law.
(b)     State Analogs to the Electoral College.  The electoral college is another
system that deviates from population-based voting.234 Under the electoral college that selects the
      235See U.S. CONST . ART. II, §1, cl. 2.
      236The number of Representatives also diverges from a strict population basis due, among other reasons, to the
constitutional requirements that all States have at least one Representative and that no congressional district cross state
lines.  See  U.S. Dep’t of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442, 447-48 (1992).  
      237Another crucial reason is that Electors are awarded on a winner-take-all basis at each State.
      238See Gray, 372 U.S. at 378-81.
      239The voting scheme was complex.  To be nominated for office, candidates for statewide office were required to
receive a majority of both the popular and unit votes.  If no candidate received both, a second run-off primary was
required between the candidate that received the most popular votes and the one that received the most unit votes.  The
candidate with the highest number of unit votes would prevail.  See id. at 372.
      240Id. at 372-73.
      241Id. at 378 (quoting Gray v. Sanders, 203 F. Supp. 158, 170).
      242Id. at 378.
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President, each State has a number of Electors equal to the whole number of Senators and
Representatives to which it is entitled in the Congress.235  Because the Senate is not apportioned on
a population basis, the ratio of Electors among the States is not  equal  to the ratio of the populations
among the States.236  For this reason, among others,237 the results of voting in the electoral college
can diverge from the popular vote.   
The Court has held that States, however, may not use a voting system analogous to the
Electoral College for the election of state officials.238  Georgia had a “county unit system,” under
which counties were allotted units on the basis of their population.  The majority in each county
determined which primary candidate would be allotted the county’s unit.239  Because the units were
not allocated on a linear population basis, the units were not proportional to population.  As a result,
rural votes were weighted more heavily than urban votes.240  A three-judge United States District
Court upheld the Georgia system to the extent that “the disparity against any county is not in excess
of the disparity that exists against any state in the most recent electoral college allocation.”241  The
Supreme Court found the analogy to the electoral college to be “inapposite” because it was “the
result of specific historical concerns.”242  Irrespective of the fact that equal protection principles do
not disqualify the Electoral system, the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause rendered
      243The Court declared  that “all who participate in the election are to have an equal vote . . . wherever their home may
be in [a] geographical unit.  This is required by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The concept
of ‘we the people’ under the Constitution visualizes no preferred class of voters but equality  among those who meet the
basic qualifications.  The idea that every voter is equal to every other voter in his State, when he casts his ballot in favor
of one of several competing candidates, underlies many of our decisions.” Id. at 379-80.  This logic would suggest that
the electoral college violates equal protection, and the Court in Gray offered no explanation as to why the electoral
college is exempted.
      244See U.S. Dep’t of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U .S. 442, 460 (1992).
      245U.S. Dep’t of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442, 461 (1992); see also id. at 460 (referring to the principle of
“equal representation for equal numbers of people”).
      246Id. at 463 (citing Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 530-31 (1969)) (emphasis omitted).
      247See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725  (1983).
67
Georgia’s analog to the Electoral system unconstitutional.  Regardless of whether the Court’s
proffered distinction is persuasive or not, the electoral college system accordingly stands as yet
another example of constitutional principles applying differently to the federal and state
governments.243
 (c)     Population-Based Apportionment. Tailoring also is manifested in the
differences between States’ duties regarding intrastate districting and Congress’ duties vis-a-vis
interstate districting. State legislatures are responsible for drawing congressional districts for the
House of Representatives (intrastate districting).  Congress is responsible for determining the number
of Representatives that each State has (interstate districting).     Intrastate districts drawn by state
legislatures are subject to a strict requirement that they be of equal populations.244  The relevant
constitutional language is Article I, §2, clause 1, which requires that Representatives be chosen “by
the people of the several States.” The Court has construed this to “require the States to pursue
equality in representation,”245 which in turn has been interpreted as dictating that States make “‘a
good faith effort to achieve precise mathematical equality’ within each State.”246  Population
deviations across intrastate districts of as little as one percent have been struck down as violating this
constitutional requirement of equality.247 
      248503 U.S. 442 (1992).
      249Id. at 461.
      250Id. at 446 (quoting Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 531).
      251Id. at 464 .  While it is difficult to discern the precise standard to  which the Court subject Congress’ interstate
districting decisions, it uncontroversially was far less searching than what the States are subject to.  The fact of such
Tailoring is all that matters for present purposes.
      252While it is difficult to discern the precise standard to which the Court subject Congress’ interstate districting
decisions, see id. at 464-66, it clearly was far less searching than what the States are subject to.  See id. at 459-61. The
mere fact that the federal and state governments were subject to varying constitutional standards –  that is, that the
principle of “equal representation” was Tailored as between them –  is all that matters for present purposes, that is, for
displaying instances of Tailoring in contemporary constitutional law.
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The Court in United States Department of Commerce v. Montana248 was confronted with the
question whether Congress is held to the same standards in interstate districting to which States are
subject in intrastate districting.  The precise textual question was whether Article I, §2, clause 3's
requirement that Representatives be apportioned among the several States “according to their
respective Numbers”“embodies the same principle of equality” that applies to the States.249  A
majority of a three-judge District Court had decided that Congress’ interstate districting
determinations were subject to the same requirements as the States’ intradistricting decisions,
meaning that “the only population variances that are acceptable are those that are ‘unavoidable
despite a good-faith effort to achieve absolute equality, or for which justification is shown.’”250 
The United States Supreme Court reversed in a unanimous opinion, concluding that
Congress’ apportionment method “commands far more deference than a state districting decision
. . .”251   The doctrinal variation across the federal and state governments accordingly occurs at step
3, such that 3.F  3.S.252  These variations are particularly striking in light of the fact that the Court
derived the districting duties incumbent on both the federal and state governments from the same
section of the Constitution: Article I, §2.
Once again, the Court pointed to institutional differences between the States and the federal
government to explain why doctrinal variations were appropriate. Though intrastate and interstate
      253See id. at 447-48.
      254Under the 1990 census utilized in Montana, the ideal district was 572,466.  Under the interstate districting scheme
challenged in that case, Montana’s population of 803,655 comprised one congressional district and the State of
Washington had nine districts that averaged 543,105.  If Montana had prevailed, M ontana would have had  two districts
with an average population of 401,838 and Washington would have had eight districts averaging 610,993.   In other
words, if Montana had prevailed, its districts’ deviations from the ideal district would have gone from 231,189 above
the ideal to 170,628 below the ideal, whereas Washington’s deviation would have gone from 29,361 below the ideal
district to 38,527 above the ideal across its eight remaining congressional districts.  Bringing Montana closer to the ideal
district accord ingly would have pushed Washington’s congressional d istricts away from the ideal.  See id. at 461-62.
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districting both are directed at creating  equality in representation, the Court ruled that equality
means different things across the different institutional contexts of interstate and intrastate
districting.  At the level of intrastate districting, the requirement of numerical equality is a
straightforward concept.  Drawing district lines so districts contain equal populations is a task that
does not require any tradeoffs because it is driven by a single criterion.  The Court concluded that
“equality” is a more complex a notion at the interstate level.  Because the Constitution itself requires
that each State have at least one Representative and forbids the creation of congressional districts
that cross state lines,253 it almost always is impossible to ensure that congressional districts across
all States are of equal size. Because of these limitations, there are multiple, mutually incompatible
conceptions of “equality” that an interstate districting scheme could seek to realize.  For that reason,
concluded the Court, equality in respect of the federal government’s interstate districting obligation
is an indeterminate concept.  
The facts in the Montana case illustrate this.  If Montana had prevailed in the litigation and
had been awarded an additional congressional district, then the State of Washington would have lost
one seat.  Bringing Montana closer to the “ideal” district – the nation’s population of voters divided
by 435 yields  the “ideal” district size of equal population districts across the country –  would have
pushed Washington’s eight congressional districts away from the ideal.254  Which would have been
the preferable outcome from the perspective of equality?  The Court  concluded that there is no
      255See id. at 464.  What is significant for present purposes is that the Court deemed it necessary to provide an
explanation for why the federal and state governments should be treated differently, not whether the explanation
ultimately is compelling.  I myself am skeptical of the Court’s decision in Montana.  While notions of equality are more
complex in interstate districting than intrastate districting, one candidate stands out from the rest as most consistent across
both contexts.  The driving principle behind the intrastate district cases is that the weight of each individual’s vote should
be as equal as possible.  See Montana, 503 U.S. at 460 (noting the principle of “equal representation for equal numbers
of people”).  This is an individual-focused conception of equality that disregards the group to which individuals belong.
Applied to the interstate districting context, it would mean that districting should be performed in such a manner that,
consistent with the limitations that each State have at least one Representative and that no district cross state lines, the
population variances across congressional d istricts nationwide is minimized.  Such an approach reflects an ind ividual-
focused conception of equality that disregards the significance of group affiliation (such as what State a person is a
citizen of).
      256See Parker v. Brown, 317 U .S. 341 (1943).
      257See City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U .S. 389 (1978).
      258See Monell v. Dep’t of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
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uncontroversial conception of equality that can determine which interstate districting plan is more
equal, and that great deference accordingly should be given to the federal government’s
determination.255  
C.     Statutory Examples.   This Part of the Article aimed to show that notwithstanding One-
Size-Fits-All’s predominance, pockets of American constitutional law already reflect sensitivity to
the different levels of government.  An examination of contemporary law’s responsiveness to
different levels of government would be remiss if it failed to refer to the many instances where
statutory law distinguishes between the different levels of government.  For example, although States
are exempt from the federal antitrust law,256 municipalities are not.257  Similarly, states may not be
sued under §1983, but municipalities may be.258  Though not direct precedent for constitutional
Tailoring, the statutory examples are further evidence that doctrinal sensitivity to the different levels
of government is not absent from American jurisprudence.  
IV.     THE PRIMA FACIE CASE FOR TAILORING: THAT DIFFERENT LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT MAY BE
RELEVANTLY DIFFERENT
After having argued in Part II that there is no convincing rationale to support a categorical
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One-Size-Fits-All (Part II) and having shown in Part III that numerous Justices have embraced
Tailoring and that several contemporary doctrines are instances of Tailoring, this Part IV provides
a formal analysis of the differences among the different levels of government that may justify
Tailoring.   It does not delve into the specifics of what constitutional provisions should be Tailored
and what the resulting context-sensitive doctrines should look like.  Part IV instead makes a generic
argument that Tailoring is a sensible option to consider as a prima facie matter.  It generates only
a prima facie case for Tailoring, not a definitive case, because there are countervailing costs
associated with Tailoring, which are identified in Part V.  
The basis for the prima facie case, however, is surprisingly robust.  It turns out that a broad
array of approaches to ordering social life, which typically generate divergent policy prescriptions,
concurs that Tailoring may be sound some of the time. Furthermore, though these different
methodologies do not generate identical conclusions as to what constitutional guarantees should be
Tailored and what the variant doctrines should be, there is considerable overlap in the considerations
they deem relevant to determining when Tailoring is appropriate. 
Drawing on these competing methodologies, Part IV identifies five  broad respects in which
different levels of government might be sufficiently different to justify Tailoring: (1) the differing
political malfunctions to which each level is susceptible, (2) the distinctive consequences that attend
each level’s geographical scope, (3) the divergent exit costs across the different levels of government
and, correspondingly, the varying extent that efficient and diverse public goods can be generated
through a competition among polities, (4) the varying number of people necessary to garner a
majority and thereby translate their preferences into law, and (5) each polity’s distinctive functions
and responsibilities.  The analysis suggests that sometimes the central government ought to be
      259See, e.g., ELY , supra note 179;   N EIL K. KOMESAR , LAW’S LIMITS: THE RULE OF LAW AND  THE SUPPLY AND
DEMA ND  OF RIGHTS (2001).  
      260One further caveat is in order: not all tribal governments function as representative democracies.
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accorded more leeway to regulate than the lower level governments, and visa-versa. 
To be clear, Part IV does not argue that any one of the competing approaches to ordering
social life is preferable.  The different methodologies rest on different conceptions of personhood
and/or conceptions of the appropriate role of government, and choosing among them is an eminently
political enterprise.  Deciding whether or not to expand Tailoring accordingly would appear to turn
on ante-legal commitments that cannot be decided by the Constitution alone. 
A.     Different Governmental Malfunctions.  Several influential schools of constitutional
theory conceptualize constitutional law largely as a tool for correcting governmental malfunctions.
Many of these analysts have focused on failures in the democratic political process at the legislative
level.259  Others have noted that many constitutional provisions –  primarily those concerning
criminal process –   aim to keep the executive branch in check by means of prophylactic rules.  The
discussion below  shows that the presence and extent of the political failures to which constitutional
doctrine is addressed frequently is a function of the level of government that is acting. From the
perspective of malfunction-remedying approaches to constitutionalism, it accordingly would follow
that Tailoring is a sensible approach to consider. 
1.     Malfunctions in the Representative Process.  With the exception of  the “direct
democracy” of initiatives and referendums, polities at all levels of government260 in the United States
are representative democracies.  This system can operate successfully only if elected governmental
officials are able to satisfactorily represent the interests of the people.  Many theories that understand
constitutional law as a remedy for governmental malfunctions have focused on malfunctions relating
      261In Ely’s terminology, such political outsiders must rely on insiders to “virtually represent” their interests.   ELY ,
supra note 179, at 82-87.   Such virtual representation will not be adequate if the insiders’s interests systematically
diverge from those of the outsiders.  Of course, political outsiders typically can lobby and contribute money to  the
political campaigns of politicians in whose jurisdictions they do not reside in an effort to have their preferences
accounted for.
      262Another limitation comes from the legislative jurisdiction limitations imposed by the due process clause.  See
Rosen, Extraterritoriality and  Federalism, supra note 216, at 871.
      263See, e.g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138, 144 (1986) (subjecting such state regulations to strict scrutiny).
      264See, e.g., Healy v. The Beer Institute, 491 U.S. 324, 346 (1989).   For a full discussion of the dormant commerce
clause’s limitations on extraterritorialism, see Rosen, Extraterritoriality and  Federalism, supra note 216, at 919-30. 
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to representation.   It is useful to break these into three types of representation failures: (1) the
absence of representation, (2) under-representation, and (3) over-representation.  Careful thought
suggests that many of these failures are a function of a polity’s size.  This provides a prima facie
basis under a malfunction-remedying approach to the Constitution for concluding that constitutional
doctrines that remedy failures in the representation process may be amenable to Tailoring. 
a.     Absence of Representation.  Consider first the absence of representation.
A well-known example is political spillover effects, a type of externality.  Such spillover effects are
found where a policy pursued by one polity has negative effects on persons in other polities.  The
democratic malfunction is that parties who are negatively impacted have severely  limited
opportunities to shape the policies that affect them because they are not members of the political
community adopting the policy and accordingly cannot vote.261  Constitutional law corrects the
problem of negative political externalities by constraining polities from imposing such costs on
political outsiders.  Many of these constitutional limitations come from the dormant commerce
clause and Article IV’s privileges and immunities clause.262  For example, the dormant commerce
clause almost categorically disallows states from discriminating against out-of-staters263 and sharply
limits states’ powers to legislate extraterritorially,264 while the privileges and immunities clause
allows one state to treat citizens from other states differently from its own citizens only for
      265See Lunding v. New York T ax Appeals Tribunal, 522 U.S. 287, 298 (1998) (quoting Supreme Court of N.H. v.
Piper, 470  U.S. 274 , 284 (1985)).  For a  full discussion of the privileges and immunities clause, see Rosen,
Extraterritoriality and  Federalism, supra note 216, at 897-909.
      266This is true at least as far as sp illover effects being imposed on U.S. citizens is concerned.  There of course may
be spillover effects that are felt outside the United States.  Various principles of international law, including the principles
of legislative jurisdiction, deal with these types of political externalities.
      267The dormant commerce clause does not apply to Congress.  See  Maine v. Taylor, 477 U .S. 131, 138 (1986) (“It
is well established that Congress may authorize the States to engage in regu lation that the Commerce C lause would
otherwise forbid.”). No case to my knowledge has even contemplated that the privileges and immunities clause’s
principles apply to the federal government.  Furthermore, the Supreme Court long has held that the privileges and
immunities clause grants no rights to a citizen as against her own State because state residents “at least have a chance
to remedy at the pols any discrimination against them.  Out-of-state citizens have no similar opportunity.”  United
Building & Construction T rades Council v. M ayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 217 (1984); see generally Rosen,
Extraterritoriality and  Federalism, supra note 216, at 900-903 (discussing cases that establish this principle).
      268See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
      269See New Y ork v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that Congress may grant states the right to refuse
to accept another state’s radioactive waste, something that states could not have done on their own without congressional
authorization).  
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“substantial reason[s].”265  
The political malfunction regarding spillover effects disappears, however, when all affected
parties are members of the political community that enacts the law, for there are no unrepresented
parties in respect of whom there can be spillovers.  The problem of political spillover effects
consequently disappears when the Congress acts.266 This helps to justify why the constitutional
principles of non-discrimination grounded in the dormant commerce clause and the privileges and
immunities clause that counteract the political malfunction of spillover effects have not been
“reverse incorporated” against the federal government.267  Accordingly, although one State cannot
discriminate on the basis of citizenship by refusing to allow garbage from another state to be
disposed in its landfills,268 Congress can authorize the states to discriminate against other states’s
garbage.269 In short, the very existence of this particular political failure is a function of the size of
the polity.  Consequently, the nature of the Constitution’s limitations vary in this context depending
upon which level of government is acting.  In this Article’s parlance, the constitutional principles
of anti-discrimination and anti-extraterritoriality are Tailored.  
      270See W ILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW , ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS (1995).
      271Id. at 126-31.
      272Id. at 139 .  
      273Id. at 131.
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Similar concerns for spillover effects have led a recent commentator to argue that local
regulations should be subject to stricter scrutiny than state or federal regulations across a wide range
of constitutional property rights.270  Professor William Fischel argues that many constitutional
provisions function as  intertemporal commitments by governments.  Such commitments encourage
citizens to engage in activities they otherwise would not due to fear that the  government will take
the fruits of their labor.  Government commitment to keep promises, such as respecting private
property, accordingly encourages investment and development today that yields benefits
tomorrow.271  
Fischel argues that smaller governments are more apt to break their promises, and that they
accordingly require heightened judicial review:  
Left to their own devices, the smaller republics would discount the welfare of
underrepresented outsiders.  Local insiders can use regulation in a way that subverts the
Constitution’s clear commands not to take property without compensation.  The larger
republics are less subject to that temptation because the burden of regulation is more likely
to fall on properly represented insiders and their progeny.272  
The burden of a smaller government’s promise-breaking is more likely to fall on unrepresented
outsiders because the costs of government promise-breaking today arise only in the future (insofar
as current promise-breaking discourages investment today, which will have consequences later), and
much of the future population that will suffer is not currently located in smaller jurisdictions on
account of the great “mobility of the population.”273  At larger levels of government, by contrast,
democratic processes provide a better check on governmental promise-breaking because the costs
of promise-breaking are more likely to fall on the people, or the descendants of those, who currently
      274See id. at 131 (providing “an economic-federalism rationale for judicial review” that “[i]n order to run a system
in which there are many governments, there must be  some external control over opportunistic defaults by one unit whose
costs are shifted to o thers or to the nation as a whole”); id. at 132 (noting a variety of non-judicial constraints on the
federal government and states that limit various types of malfeasance but noting that “in the context of local government
takings, sometimes courts are the only serious constraint”).
      275See id. 
      276Fischel’s analysis focuses only on the contract clause decision of Home Building & Loan  Assn. v. Blaisdsell, 290
U.S. 398 (1934), and  mistakenly treats the contract clause as wholly devoid of substantive b ite.  See FISCHEL, supra note
269, at 130-31.  In fact, the Court has relied on the contract clause in striking down two state statutes since Blaisdell was
decided.  See United Trust Company of New York v . New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977); Allied Structural Steel Co. v.
Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978).
      277See, e.g., Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Company, 467 U.S. 717 (1984).
      278See Pension Benefit Guaranty, 467 U.S. at 732-33 (“it is suggested that we apply constitutional principles that have
been developed under the Contract Clause . . . when reviewing this federal legislation.  We have never held, however,
that the principles embodied in the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause are coextensive with prohibitions existing
against state impairments of pre-existing contracts.  Indeed, to the extent that recent decisions of the Court have
addressed the issue, we have contrasted the limitations imposed on States by the Contract Clause with the less searching
standards imposed on economic legislation by the Due Process Clauses.”) (internal citations omitted); see also Natioal
Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co., 470 U.S. 451, 472 & n. 25 (1985) (same).
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reside in the polity.  In short, Fischel argues that larger governments require less active constitutional
oversight by the judiciary because they are less capable of imposing promise-breaking costs on
unrepresented outsiders.274 
Fischel applies his theory to takings doctrine, which currently is One-Size-Fits-All, and
concludes that the law should be altered so that smaller polities are subject to greater scrutiny than
larger polities.275  There is another area of constitutional law Fischel does not mention in this regard
that is consistent with his theory.276  The Contract Clause, which by its terms applies only to States,
is an anti-retroactivity principle that proscribes legislative impairment of contracts.  Although there
is no analogous constitutional language that addresses the federal government, the Supreme Court
long has held that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause imposes anti-retroactivity limitations
on the federal government, as well.277  It is well established, however, that these anti-retroactivity
limitations are not identical.278  The Court has offered virtually no justification for the disparate
      279The Court has explained that “[i]t could not justifiably be claimed that the Contract Clause applies, either by its
own terms of by convincing historical evidence, to actions of the National Government.”  Pension Benefit, 467 U.S. at
733 & n. 9.  The problem with this justification is that the absence of text and history has not kept the Court from
incorporating the Bill of Rights’s guarantees against the States.  See Dorf, supra note 24, at xx, discussed supra at p. x.
      280See Pension Benefit, 467 U.S. at 732-33.
      281ELY , supra note 179, at 153-54.
      282Id. at 151.
      283Id. at 161.
      284Id. at 160.
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treatment of the federal and state governments as regards retroactivity.279  Fischel’s theory provides
a plausible answer: the Court appropriately subjects retroactive federal legislation to lower level
scrutiny than is given to state legislation280 because the federal government is less able to break its
promises than are the states.  When Congress acts, there are fewer unrepresented outsiders upon
whom the externality of promise-breaking could fall by virtue of the fact that Congress represents
the interests of a larger bloc of citizens than do either states or municipalities.
b.     Under-Representation.   Consider next  the problem of systematic
“under-representation” of discrete and insular minorities that was famously identified by John Hart
Ely.   Ely argued that the heightened scrutiny that the Court affords to suspect classifications is a
proper doctrinal response to political failures where governmental officials systematically disregard
the interests of a “discrete and insular” minority for two reasons.   First,  “widespread hostility” may
“distort reality” such that legislators will be unable to see the “overlapping interests that can bind
them into a majority on a given issue.”281  As a result, the “wheeling and dealing by which various
minorities that make up our society typically interact to protect their interests” may “prove
recurrently unavailing.”282 Second, even where there is not such hostility, there might be “subtle[]
self-aggrandizing biases of the majority”283 that “distort” their perspectives284 and  result in
legislation that is based on problematic stereotypes and generalizations.  Ely argued that
contemporary constitutional doctrine, which upholds “suspect classifications” only when the state
      285ELY , supra note 179, at 146.
      286Id. at 147-48.
      287Under E ly’s analysis, there might be relevant differences among different polities for purposes of suspect
classifications even if the racial group did  not constitute a numerical majority in the sub-federal polity.  Ely notes that
hostility and stereotyping are likely to be diminished as “social intercourse” among groups increases, see id. at 161, and
it is quite possible that the amount of inter-group social interaction might vary across polities.
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can “come up with a goal of substantial weight” and “show that the classification fits that goal with
virtual perfection,”285 is a sensible way to identify legislation that is the product of the political
malfunctions of hostility or distorted perspectives.286
Importantly, the risk of both types of political malfunctions turns on the size and make-up
of the polity that is acting.   For instance, though there might be “widespread hostility” across the
country against a particular group, there might be a majority of that group in a particular sub-federal
polity.  If so, the very predicate for heightened scrutiny would be absent when such a sub-federal
polity acts.   Similarly, the self-aggrandizing perceptions that distort the perspective of the majority
when the Congress acts, and that appropriately invites the doctrine of suspect classifications and
heightened scrutiny under Ely’s approach, would not be present if the government that enacted a
racial classification (for instance) were a sub-federal polity in which the majority of citizens and
representatives belonged to the racial group that constitutes a minority on the national political
stage.287   
Ely’s analysis accordingly suggests, at least as a prima facie matter, that whether a given
classification constitutes  a suspect class that appropriately triggers heightened scrutiny may depend
on which level of government has acted.  What constitutes a “minority” at the national level, with
respect to  whom the majority might either be hostile or might systematically misperceive, may not
be a minority at the sub-federal level.  If the predicate for political malfunction is absent, it would
follow that the constitutional doctrine that seeks to remedy the malfunction is inapposite. So, for
      288This would  not necessarily be so, however, if the classification burdened the white racial minority in the local
government.  Cf. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
      289THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 77-78 (CLINTON ROSSITER, ED . 1961).  
      290See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV . 29 (1985) (equating
Madison’s faction with interest groups); Jonathan M acey, Transaction Costs and the Normative E lements of the Public
Choice Model: An Application to Constitutional Theory , 74 VA. L. REV. 471 (1988) (same).
      291See NEIL K. KOMESAR , IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES 217-21 (U. Chi. Press. 1994).
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example, a racial classification might appropriately be subject to heightened scrutiny if enacted by
the federal government but only to rational basis scrutiny if enacted by an African-American majority
local government.288  More generally, Ely’s analysis gives rise to the possibility of Tailoring at the
levels of 3 and 4, such that    
3.F 3.S, and/or 
4.F 4.S.  
It also suggests that not all sub-federal governments that are situated at the same hierarchical level
should be treated the same.   A white majority in a municipality, for instance, may be relevantly
different for present purposes from an African-American majority in a municipality.
c.     Over-Representation.   Finally, consider the malfunction I termed “over-
representation.” This refers to a political decision that reflects the desires of the numerical majority
that does not take adequate account of the numerical minority’s interests.   James Madison famously
referred to this as the problem of “factions” in the Federalist 10.289  Though  contemporary readers
schooled in public choice may naturally conceptualize “factions” as numerical minorities that can
successfully influence governmental action due to their intense desires – that is, as “interest
groups”290 – this is not what Madison appears to have had in mind.291  As Neil Komesar has pointed
out, Madison seemed to be of the view in Federalist 42 that numerical minorities are not dangerous:
“If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the republican principle, which
      292FEDERALIST PAPERS, supra note 288, at xx.
      293See KOMESAR , IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES, supra note 290, at 53-97.
      294For an illuminating discussion of the normative shortcomings of majority rule, see Christopher J. Peters,
Persuasion: A Model of Majoritarianism as Adjudication, 96 NW . U. L. REV. 1,2 (2001).
      295See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMP TING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW , 139-41 (1990)
(noting the principle of “self-government, which means that in wide areas of life majorities are entitled to rule, if they
wish, simply because they are majorities); ELY , supra note 179, at 7 (“whatever the explanation, and granting the
qualifications, rule in accord with the consent of a majority of those governed is the core of the American governmental
system”).  On the other hand, others have argued that many elements of the Constitution reflect a rejection of pure
democracy.  See, e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL, HO W  DEMOCRATIC IS THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION? (2001) (noting and
bemoaning this); Randy E. Barnett, Constitutional Legitimacy, 103 COLUM . L. REV. 111, 128 (2003).  For present
purposes I will leave aside the question of supermajority and supramajority rules. 
      296For instance, although it readily can be shown that rule by a pure numerical majority can lead to inefficient
outcomes, see KOMESAR , LAW’S LIMITS, supra note 258, at 64-67, it is not axiomatic that obtaining efficient outcomes
is the end goal of democratic lawmaking.  Similarly, although many might think it unfair for a numerical minority’s
interests to be systematically disregard in a solely majoritarian-regard ing political process, see id. at 65, any such fairness
principle also is exogenous to democratic theory.  Indeed, Neil Komesar forthrightly acknowledges that determining
whether majoritiarian influences constitute a  political malfunction in any given instance of governmental action turns
on normative considerations.  See id. at 64; K OMESAR , IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES, supra note 290, at 76- 80 (the chosen
“social goal” determines whether legislation appropriately reflects the desires of the majority or problematically reflects
majoritarian bias).
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enables the majority to defeat its sinister views by regular vote.”292  The problem of factions, instead,
arises when the faction is part of the majority: “When a majority is included in a faction, the form
of popular Government, on the other hand, enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest both
the public good and the rights of other citizens.”  Komesar has usefully dubbed this political
malfunction the problem of “majoritarian bias.”293 
Determining what qualifies as majoritarian bias is tricky insofar as it is not simple to explain
why a system of rule by numerical majority constitutes a political malfunction.294  After all, the right
to regulate rule in accordance with the majority’s desire  is a cornerstone of our democratic
government.295  Determining if and when majoritarianism is problematic  rests on contestable value
judgments that are exogenous to democratic theory, and about which  people are deeply divided.296
In short, identifying why and when laws that reflect the will of the majority constitute a failure of
the political process is a deeply political question, and resolving it is beyond the scope of this Article.
Regardless of how the political malfunction of over-representation is normatively grounded,
      297FEDERALIST PAPERS, supra note 288, at  83.
      298Id.
      299Id.
      300See supra at Part II.B.1.  
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however, the discussion immediately below shows that the extent of this political failure (for those
who identify it as such) will likely be a function of the polity’s size.   The logic that inclines these
people to conceptualize constitutionalism as a remedy for the political malfunction of
majoritarianism accordingly should lead them to a prima facie conclusion that Tailoring is a
doctrinal option that ought to be considered.
(i)     Federalist 10.  First consider Madison.  He proposed that the
problem of factions is tamed, if not solved, to the extent a polity “[e]xtend[s] the sphere.”297  By this,
Madison meant extending the borders of the relevant political unit and accordingly enlarging it.
“Extend the sphere,” wrote Madison, “and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you
make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights
of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to
discover their own strength and to act in unison with each other.”298 
To be sure, the discussion in Federalist 10 was not intended to give guidance to courts, but
instead sought to explain the benefit of a “large over a small republic.”299  Supreme Court Justices,
however, have understood Madison’s insight to have implications in respect of constitutional
principles that remedy political malfunctions.  Thus it is these very passages from the Federalist 10
that Justice Scalia quoted in his concurring opinion in the Croson decision, and that Justice Stevens
cited in his dissent in Adarand, to support the proposition that the dangers of racial discrimination
are greater at lower levels of government than at higher levels.300  The lower likelihood of
factionalism at the higher level of government was the predicate for these Justices’s conclusion  that
      301See id.  As discussed above, Justice Scalia abandoned this analysis in Adarand when he embraced the princip le
of congruence.  See id.
      302See LAW’S LIMITS, supra note 258, at 60-70.
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congressional enactments of benign racial classifications should be subject to a lower level of
judicial scrutiny than racial classifications created by states or localities.301  
The Justices’s arguments based on the Federalist 10 can be usefully restated as follows: The
content of the constitutional principle of equal protection appropriately varies across polities of
different size when the political malfunction that equal protection seeks to remedy is a function of
the polity’s size, and “factionalism” is one such political malfunction.  This logic can be generalized:
to the extent a constitutional principle remedies the political malfunction of majoritarianism, there
is a prima facie basis for concluding that the principle should be Tailored depending upon the level
of government whose activity is being reviewed.
(ii)     Komesar’s “Two-Force” Model of Politics.  Professor Neil
Komesar has propounded a rich theory of politics that builds on public choice’s interest group
theory. Komesar identifies political malfunctions and construes various constitutional provisions as
remedies for certain types of  political malfunctions.  His account suggests that the nature and extent
of political failure is a function of the level of government that has acted.  It follows that
constitutional doctrines also may vary in accordance with the level of government that has acted. 
Komesar identifies two types of political malfunctions: “majoritarian” and “minoritarian”
bias.302  Minoritarian bias refers to the legislative distortions recognized by interest group politics:
the ability of groups with small numbers but high stakes to organize and successfully lobby for laws
that benefit them at the expense of a diffuse majority that fails to press their interests due to the
transactions costs of organizing a large group, free rider problems, and relatively low per capita
      303See KOMESAR , IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES, supra note 290, at 54-58; Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Public
Choice Revisited, 96 MICH . L. REV. 1715, 1718  (1998).
      304See KOMESAR , IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES, supra note 290, at 80; see also id. at 56, n.5; id. at 76; id. at 79.
      305See id. at 80.
      306Id. at 81.
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stakes.303  Majoritarian bias, as discussed above, is the converse situation of numerical majorities
winning laws that advance their interests at the expense of minorities.  Komesar astutely notes that
determining whether any given policy is an instance of legitimate governmental response to majority
desires (“majoritarian influence,” which is not a political malfunction) or illegitimate invasion of
minority interests at the behest of the majority (the political malfunction of “majoritarian bias”) turns
on the normative metric used to evaluate the governmental action.304  The same need for a normative
baseline besets efforts to distinguish minoritarian influence from minoritarian bias.305  Though the
line between welcome influence and dysfunctional bias thus is bound to be deeply   contested,
Komesar is probably right when he states that there is a “pervasive, though amorphous, intuition that
both simply counting noses without considering the degree and extent of impacts [majoritarianism]
and simply ministering to the desires of the active few [minoritarianism] can sometimes lead to
severe injustice.”306  
For present purposes we need not establish what normative baseline is appropriate.  What
matters instead is that we have an understanding of the dynamics of majoritarian and minoritarian
influence on the political process.  Under Komear’s account, the nature and extent of each type of
influence systematically varies on the basis of which level of government is acting.  This suggests
that there is a prima facie basis for concluding that multi-level constitutional doctrines may vary in
their application depending on which level of government is acting.
Under Komesar’s analysis, whether majoritarian or minoritarian influence  prevails in a given
      307Id. at 30.  For a similar analysis of the political economy of land use laws, see W ILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE
ECONOMICS OF ZONING LA W S: A  PROPERTY RIGHTS APPROACH TO AMERICAN LAND USE CON TRO LS (1985) at 209
(majoritarian bias the more common form of political malfunction at suburban level); id. at 211-21 (minoritarian the more
likely problem at higher levels of government).
      308 KOMESAR , IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES, supra note 290, at 73.
      309See KOMESAR , LAW’S LIMITS, supra note 258, at 62-63.
      310 KOMESAR , IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES, supra note 290, at 60-64.
      311Id. at 69.
      312Id. at 226 (“As a general matter, an active majority can overwhelm an active minority.”).
      313See KOMESAR , LAW’S LIMITS, supra note 258, at 63 (noting that the likelihood of majoritarian or minoritarian bias
is likely to “vary across political issues and political jurisdictions”).
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situation is a function of the costs and benefits of participating in the political process that are faced
by the majority and minority.307  The costs are a function of the size and complexity of the political
process (which is a function of the number of legislators, “the frequency of elections, the size and
scope of the legislative agenda, and the rules of the legislature”308), the complexity of the substantive
issue, and the cost of organizing the group (which is a function of the group size and the information
costs of educating the group members).309  The relevant benefits of participation are the per capita
stakes and the distribution of the potential benefits.310   The costs and benefits typically will vary
depending upon the size of the group that shares a common interest.  All other things being equal,
it is easier to organize smaller groups than larger groups because it is cheaper to educate smaller
groups of people and less expensive to  form and police agreements among smaller groups.311 If the
benefits exceed costs for the minority but not the majority, then minority influence is likely to prevail
over majority influence.  If the benefits exceed costs for both the majority and minority, then
majority influence is likely to prevail.312 
Importantly, the costs of political participation systematically vary across different levels of
government.313  Information and agency costs typically increase at higher levels of government.
Compare, for instance, participation costs at local versus the federal government. Effective political
participation is far cheaper at the local level because lobbying costs are smaller (there are far fewer
      314Id.  KOMESAR , IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES, supra note 290, at 63.
      315This analysis simplifies matters somewhat.  There are some mediating institutions (such as public interest groups)
that represent “common” interests.  Such groups, however, tend to operate mostly at the federal level.  Moreover, many
“common” interests are not represented by any such mediating institutions.
      316See KOMESAR , LAW’S LIMITS, supra note 258, at 62-63.
      317See ROBERT A. DAHL AND EDWARD R. TUFTE, SIZE AND DEMOCRACY 55 (Stanford U. Press 1973) (“The effects
of unit size on participation and effectiveness are . . . important within countries.”); id. at 65(noting that local
governments are seen as “more accessible, more subject to their control, more manageable.”).
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politicians that must be lobbied, and the lobbying costs per politician are likely to be far less
expensive insofar as it is cheaper to walk into their offices than to fly to Washington), it is “easier
to discipline unwanted action at the ballot box”314 (because it is easier to hold small numbers of
representatives politically accountable), and the costs of politically organizing a group of people who
feel similarly about a given political issue is smaller since the size of the group is smaller at the local
level.315  Moreover, the information costs associated with attaining sufficient mastery of the
substantive issue so that one can effectively influence politics typically are smaller at the local level,
where the issues are less complex and the more immediate personal stakes tends to mean that
citizens already have a stock of “general information” that diminishes the costs of obtaining
information about even relatively complex matters.316  These factors may help explain the
robust cross-country, empirical findings of prominent political theorist Robert Dahl and social
scientist Edward Tufte that citizen effectiveness and participation is far greater at local levels than
the national level.317  In any event, Dahl and Tufte’s work provides empirical support for Komesar’s
predictions as regards varying political participation across different levels of government. 
The implication of the preceding analysis is that majoritarian influence is far more likely to
prevail over the interests of numerical minorities in smaller governmental units than in larger units;
because the costs of political participation are smaller in smaller governmental units, majorities can
be expected to participate, and hence exert determinative influence by virtue of their numbers, even
      318Komesar notes, of course, that political issues sometimes generate sufficient public interest so that majoritarian
interests are reflected in federal legislation.  See KOMESAR , IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES, supra note 290, at 53-55.  Indeed,
this observation propels Komesar to augment the interest group model of politics, which focuses solely on minoritarian
bias.  See id.
      319See KOMESAR , IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES, supra note 290, at 219-20.
      320See id. at 220.
      321See id. at 99 & n.20.
      322Id. at 95. 
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when per capita stakes are relatively small.   Conversely, minoritarian influence is more likely to
prevail in larger governmental units, where there are higher costs of political participation, per capita
benefits frequently are low, and free rider obstacles may hinder if not wholly bar effective political
organization by the majority, leaving only small groups with high per capita interests to politically
organize and affect policy.  To be sure, what is significant under Komesar’s analysis is not the legal
status of the polity but its physical size; for instance, majoritarian influence is more likely to prevail
in a rural county than a large metropolitan city.  Nonetheless, generalizations certainly can be made
with respect to federal, state, and local governments.  For example, minoritarian influence is more
likely to prevail at the federal level than at the sub-federal levels.318 
Understanding the nature of the political malfunction is important to constitutional analysis
under Komesar’s approach because he suggests that many constitutional provisions are remedies for
particular types of political malfunctions.  The  Anti-Federalists were concerned with  curbing
minoritarian bias,319 but the Constitution that was adopted ultimately reflected the Federalist’s
concern with controlling majoritarian bias.320  In keeping with the Constitution’s general anti-
majoritarianism tendency, Komesar suggests that the takings clause is best understood as a protection
against majoritarian bias.321  Indeed, Komesar argues that the Taking Clause’s requirement of just
compensation is structured in a manner that “corrects majoritarian bias, not minoritarian bias.”322
How so?  The requirement of just compensation imposes a cost on all taxpayers – the majority –
      323See id. at 95-97.
      324See id. at 97-98.  
      325See id.
      326See id.
      327Prophylactic rules are not limited, however, to criminal procedure.  For a discussion of prophylactic rules in the
context of  speech and equal protection, see David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules,  55 U. CHI. L. REV.
190, 195-207 (1988).
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hence eliminating the majority’s incentive to take from the minority.  Compensation would not,
however, discourage minoritarian bias because the pro rata tax increase small groups would bear by
virtue of the takings clause’s compensation requirement is smaller than the benefits they could reap
by the taking.323  Indeed, a judicially administered compensation requirement itself creates new
opportunities for minoritarian bias insofar as the judicial process is very costly.324  This suggests that
if the takings clause were utilized to correct minoritarian bias, it not only would fail in its mission
but perversely would make matters worse.325  Komesar accordingly argues that takings doctrine
should be understood as a remedy for majoritarian bias, and that takings doctrine should review local
regulations more strictly than federal regulations because majoritarian bias is far more likely to occur
at lower levels of government.326
                                       * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
To quickly conclude, the analyses of Madison, Fischel, and Komesar converge on the
following principle:  constitutional principles designed to correct political malfunctions might vary
in their application if the malfunctions they aim to remedy systematically vary from one level of
government to another.
2.     Prophylactic Rules. It is widely thought that many constitutional doctrines,
particularly those relating to criminal procedure,327 are prophylactic rules designed to insure against
constitutional violations by governmental actors, particularly members of the executive branch such
      328See, e.g., Susan R. Klein, Identifying and (Re)Formulating Prophylactic Rules, Safe Harbors, and Incidental
Rights in Constitutional Criminal Procedure , 99 MICH . L. REV. 1030, 1037-44 (2001); Brian K. Landsberg,
Safeguarding Constitutional Rights: The Uses and Limits of Prophylactic Rules, 66 TENN. L. REV. 925 (1999); Strauss,
Ubiquity , supra note 326, at 190; Joseph D. Grano, Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure: A Q uestion of Article
III Legitimacy , 80 NW . U. L. REV. 100 (1985); but  see Evan H. Caminker, Miranda and Some Puzzles of “Prophylactic”
Rules, 70 U. CIN . L. REV. 1, 2 (2001)(arguing that “there is no difference in kind, or meaningful difference in degree,
between Miranda’s so-called prophylactic rule and the run-of-the-mill judicial doctrines routinely constructed by the
Court . . .”).  Professor Caminker’s argument can be viewed as an extension of the point made by Professor Strauss in
1988.   Consistent with this Article’s methodology of identifying competing approaches to ordering social life without
deciding among them, I need not here take sides on the issue of whether or not constitutional doctrine generated by the
Supreme Court by its nature is prophylactic in character.  Regardless of whether prophylactic rules are occasional,
ubiquitous, or omnipresent, the same question arises as to the appropriate scope of a doctrine’s ban on activities that in
and of themselves are not unconstitutional.  As argued below, Tailoring is prima facie sensible to the extent that either
the likelihood of misbehavior, or the costs of over-protecting, vary across the different levels of government. 
      329See Klein, Identifying, supra note 327, at 1033.
      330The Court’s opinion in Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000), however, muddied the waters with
regard to the status of the Miranda warnings.  For a fine discussion, see Klein, Identifying, supra note 327, at 1071-76.
      331In fact, the Court has not spoken with one voice as to whether, in its view, prophylactic rules are legitimate. 
      332See sources referenced above in footnote 327.
      333See Grano, Article III Legitimacy, supra note 327 (arguing that prophylactic rules are beyond the appropriate scope
of powers of Article III courts); Strauss, Ubiquity , supra note 326 (noting the “ubiquity” of prophylactic rules in an effort
to establish their legitimacy).
      334See Klein, Identifying, supra note 327, at 1035 (showing this).  Not all  Justices agree; Justices Scalia and Thomas
appear  to be of the view that prophylactic rules are beyond the Court’s proper powers.  See Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at xx
(Scalia and Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
      335See Landsberg, Uses and  Limits, supra note 327, at 963-976; Klein, Identifying, supra note 327, at xx.
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as police and prosecutors, when they implement government policy.328  Prophylactic rules prohibit
behaviors that in themselves are not unconstitutional, or require behaviors that in themselves are not
constitutionally mandated, for the sake of ensuring that core constitutional rights are not violated.
Prophylactic rules hence “overprotect[] the constitutional clause at issue.”329  The Miranda warnings
long were understood as paradigmatic prophylactic requirements.330  
The Court has not articulated a coherent theory regarding prophylactic rules.331  This has led
to a sizable amount of scholarly discussion of the subject.332  The first generation of scholarship
identified the phenomenon of prophylactic rules and debated their legitimacy.333  The scholarly
consensus today is that the Court has the power to fashion such rules.334   The second generation of
scholarship has considered the appropriate scope of prophylactic rules.335  Although not much has
      336Klein, Identifying, supra note 327, at 1060.
      337Id.
      338Id. at 1054.
      339See id. at 1054-1059.
      340Id. at 1055.
      341Id.  For examples, see Klein, Identifying, supra note 327, at 1054-59.
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been written yet on this subject, several commentators’ analyses, as well as good sense, suggest that
the scope of a given prophylactic rule may appropriately vary depending upon the level of
government to which the rule is to be applied.
a.     The Need to Over-Protect Constitutional Rights.  Professor Klein, for
example, has argued that prophylactic rules are appropriate when “the Court finds that it cannot
otherwise protect a particular constitutional clause,” but notes that “[a]lthough in such situations
some prophylactic rule is necessary, no particular rule is required – only one that is ‘effective.’”336
Klein accordingly concludes that prophylactic rules can be modified “as changed circumstances and
new data generated by social scientists mandate.” Furthermore,  the Court can “change the rules by
accepting alternate rules provided by Congress, state legislators, federal and state law enforcement
agencies and state judges, who may have better knowledge of the circumstances encountered or facts
on the ground . . .”337  Indeed, Professor Klein shows several instances where the Court has adopted
a prophylactic rule and then “signal[ed]”338 to other federal or state actors that they could adopt
alternative strategies for protecting the core constitutional right that the Court’s prophylactic rule
protected.339  In some instances states and the federal executive have responded, “attempt[ing] to
institute substitute procedures” for the prophylactic rule laid down by the Court.340  Not surprisingly,
these responses were neither coordinated nor identical, with the result that the  federal executive
branch and the different states adopted different procedures.341
Professor Klein’s reasoning suggests that it might be appropriate to Size prophylactic rules.
      342Consideration of such costs are not wholly absent from Professor K lein’s analysis, see, e.g.,  Klein, Identifying,
supra note 327, at 1033 (prophylactic rules must be “more effective” than no rule in guarding against constitutional
violations and “involve only acceptable costs”), but they receive little direct attention throughout the article.
90
On her account, prophylactic rules are pragmatic attempts to guard constitutional rights, and a
prophylactic rule’s  scope is determined by whatever the “circumstances” require so that the rule is
“effective” in accomplishing its protective goal.   The question becomes whether the circumstances
that call for prophylactic rules might systematically vary across the different levels of government.
Might there, for example, be consistent  differences across workers at the different levels of
government with regard to such variables as training, skill, accountability to the public, and so forth?
If so, the risks of constitutional violation accordingly may vary across the different levels of
government. 
The answer ultimately is empirical in nature, and it might well vary across subject matter.
There seems to be little reason, however, to conclusively presume identicality as among the different
levels of government across all relevant variables, as the contemporary doctrine of One-Size-Fits-All
does.  In the end, considerations of administrability might lead to the conclusion that the Court
should not draft one set of prophylactic rules for federal actors and a different set for state actors.
But it should be understood that such an election to adopt a One-Size-Fits-All approach to
prophylactic rules is driven by pragmatics rather than conceptual necessity. Legalists accordingly
should be open-minded to the possibility that there may be sufficient differences across levels of
government in some circumstances to justify Tailoring.
b.     The Costs of Over-Protection.  Whereas Professor Klein’s analysis
focuses primarily  on what is necessary to protect the constitutional right, it also might be wise to
take account of the potential costs of over-protection. 342  Professor Landsberg suggestively invokes
      343See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
      344See Landsberg, supra note 327, at 966-67.
      345Cf. Strauss, Ubiquity , supra note 326, at 193 & n. 12.
      346SeeJoseph Raz, Incommensurability and Agency, in INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL REASON 110
(RUTH CHANG, ED., 1997) (“Incommensurability is the absence of a common measure”).
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the concept of “proportionality,” which the Court has utilized to limit Congress’s powers to enact
prophylactic legislation pursuant to its powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,343 as
a guide.344   Though proportionality is notoriously difficult to specify, the concept that serves as its
foundation is instructive in the present context.  One factor relevant to a proportionality analysis is,
as under Professor Klein’s approach, the likelihood of constitutional violation absent some
prophylactic rule.  Proportionality also bids the analyst to consider the costs of over-protection
imposed by the prophylactic rule.345  Over-protection costs refer to the liberty sacrifices that attend
proscribing (or requiring) behaviors that themselves are not constitutionally proscribed (or required)
for the sake of protecting core constitutional rights, as well as the consequences of those proscribed
or required behaviors.  For instance, the exclusionary remedy is a prophylactic rule whose over-
protection costs include withholding relevant evidence during prosecution and possibly keeping
dangerous persons on the street instead of in prison.  
In assessing whether a given prophylactic rule was appropriate in scope, a proportionality
analysis thus would take account of the probability of a constitutional violation, the cost of any such
violation, and the over-protection costs.  I do not mean to suggest that these various considerations
can be reduced to a common metric and readily balanced; surely the “costs” of a constitutional
violation and the “costs” of over-protection are incommensurable.346  I simply mean that a
proportionality analysis would take account of the costs of over-protection in the same  way that
      347See Brett G. Scharffs, Adjudications and the Problems of Incommensurability, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1367, 1374
(1991)(noting that “[j]udges routinely seek to accomplish the impossible – to commensurate incommensurable values.  That they
attempt to do so with regularity says something important about the problems of incommensurability, namely that such problems do
not foreclose reasoned deliberation and choice.”).  For an enlightening discussion of how decisionmakers can decide among
incommensurable options, see Elijah Millgram, Incommensurability and Practical Reasoning, in INCOMMENSURABILITY, supra
note 345, at 151-69 (focusing on individual decisionmaking under circumstances of incommensurability).
      348See supra Part III.A.
      349Time and circumstances will determine which cost is greater.  Cf. William J. Stuntz, O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton,
and the Transsubstantive Fourth Amendment, 114 HARV. L. REV. 842, 847-48 (2001) (criticizing contemporary doctrine
on the basis that while “the Fourth Amendment treats one crime just like another . . . one crime is not just like another.
The Fourth Amendment forbids ‘unreasonable searches and seizures.’  Reasonableness here, as elsewhere in law, requires
a balance of gains and losses, benefits and costs,” and noting that the benefits of capturing a murderer are  “strikingly
different” from those of jailing persons who sell marijuana from their homes).
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courts typically take account of incommensurable considerations when they decide cases.347
Common sense suggests that some over-protection costs may  systematically vary depending
upon which level of government is acting.  Such costs are a function of what the government is
attempting to accomplish.  A prophylactic rule might hinder the government’s ability to accomplish
a particular task, and the rule’s over-protection cost will be a function of the value of that task.
Tailoring is implicated to the extent that different levels of government may be responsible for
different tasks that have dissimilar values.  As discussed above, Justice Jackson and Justice Harlan
made just this point.348 To provide another concrete example, compare specialized federal agencies
and local governments.  Imagine a federal agency that were responsible exclusively for preventing
and investigating terrorism. The over-protection costs of a prophylactic rule that interfered with the
agency’s discharge of its duty would not be identical to the over-protection costs of the same rule
in respect of local law enforcement that is directed to solving petty crimes.349  
The point is that there is no good reason to conclusively assume that over-protection costs
are identical across different levels of government.  To the extent they are not, a proportionality
analysis supports the Tailoring of prophylactic rules.  Once again, administrability concerns might
suggest that it is not wise to create different prophylactic rules for different levels of government.
      350A caveat is in order:  polities have the power to regulate extraterritorially to a certain degree.  See generally Rosen,
Extra territoriality and Federalism, supra note 216, at 877-91945-55.   In general, however, the statement above in text
is correct.
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Such a conclusion should be recognized, however, for what it is: a pragmatic determination, and not
a judgment of what the Constitution requires as an a priori matter.  Indeed, the insight that there is
a basis for concluding that federal authorities can be subjected to different prophylactic rules than
state and local authorities might be particularly relevant in our post-9/11 world.   There is a
principled basis for concluding that a federal anti-terrorism agency populated by highly trained
experts could be subject to less stringent prophylactic limitations than local police departments
owing to the federal agents’s higher training and the greater over-protection costs as a result of the
agency’s responsibility.
B.     Differing Geographical Scope.  Another difference between the different levels of
government is the different geographical scope to which their regulations and other activities apply.
For example, Congress’s statutes apply nationwide, whereas Chicago’s ordinances for the most part
apply only within the territorial borders of Chicago.350  It is conceivable that the differing
geographical scope of different levels of government could be constitutionally significant such that
Tailoring is appropriate.
1.     Varying Risks and Benefits. The risks and benefits of a regulation frequently are
a function of its geographical scope.   With regard to risks, consider a regulation banning a particular
book on the ground that it is obscene.  One constitutional defect of such a regulation is that it
interferes with the marketplace of ideas or art.  The quantum of the constitutionally problematic
interference is smaller if the regulation is the product of a municipality rather than the federal
government because a nation-wide proscription interferes with these interests more than a city-wide
      351354 U.S. 476 (1957).
      352Id. at 506 (Harlan, J., dissenting).  It is possible, of course, that a patchwork of regulations could lead to nationwide
banning in effect if national retailers decided no t to stock works that were prohibited in any of the markets in which they
did business.  On the other hand, there remain independent vendors in most locales, and a decision by Barnes and N oble
or Amazon not to  stock such controversial works likely would serve only to deepen the independent vendors’s market
appeal.
      353See id. at 476-494.   Much of the analysis in Roth presumes identicality of constitutional standards as they app ly
to the States and  to the Federal government.  See, e.g., id. at 482 (looking to the “guaranties of freedom of expression
in effect” in the States that ratified the Constitution to shed light on the meaning of the First Amendment); id. at 488
(speaking of the need to bar “federal and state intrusion into” the “fundamental freedom of speech and press”).
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prohibition does.   This was Justice Harlan’s point in his dissent in Roth v. United States:351 “it seems
to me that no overwhelming danger to our freedom to experiment and to gratify our tastes in
literature is likely to result from the suppression of a borderline book in one of the States, so long
as there is no uniform nation-wide suppression of the book, and so long as other States are free to
experiment with the same or bolder books.”352  
Justice Harlan’s statement contains both a positive and an evaluative statement.  As to the
former, it seems undeniable that there is a difference in point of fact between the consequences that
attend a local proscription and a nation-wide ban.  As to the evaluative question of whether this
difference in fact ought to be  of legal significance, I do not intend here to argue that Justice Harlan’s
judgment was correct. A legal doctrine that categorically ignores such differences, however, cannot
plausibly be said to be self-evidently correct, for the consequences of these differences may go to the
heart of what the constitutional provision aims to guard.  When this is the case, logic suggests that
there must be an argument proffered as to why regulations emanating from two differently situated
polities ought to be treated identically by constitutional doctrine.  Justice Harlan’s dissent provided
a reasoned explanation as to why they should not.  The Roth majority, however, did not feel it
necessary to explain why it adopted a One-Size-Fits-All approach.353  One need not concur with
Justice Harlan’s ultimate evaluation to agree that a categorical and unexplained One-Size-Fits-All
      354This hypothetical ca lls to mind, of course, the Nazi Party’s effort to march in Skokie, Illinois, a largely Jewish
suburb then populated by large numbers of Holocaust survivors.  See Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978).
      355See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota, 505 U.S. 377, 391-96 (1992)(applying categorical test that did not rely
on heightened scrutiny analysis).
      356See Restatement, supra note 222, at 1551 (arguing that “constitutional practice is pervasively more oriented toward
expressive considerations than is generally recognized.”).  As is true with all the approaches to social ordering explored
in this Article, expressivism is not without its  critics.  See, e.g., Matthew D . Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A
Skeptical Overview,  148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363 (2000).  
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approach is problematic in view of the undeniable differences that attend the different geographical
scopes of federal and state regulation.
Next consider the linkage between benefits and geographical scope.  Think about regulations
of hate speech.  In the view of most, hate speech primarily injures the members of the denigrated
group about which the speech concerns.  Now compare a federal and municipal prohibition against
Nazi marches.  In the case of a federal ban on such Nazi activity, the benefits would be diffuse
because there would be potential victims in only a fraction of the places to which the proscription
would apply. The benefits would be far more concentrated if the regulation were adopted by a
municipality populated by a significant percentage of Holocaust survivors.354  These differences as
regards the distribution of benefits frequently can be relevant under contemporary doctrine.  For
example, although it would not be relevant under today’s hate speech doctrine,355 the presence of a
heavily concentrated population with particular needs might be relevant to establishing a
“compelling” governmental interest in other contexts.  Conversely, widely dispersed benefits may
suggest that a regulation has not been narrowly tailored.
2.     Varying Expressive Consequences.  The “social meaning” of a constitutional rule
frequently turns on the level of government to which it applies.  For expressive theorists, who believe
that social meaning often is an important determinant of constitutional doctrine,356 the level of
      357Much of the discussion that follows in this subsection draws on my analysis in Mark D. Rosen, Establishm ent,
Expressivism, and  Federalism, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 669 (2003).
      358See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and
Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGA L STUD. 725, 749 (1998).
      359Restatement, supra note 222, at 1520-27.  Elizabeth Anderson and Richard Pildes, among the most important of
the expressivist theorists, argue that the social meaning “do not actually have to be recognized by the community” but
only “have to be recognizable by it, if people were to exercise enough interpretive self-scrutiny.”  Id. at 1525.  For more
about their understanding of expression, see Rosen, Expressivim & Establishment, supra note 356, at 112-15.  For a brief
discussion about competing schools of expressivist thought, see id. at 113-15.
      360See Restatement, supra note 222, at 1551 (arguing that “constitutional practice is pervasively more oriented toward
expressive considerations than is generally recognized.”).
      361Id. at 1530-31.
      362Id. at 1560.
      363Id.
      364Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGA L STUD. 585, 586 (1998).  The other expressive function
Cooter mentions is “[c]reating focal points” that lead to a new equilibrium for a given system of social norms.  Id.  By
this, Cooter means law’s ability to switch behavior without altering the individual’s tastes. Id. at 595 .  Examples include
prohibiting smoking in airports and requiring dog owners to clean up after their pets.  Id.   It is likely that altering
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government that is acting accordingly may be a constitutionally significant consideration.357  
Expressivists believe it necessary to identify the“social meaning” of legal doctrine,358 by
which they mean the messages that are expressed by law and that are “recognizable” by citizens.359
Expressivists are of the view that social meaning is an important determinant of constitutional
doctrine as a purely descriptive matter.360  Expressivists believe this to be a good thing, though they
justify this normative conclusion on different grounds.  Professors Elizabeth Anderson and Richard
Pildes are of the view that legal doctrine appropriately takes account of social meaning because
expressing messages  invariably is part of what law does.  That is to say, understanding a law’s
expressive component is necessary to fully understand law.361 While Anderson and Pildes
deliberately try to disassociate expressivism from efforts to identify laws’ “direct cultural effects,”362
apparently due to a concern that courts are not capable of making such “speculative” judgments,363
other noted theorists are interested in the ways that law’s social meaning socializes citizens.  Robert
Cooter, for example, speaks of two expressive uses of law, one of which is “[c]hanging individual
values.”364 Similarly, Cass Sunstein argues that  law inevitably and properly is involved in “norm
behavior in this way ultimately leads to a change in societal values, as well.  
      365Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM . L. REV. 903, 907, 910 (1996); see also Cass R.
Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law,  144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996) (examining how law effectuates changes
in social norms).
      366See  Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 580 (1992); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1968) (“Government
in our democracy, state and national, must be neutral in matters of religious theory, doctrine, and  practice.”) (emphasis
supplied).
      367Depending on one’s view, this occurred either upon the  Fourteenth Amendment’s adoption or in Everson v. Bd.
of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
      368Daniel O. Conkle, Toward a G eneral Theory of the Estab lishment Clause , 82 NW . U. L. REV. 1113, 1132  (1988).
      369See  PHILIP HAMBUR GER, SEPARA TION OF CHURCH AND STATE (2002).
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management,” and in “expressing social values” and the “social norms” that constitute the political
community.365  
To understand the possible link between governmental level and social meaning, consider
the Establishment Clause.  It is not difficult to show that social meaning varies depending upon what
level of government –  federal, state, or local – is barred from doing the “establishing.”  A
constitutional rule prohibiting a national church precludes the federal government from proclaiming
that this is a Christian country.  A rule that also disallows the establishment of state or local
churches, as our current doctrine does,366 expresses wholesale disapproval of the intermixing of
secular and religious authority.   By contrast, a rule prohibiting a national church but not limiting
sub-federal polities –  as was the case from the Founding up to the incorporation of the
Establishment Clause against the states367 –  could be said to express neutrality on the issue of
intermixing insofar as such a rule disallows a single, nationwide  orthodoxy but permits divergent
approaches to flourish at the sub-federal level.  Indeed, one could not plausibly have described the
American political tradition as expressing  categorical opposition to the intermixing of religious and
political authority during our country’s first century inasmuch as there were established churches in
six states,368 and state and local governments in many cases paid salaries for clergy.369 
For an expressivist, the fact that a constitutional limitation’s social meaning might vary
      370See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY , STATE, AND UTO PIA  312  (1974).  As will be shown below in section D, exit also
plays a prominent role in John Rawls’s po litical thought, though it does not assume the centrality that it plays in the
approaches adopted by economists and Nozick.
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depending on the level of government to which the limitation is applied is a prima facie basis for
concluding that the constitutional principle may apply differently to the different levels of
government, i.e., that it may be appropriate to Size the constitutional guarantee.  Whether or not a
provision should be Tailored ultimately turns on normative considerations.  What follows below in
Sections C through E is an examination of how a variety of normative approaches answers this
question.  Though these varying approaches to ordering social life generate divergent policy
prescriptions, they all suggest that Tailoring sometimes might be appropriate.  
C.     Different Exit Costs.  Exit costs are another systemic difference among the different
levels of government that may have constitutional relevance for purposes of Tailoring.  Common
sense suggests that it is easier, both financially and emotionally, to leave smaller polities than larger
ones.  As will be shown, the empirical data supports this.  As exit costs diminish, it is increasingly
realistic to make two related assumptions: that (1) citizens make active choices where to live and (2)
polities compete among each other for citizens.  This is deemed to be beneficial by several
approaches to ordering social life.  Economists (and their law and economics cousins) argue that
such competition among polities leads to greater efficiencies as well as increased diversity than a less
competitive system. Easy exit also is a precondition of the “framework for utopias” described by
libertarian political theorist Robert Nozick.370 
What connection do reduced exit costs and the normative commitments that view them
favorably have to constitutional interpretation?  The answer is this:  Once it is realized that Tailoring
is a doctrinal option that is not precluded by the Constitution itself – the point made in Parts I and
      371See ALBERT H IRSCHMAN , EXIT , VOICE AND LOYALTY (1973).
      372See Jason Schacter, Current Population Reports: March 1999-March 2000 (U.S. Department of Commerce, May
2001) (available at www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/p20-538.pdf) [“Population Reports”].
      373Id. at 1-2.
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II of this Article – whether to Size invariably becomes a question that turns on the constitutional
interpreter’s pre-legal commitments.  Under either a law and econmics or Nozickean approach, the
nature and extent of exit costs are relevant to determining the powers and limits of any given level
of government.  It would follow that a systemic difference in respect of exit costs would be
doctrinally relevant to the interpretation of constitutional provisions that concern the powers and
limits of the different levels of government.  It is in this respect that exit costs are doctrinally relevant
to Tailoring constitutional provisions.
1.     That Smaller Polities Have Smaller Exit Costs.  Exit costs refers to the cost of
leaving one polity for another.371  In general, it is easier to exit smaller polities than larger polities.
Moving from a large polity to a new jurisdiction on average will require a move of a greater distance
than will a move from a smaller polity to a new jurisdiction.  Moving costs generally increase with
the distance of the move.  Many of the nonfinancial costs of moving also tend to increase with
distance moved.   Short moves need not disrupt networks of friends, family and job in the way that
long-distant moves typically do.  Short moves do not necessitate the relocation of new doctors,
dentists, shopping, and other resources in the way that longer-distance moves do.
Data concerning mobility supports the hypothesis that exit costs are smaller for shorter
moves.  To begin, it is worthwhile to note that the evidence shows that Americans move a great deal.
Between March 1999 and March 2000, for instance, 43.4 million Americans moved.372  This
amounts to 16.1% of the entire population.373  This is not unusual.  From 1990 to 2000, the
percentage of the population that has moved on a yearly basis has ranged from 15.9% to 17.3%, and
      374Id.
      375Id. at 4-5.
      376Id. at 1.
      377See id.
      378Vicki Been, “Exit” as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine,
91  CO LU M  L. REV. 473, 518 & n. 210 (1991).
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between the years 1947 to 1969 at least 19%, and as much as 21.2% of the population, moved in a
one-year period.374  Interestingly, the likelihood of moving is inversely proportional to income.
Between March 1999 and March 2000, “[p]eople living in households in lower-income categories
were more likely to move than those in higher-income categories: 21 percent for incomes under
$25,000, compared with 12% for incomes over $100,000,” and “[t]hose with income below the
poverty level were more likely to have moved (28%) than those with income 150% above the
poverty level or higher (14%).”375
Now consider the distribution with respect to distance moved.  Between March 1999 and
March 2000, approximately 56% of the moves were local, meaning within the same county, and an
additional 20% were between counties in the same state.376  About 19% were moves to a different
state.  Approximately 5% of all moves were outside the country.377  Unfortunately, census figures
do not  distinguish between those intra-county moves that are intra-municipality and those that are
inter-municipality.   Working with similar data from a few years before, however, one noted
commentator wrote that a “conservative estimate is that approximately 20% of the population will
move to a different political jurisdiction in a five-year period.”378  
In short, Americans are quite mobile.  Most moves are short-distance;  the mobility rate
diminishes with distance moved.  This data supports the hypothesis that Americans exercise “exit”
from their home jurisdictions with significant regularity.  The data also is consistent with the
hypothesis that exit from smaller jurisdictions is cheaper than exit from larger jurisdictions, though
      379See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POLIT . ECON. 416 (1956).
      380See id.
      381Tiebout assumed (1) full consumer knowledge about different locations, (2 ) that people were fully and costlessly
mobile, (3) that they lived on dividend income, so employment opportunities were not a factor, (4) that there were a large
number of communities, (5) that the different communities did not impose externalities, and that (6) for every package
of community services, there’s an optimal community size for the provision of those goods.  See Tiebout, Pure Theory,
supra note 378.  For a slightly modified restatement of Tiebout’s conditions and a  clear explanation, see Robert P. Inman
and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Political Economy of Federalism , in PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE 73-106(D EN NIS C.
MUELLER, ED . 1997).
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it admittedly does not establish a causal link between exit costs and distance of move.
2.     Law and Economics.  Economists long have conceptualized the federal political
structure as affording the possibility of a competition among sub-federal jurisdictions.  In a seminal
article, economist Charles Tiebout theorized that local governments compete for citizens by offering
different packages of public goods.379  Competition generates differences across jurisdictions along
two dimensions under this approach.  The first is efficiency: jurisdictions will be pressed to deliver
their public goods in a cost-efficient way, or people will move away to locate in another jurisdiction
that offers the same public goods for less money.  Second, jurisdictions will try to differentiate
themselves by offering different packages of public goods, which will appeal to different types of
citizens.  This competition among jurisdictions is normatively desirable in Tiebout’s view for two
reasons.  First, ceteris paribus, the efficient provision of goods is preferable to less efficient
provision.  Second, greater numbers of options increase consumer welfare; those who value public
good “A” can locate themselves in a jurisdiction that provides it, and those that do not can live in
a polity that does not so that they’ll not have to pay for something they do not value.380 
Like all economic models, Tiebout’s was based on specified ideal conditions that are not
fully reflected in the real world.381  Tiebout’s model has been criticized on the basis that the real
      382Some have argued that even if the model’s assumptions sufficiently represent the real world, modeling public
policy in economic terms is normatively problematic.  See, e.g., GERALD FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMM UNITIES
W ITHOUT BUILDING WALLS  171-77 (1999)(criticizing Tiebout’s “consumer-oriented vision of city services” and the
nature of cities); see also Richard Schragger, Consuming Government, 101 MICH . L. REV. 1824 (2003); Lee Anne
Fennell, Homes Rule, 112 YALE L. J. 617 (2002).  I’ll not explore the second criticism here, insofar as this Article
attempts to show how competing normative approaches would analyze Tailoring, not to criticize or defend  the competing
approaches.
      383Been, “Exit” As Constraint, supra note 377, at 514-15.  According to Professor Been, “[e]vidence whether
communities compete for residents primarily stems from the efforts of scores of economists and political scientists to
test the accuracy of Tiebout’s theory that citizens’ opportunities to ‘vote with their feet’ will result in the efficient
provision of public goods by local governments.  Those studies provide substantial proof that local jurisdictions do
compete for residents.” Id. (internal citations omitted).  
      384Been, “Exit” As Constraint, supra note 377, at 527-28.   Professor Been surveys multiple empirical studies and
concludes that “data about the extent to which differences in public service expenditures and taxes are capitalized into
house values, data about the relationship between migration pattern and fiscal characteristics of communities, and data
about the increasing homogeneity of communities all support the proposition that consumers consider a community’s
public service and tax packages when they choose where to live . . . .  “[T]he fact that consumers shop for a public service
and tax package is strong evidence supporting the core Tiebout proposition that jurisdictions compete for residents by
attempting to offer desirable public service / tax packages.”  Id.
      385Professor W illiam A. Fischel’s new book builds on Tiebout’s model, but offers an  important modification of it.
Tiebout’s assumption of perfect mobility is replaced with the assumption that local governments must be able to restrict
new immigrants so as to keep each po lity scarce.  See W ILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPO TH ES IS: HOW HO M E
VALUES INFLUENCE LOC AL GOVERNM ENT TAXATION , SCH OO L FINANCE, AND LAND USE POLICIES 51-57 (Harv. U. Press
2001).   This does not undermine the point made above in text, however, concerning exit costs; though the demands of
scarcity mean for Fischel that not everyone who wishes to  enter a given locale will be able to, local governments will
be subjected to market pressures only if exit is possible.
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world’s deviations from the model’s assumptions fatally undermine the model’s utility.382  Two
points merit mention.  First, notwithstanding the fact that the real world is far  more complex than
the conditions idealized in Tiebout’s model, there is a substantial  body of empirical data that
“provides substantial proof that local jurisdictions do compete for residents”383 and that “support[s]
the core Tiebout proposition that jurisdictions compete for residents by attempting to offer desirable
public service / tax packages.”384    
The second point relates directly to Tailoring.  One of the Tiebout model’s  assumptions is
the absence of exit costs.  Although there obviously are exit costs in the real world,  the quantity of
costs is a function of the size of the polity from which a person exits.  This is crucial for Tiebout’s
analysis.  Remaining or exiting is the mechanism by which “voter-consumers” choose a bundle of
public goods.385 Such choice is what induces polities to spend efficiently and carefully tailor the
      386See generally ROBERT D. COOTER , THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION 1-14 (Princeton Univ. Press 2002).
      387But consider Komesar and  Fischel: two economists who, at least in the takings context, advocate more active
judicial review of smaller polities.
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public goods they offer.  If exit is not a realistic possibility,  these “market” checks on polities are
lost.  It follows that the potential benefits identified by Tiebout likely are a function of exit costs and,
correspondingly, the size of the polity under consideration.  For instance, localities will be subject
to the market pressure of citizen-consumers more than is the United States since smaller exit costs
mean that inter-city moves are more likely than international relocations.  
These insights have implications for economic analyses of constitutional law.  Under a law
and economics methodology, constitutional provisions are construed to generate welfare-enhancing
 results.386  Tieboutian analysis is relevant to the interpretation of constitutional provisions that bear
on the powers of the different levels of government.  Welfare is enhanced by permitting a
competition among jurisdictions in circumstances where voter-consumers realistically can exercise
an exit option.  There is no a priori reason to exclude policies that implicate constitutional principles
from the mix of public goods with respect to which polities can compete.  Competition cannot be
expected to occur, however, where exit is not a realistic option.  Taken together, this analysis
suggests that the systemic differences in exit costs across different levels of government are  a prima
facie basis for Tailoring constitutional principles to different levels of government.  Generally
speaking, there is less need for judicially enforced constitutional protections at lower levels of
government, where exit costs are lower.387  As Professor Robert Cooter recently put it, 
[i]n general, escaping jurisdiction by a less comprehensive government is easier than
escaping jurisdiction by a more comprehensive government.  Differences in the cost of exit
from different levels of government justify different degrees of vigilance by courts in
protecting individual liberties . . . .  The ‘exit principle’ implies the ‘federalism of individual
rights,’ by which I mean that courts should tolerate more interference with individual liberty
      388See STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION , supra note 385, at 323.
      389Indeed, a lack of satisfactory responses to foundational questions seems to be endemic to the field of constitutional
law even with regard to issues that have received vast scholarly attention. For instance, judges and scholars still are
deeply divided over what modes of interpretation the Constitution are legitimate.  M ore fundamentally still, scholars to
this day discuss the justification for, and implications of, being bound by constitutional text that was drafted and enacted
by people of another era, see, e.g., David Strauss, Unwritten Constitution, and debate the justification for the principle
of majority rule, see, e.g., Peters, Majoritarianism , supra note 293, at xx.
      390Consider, for instance, Cooter’s analysis of free speech protections.   Cooter provides an economic justification
for the constitutional protection of speech.  Speech is likely to be undersupplied on account of its beneficial externalities,
and efficiency demands broad distribution because it is a nonrivalrous good, whose benefits include the transmission of
ideas and the stimulation of innovation.  Id.  at 311.  Cooter argues that speech’s constitutional protection should  increase
to the extent there are beneficial externalities and that regulation increases monopoly power.  Id. at 312 .  This
104
when the effects are localized.388 
In short, under a Tieboutian analysis, constitutional principles should be Tailored so that the
policies of smaller polities are more deferentially reviewed than regulations from larger polities for
two reasons.  First, the threat of exit tames polities’ policy choices, and the threat of exit is more
viable at smaller levels of government, where exit costs are smaller.  Second, greater deference to
lower levels of government allows for a broader range of regulations at lower levels of government.
Citizens accordingly have more options to select among, thereby increasing the welfare of voter-
consumers. 
To be sure, Cooter’s application of Tieboutian principles to constitutional law leaves
unanswered many important questions.  For example, should every constitutional guarantee be
amenable to Tailoring?  Are there any firm floors below which a constitutional protection could not
be Tailored?  If so, what justifies them?  The absence of ready replies to these questions means that
they require more serious thought, not necessarily that no good answers can be supplied.  It is not
surprising that such basic question remain open, for there has been virtually no scholarly attention
paid to Tailoring up to now.389   Consistent with this Article’s limited focus, I’ll not attempt to
answer these particular questions here, particularly since any analysis is likely to be specific to the
constitutional protection at issue.390  What matters for present purposes is that the economic approach
justification opens the door to Tailoring because the determination of whether speech imposes any externalities, and if
so whether they’re beneficial or negative, turns on cultural values that might vary from group to group.  If there are
different cultural evaluations of this that correspond to different groups that are situated in discrete  geographical
locations that coincide with political jurisdictions, then an approach designed to maximize preferences would suggest
that Tailoring is desirable.  Whether or not one agrees with this analysis, the point for present purposes is that the analysis
is specific to the particular constitutional guarantee with regard to speech, and does not shed any light on, for instance,
the appropriate scope of the contracts clause.  
      391NOZICK, supra note 369, at 312.
      392See id. at 320-23.
      393See id. at 299 (defining “association” as “a world which all rational inhabitants may leave for any other world they
can imagine (in which all the rational inhabitants may leave for any other world they can imagine in which . . .”).
      394See, e.g., id. at 307, 309 (using the appellation “community” to describe what Nozick previously defines as
“associations”).
      395Id. at 320-21 (“though there is great liberty to choose among communities, many particular communities internally
may have many restrictions unjustifiable on libertarian grounds: that is restrictions which libertarians would condemn
if they were enforced by a central state apparatus.  For example, paternalistic intervention into people’s lives, restrictions
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generates a prima facie case for Tailoring constitutional principles.  This suggests the wisdom of
modifying doctrine so that it can be receptive to such arguments, should they prove to be compelling.
This analysis accordingly supports the hypothesis that One-Size-Fits-All should be downgraded from
a categorical requirement to a rebuttable presumption.
3.     Robert Nozick’s “Framework for Utopias”.  Exit also is a precondition for the
libertarian political philosopher Robert Nozick’s social vision.  Applying Nozickean analysis to our
contemporary constitutional order,  the systemic differences across different levels of polities with
respect to exit suggest that limitations on governmental power ought to vary in accordance with the
level of government that is acting.
Nozick famously argued that the ideal state would establish a “framework for utopias”391
within which communities could do almost anything they wanted, subject to only a few caveats.392
Nozick’s vision takes the form of a federal political structure within which the “central” state
apparatus has few regulatory powers but the sub-state regulatory entities (“associations”393 and
“communities”394 in his terminology) may extensively supervise their members’ behaviors, if they
so choose.395  His solution is driven by two assumptions.  First, that there are such great differences
on the range of books which may circulate in the community, limitations on the kinds of sexual behavior, and so on.”).
Below I discuss the question of whether any polity can function in place of the “communities” (and “associations”) that
Nozick speaks of, or whether “communities” (and  “associations”) necessarily must be non-political entities.  See infra
at p. ?.
      396See id. at 310-11 (“Wittgenstein, Elizabeth Taylor, Bertrand Russell, Thomas Merton, Yogi Berra, Allen Ginsburg,
Harry Wolfson, Thoreau, Casey Stengel, The Lubavitcher Rebbe, Picasso, Moses, Einstein, Hugh Heffner, Socrates,
Henry Ford , Lenny Bruce, Baba Ram Dass, Gandhi, Sir Edmund  Hillary, Raymond Lubitz, Buddha, Frank Sinatra,
Columbus, Freud, Norman Mailer, Ayn Rand, Baron Rothschild, Ted Williams, Thomas Edison, H. L. Mencken, Thomas
Jefferson, Ralph Ellison, Bobby Fischer, Emma Goldman, Peter Kropotkin, you, and your parents.  Is there really one
kind of life which is best for each of these people?  Imagine all of them living in any utiopia you’ve ever seen described
in detail . . . . The idea that there is one best composite answer  . . . one best society for everyone to live in, seems to me
to be an incredible one.”).
      397See id. at 313-15 (arguing that social development must occur by means of “filter devices” rather than “design
devices”).
      398See id. at 302 (noting the parallels between his approach and “the economists’ model of a competitive market” in
which there are “[m]any associations competing for my membership”).
      399See id. at 315-19.
      400See id. at 309 (“if there is a diverse range of communities, then (putting it roughly) more persons will be ab le to
come closer to how they wish to live, than if there is only one kind of community”).
      401Id. at 307 ; see also id. at 299.
      402See supra at p. 94.
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across individuals that it is impossible that any single “utopia” would be best for all of them.396
Second, that it is impossible to specify the character of complex social systems in an a priori fashion,
but that the development of a society only can occur in an evolutionary process.397 
Nozick’s solution requires a competition among communities to attract adherents.398  The
competition accomplishes two things.  First, it permits experimentation and step-by-step
refinement.399  Second, it allows there to be different communities that satisfy the needs of different
people, thereby increasing overall welfare.400  One of the crucial requirements for the framework to
succeed is that people can “freely leav[e] their own community to join another.”401  As shown
above,402 exit is instrumentally necessary for there to be a competition among jurisdictions under a
Tieboutian analysis.  Even more than this, exit is a foundational precondition under Nozick’s
libertarian political philosophy.  The core of Nozick’s approach  is that “you choose what you will,
with the sole constraint being that others may do the same for themselves and refuse to stay in the
      403Id. at 302.
      404Instead, his analysis proceeds as a thought-experiment that starts with no assumptions concerning current
institutions, the size of government, and so forth.  See generally id. at 297-306.
      405For instance, the central government would have far fewer powers than does today’s  federal government.  See id.
at 333 (concluding that only a “minimal state” is “morally legitimate” because “any more extensive state  would  (will)
violate the rights of individuals”).  Below I discuss what Nozick’s analysis implies about sub-federal polities. 
      406American legal scholars certainly appear to believe this to  be true .  A recent W estlaw search of references to
Nozick’s Anarchy, State, and Utopia  uncovered more than 1 ,100 citations.  Westlaw search conducted on 2.7.03,
(Nozick /3 Anarchy) in Journals and Law Reviews library (1120 citations).
      407Indeed, there might not be very much difference at all between small po lities and Nozickean associations.
Associations are permitted  to redistribute wealth and exert other coercive powers over its members for so long as a
person remains a member.  See id. at 321 .  Furthermore, Nozick’s logic behind permitting coercive regulation in the
“face-to-face community” – in such communities “one canno t avoid  being directly confronted with what one finds to be
offensive [in another person’s actions].  How one lives in once’s immediate environment is affected,” id. at 322) –
suggests that face-to-face communities should have a monopoly on coercive powers within their geographical locale.
Such a monopoly on coercive power within a fixed territory is one of the core characteristics of a “state” for Nozick.
See id. at 22-25 (distinguishing a “protective association” from a “state” on the ground that a state has a monopoly on
coercive power whereas a protective association has power only in respect of those individuals to decide to pay for its
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world you have”created.403   “You” can choose the world you want to live in and others can either
remain or “refuse to stay,” however, only if there is a real option to exit.
To what extent can Nozick’s approach inform the interpretation of our Constitution?
Determining the practical applications of Nozickean theory to our system of government is tricky.
Nozick’s analysis does not take as a given our Constitution –  or any other governmental institutions,
for that matter.404   Indeed, his approach, if adopted in its entirety, would require a radical retooling
of many  aspects of our governmental system.405  Nonetheless, Nozick’s framework still may have
policy implications for an analyst who wished to work from within the United States’s existing
governmental institutions and structure.406  
I submit that the following is a faithful application of Nozick’s analysis to contemporary
American constitutional doctrine.  The framework for utopias, under which each association under
the minimal central government may extensively regulate its members, requires low exit costs from
association to association.  Small sub-federal polities, with respect to which exit costs are minimal,
may be rough contemporary substitutes for Nozick’s “associations.”407  Under this approach, states
protection, and thus may be unable to  exercise power over all people in a given geographical location).
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would be too large to qualify as associations, but many municipalities likely would qualify, as would
smaller forms of local government such as villages.  Nozick’s analysis thus suggests that qualifying
small polities should be granted more extensive regulatory powers than large polities.  Under our
contemporary constitutional order – where the Constitution’s constraints have been incorporated
against the sub-federal polities – Nozick’s analysis accordingly suggests that constitutional principles
should be Tailored, such that qualifying small polities be permitted more regulatory powers than are
larger polities.
D.     Different “We’s” and Democratic Theory.  Another systemic difference across different
levels of government that might justify Tailoring is the number and identity of the polity’s citizens.
Each polity is constituted by a different “we.”  The varying number and identity of citizens that are
represented in a particular polity can have significant consequences in respect of democratic theory.
A limitation on one level of government accordingly might have very different democratic effects
when it is applied to another level.
1.     Outsiders’ Extraterritorial Interference Versus Insiders’ Self-Regulation.  A
cornerstone of democratic theory is that, with only limited exceptions, a political community has the
right to create laws that bind the entire community if a majority of its members (or its
representatives) desire the law.  This is paradigmatic  democratic self-governance by the political
community.  Conversely, it is violative of basic democratic principles for outsiders of the political
community to dictate laws to the community.  Such regulations may be thought of as extraterritorial
in nature, and are just a step away from the “taxation without representation” that so vexed our
country’s forefathers.  It follows that a particular regulation could constitute either democratic self-
      408Most, but not everybody.  For example, citizens of Puerto Rico are citizens of the United States but do not belong
to a state.  Also, many people live in unincorporated parts of states.  Similarly, Native Americans who live on
reservations are citizens of the United States and the State in which the reservation is located, but are not citizens of any
local governments.
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governance or its converse depending upon which polity enacted it.  Stated differently, the
determinant of a regulation’s consistency with democracy sometimes may be a function of which
polity acted, not the content of the regulation itself.  A constitutional principle that aimed at securing
democratic principles against interference by outsiders – and there are some, as we shall see below
–  accordingly would have to be cognizant of which level of government acted.  In fact, One-Size-
Fits-All would be absolutely unsuitable for such a constitutional principle.
The crucial step in determining whether a particular regulation constitutes acceptable
democratic self-governance or problematic extraterritorial governance is defining the relevant
political community.  After all, a regulation that comes from outsiders when the political community
is conceptualized as being small can be viewed as an exemplar of self-governance if the relevant
political community is more broadly characterized so as to encompass the (former) outsiders.
Determining what is the relevant political community is complicated in the United States’ federal
system because each person simultaneously belongs to multiple political communities – federal and,
for most people,408 state and local political communities, as well.  
In the end, identifying the relevant political community for purposes of determining if a
particular regulation instantiates democratic self-governance or its antithesis inevitably is highly
context-dependent.  Constitutional doctrine that reflects the concern of protecting the integrity of
democratic politics, however, must directly confront the question of what constitutes the relevant
political community if the doctrine is not to be babble.  Sometimes the context is clear enough, such
that asking the question leads to a straightforward answer.  Even when it does not, the question of
      409514 U.S. 779 (1995).
      410See supra at n. 15 and surrounding text.
      411395  U.S. 486 (1969).  The plurality noted that this was the “most important[]” consideration in its rationale.  See
514 U.S. at 806.
      412See xx.
      413See id. 820 (“the source of the qualification is of little moment in assessing the qualification’s restrictive impact.”).
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defining the relevant political community is crucial; identifying the relevant political community is
the tough question that must be answered, and it is better to confront the real question when tackling
difficult constitutional issues.
In this regard, consider the U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton409 case discussed above.410  In
striking down an amendment to the Arkansas constitution that was adopted by a ballot initiative, the
plurality opinion unthinkingly imported a “fundamental” democratic principle that the Court had
developed in the federal context.  The plurality’s One-Size-Fits-All analysis overlooked the crucial
question of what constituted the relevant political community, undermining the cogency of its
argument.  
The Court had held in the earlier case of Powell v. McCormick 411  that additional
qualifications as to who could be a Congressman that were imposed by Congress when it sought to
prevent Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. from taking his seat thwarted the desires of the majority of voters
in New York’s Eighteenth Congressional District, who had elected him.  In so doing, Congress’s
additional qualifications violated the “fundamental principle of our representative democracy” that
“the people should choose whom they please to govern them”412 and accordingly were
unconstitutional.  The plurality opinion in Thornton concluded that Powell’s principle –  that
additional qualifications undermined fundamental democratic principles –  equally applied to
conditions (such as term limits) that were imposed by the States,413 and struck down Arkansas’s
      414See id.
      415This does not mean that the ultimate holding in Thornton was wrong, but only that the “most important[]”
justification that the plurality provided , id. at 806, was ineffectual.  There are  plausib le arguments outside of
“fundamental democratic principles” that could have been propounded to strike down Arkansas’s amendment.  Indeed,
understanding the centrality of defining the relevant political community makes clear that an argument based on
democratic principles argument was possible.  The claim would  be that the relevant political community for purposes
of laying down the criteria for congresspersons is the national political community.  Any such argument, however, would
confront several challenges.  First, it would have to be explained why qualifications are properly determined by the
national political community. In addition to requiring  a normative justification, any such claim is in tension with the
Powell case’s holding that the congressional district is the relevant political community for purposes of selecting
congresspersons.   Second, this argument is inconsistent with Powell  insofar as the argument implies that Congress is
the appropriate forum for creating additional qualifications –  a principle that Powell squarely rejected.
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amendment on that basis.414  
The problem with the plurality’s reasoning is that it failed to consider who constituted the
relevant “people” whose choice had to be respected under fundamental principles of democracy.  The
democratic principle’s application in the Powell case was sensible; the relevant political community
whose preferences merited respect clearly was the community defined by the 18th Congressional
District, and people outside of that community (members of Congress, who by necessity did not live
in Powell’s district) were interfering with the District’s choice.  However, treating Powell’s principle
in a One-Size-Fits-All manner, as the plurality did in Thornton, actually vitiated the Powell principle.
Powell impliedly held that the relevant political community with regard to choosing representatives
is the congressional district.  A majority of voters in every Arkansas congressional district approved
the term limits amendment.  Applying the term limit accordingly would have implemented, rather
than undermined, the choice of the relevant political community.415  
In short, the Powell principle  relates to a problem of extraterritoriality –  outsiders’
interference with a political community’s choice – not the substance of the regulation.  It is not the
additional restrictions on who can sit for Congress that were problematic from the perspective of
representative democracy, but rather who imposed them.  One-Size-Fits-All is flatly illogical in
      416There are two major simplifications in the statement above in text: the text (1) presumes direct rather than
representative democracy and (2) ignores coalition-building and log-rolling across issues that can allow numerical
minorities to obtain particular laws they might want.  The text’s simplifying assumptions do not, however, undermine
its point concerning the legitimacy of majoritarianism.
      417See Oregon v. City of Rajneeshpuram, 598 F. Supp. 1208 (D. Ore. 1984).  For a discussion of the city of
Rajneeshpuram, see Mark D. Rosen, The Outer Limits of Community Self-Governance: A Liberal Theory , 84 VA. L. REV.
1053, 1082-86 (1998).
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respect of this type of constitutional principle.  Rather, any such constitutional principle that seeks
to protect fundamental democratic principles of this sort necessarily must be Tailored.
2.     Limiting the Dilemmas of Majoritarianism.  Another systemic difference across
different levels of government that implicates democratic theory and accordingly might justify
Tailoring is the number of voters in the polity.  The federal polity encompasses the most voters,
whereas states, municipalities, towns, and villages generally have ever-diminishing numbers of
voters.  To simplify a bit, in a political system characterized by majority rule, the number of voters
determines the number of persons that constitutes the majority that can translate its will into law.416
Insofar as democracy is “rule by the people,” the number of voters in a given polity determines the
relevant “we” that can rule itself by choosing policies that more than half its members desire. 
The size and make-up of the “we” determines whether idiosyncratic groups can be guaranteed
that their political wills can be translated into law in some polity.  For example, there were no more
than a few thousand members of the Rajneesh religious group in the 1980s, and it is virtually
inconceivable that their idiosyncratic political desires ever would have been shared by a majority of
American citizens.  By creating the municipality of Rajneeshpuram,417 where all citizens were
adherents of the Rajneesh creed, the Rajneesh created a “we” that guaranteed that their particular
zoning and other needs could become law in some polity.
The realization that there are a multiplicity of possible “we’s” complicates democratic theory.
Even if one grants the proposition that it is fair that numerical majorities can politically coerce
      418For a good discussion of the problem of majority rule, see Peters, Majoritarianism as Adjudication, supra note 293,
at 1-7.  Jurgen Habermas, Frank Michelman, and  Joshua Cohen try to solve this difficulty by arguing that legitimate
democratic institutions permit people to understand themselves as the authors of the laws that bind  them, see id. at 3-7,
but this approach is unavailing to the extent there exists discrete subgroups in society that have packages of interests that
systematically vary from the majority’s desires.
      419See, e.g., ROBERT DAHL, D ILEMM AS OF PLURALIST DEMOCRACY  96-100 (1982) (noting the  “dilemma” of “a more
exclusive versus a more inclusive demos” and concluding that there is no determinate theoretical solution as to how large
a democratic polity should be).
      420Plato calculated the optimal number of citizens at just over five thousand, and Aristotle thought a polity must be
large enough so the po lity is self-sufficient but small enough so that citizens could “know one another’s characters.”
DAHL &  TUFTE, SIZE AND DEMOCRACY , supra note 316, at 5-7.  Rousseau and  Montesquieu also devoted considerable
attention to the connection between size and democracy.  Id.  These theorists’ were concerned with size did not grow
out of a concern of accommodating a heterogeneous population.  Rather, they  thought that small size was a precondition
for the successful operation of democratic polities.   Under classical Greek political thought, for example, “[a] democratic
polity must have so few citizens that all of them could meet frequently in the popular assembly to listen, to vote, perhaps
even to speak.  Smallness, it was thought, enhanced the opportunities for participation in and control of the government
in many ways.  For example, in a small polity every citizen stood a very good chance of being chosen by lot at least once
in his lifetime to sit on one of the important administrative bodies.  Smallness made it possible for every citizen to know
every other, to  estimate his qualities, to  understand his problems, to develop friendly feelings toward him, to analyze and
discuss with comprehension the problems facing the polity.”  Id. at 5.  To put the matter in the modern language of
economics, democratic politics was thought to work better in smaller polities because agency and information costs are
smaller in such political units.  See   Inman and  Rubinfeld, supra note 380, at 74, 85.
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numerical minorities – a proposition that is not at all self-evident418 – how is it to be determined what
group constitutes the appropriate “we” from which to search for the “majority’s” will?  If it is too
large, the desires of numerical minorities will be systematically submerged to the wants of
majorities.  If it is too small, there are risks of balkanization, inefficiencies owing to duplicative
governmental institutions, and the coordination problems that attend large numbers of actors (in this
case, polities).  It seems unlikely that there is a single, a priori solution to this question of how to
define the relevant “we.”419  
One might think that determining the appropriate “we” is another way of asking the question
of how large a democratic political community should be.  It might, in which case the query joins
a long line of democratic theorists who have asked how small democracies must be to work
properly.420    On the other hand,  there are important differences between the classical theorists and
the problem mentioned above.  For one, the classic theorists who have been concerned with size  did
      421See TAYLOR, supra note 424, at 50-51.
      422This is true of all the political theorists referred to above in footnote 419.
      423It also turns on the possibility of exit.
      424See W ILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTUR AL CITIZEN SH IP 94 (1995).
      425See Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recogn ition, in MULTICULTURALISM : EXAMINING THE POLITICS OF
RECOGNITION (AMY GUTMANN, ED .) (1994).
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not think about societies that consisted of heterogeneous groups and interests.421  Furthermore, the
classical democratic theorists assumed that citizens could belong to only a single polity.422  This is
not the case under the federal political structures of today, where citizens simultaneously belong to
multiple political communities. 
In fact, the federal political structure holds out the promise of blunting the problem of how
to define the relevant “we.”  The key is that citizens belong to numerous “we’s,” and they can freely
choose what small polity “we” they wish to be part of.  The problem is solved, however, only if the
smaller-level polities have sufficient political powers to satisfy their citizens’ needs.423  Tailoring
constitutional guarantees, it turns out, is a method for ensuring that such polities enjoy neither too
much nor too little political power.
The discussion below draws upon two schools of contemporary political theory to show the
connection between defining the relevant “we” and Tailoring.  The first subsection discusses the
arguments of multiculturalist liberal theorists Will Kymlicka424 and Charles Taylor,425 who contend
that liberal values call for granting  to certain groups extensive powers of self-governance that larger
polities do not enjoy.  Insofar as Tailoring constitutional provisions is a  doctrinal mechanism by
which such empowerment of select polities can occur, these theorists’ arguments are prima facie
justifications for Tailoring.  The second subsection suggests that foundational liberal commitments
captured in John Rawls’s account are best realized by taking advantage of the opportunities inherent
in the  federal political structure’s multiple levels of government for permitting citizens flexibility
      426As is true with all the approaches to social ordering canvassed here, Taylor’s and Kymlicka’s are rejected by many.
See, e.g., BRIAN BARRY, CULTURE AND EQUALITY  (Harv. Univ. Press. 2001).  For a partial response, see Waldron, Logic
Of Cultural Accommodation, supra note 426.
      427See Taylor, supra note 424, at 39 (“we give due acknowledgment only to what is universally present – everyone
has an identity – through recognizing what is peculiar to each.  The universal demand [of equality] powers an
acknowledgment of specificity . . . . [Nondiscrimination requires] that we make . . . the ways in which citizens differ .
. . the basis of differential treatment.”); K YMLICKA, supra note 423, at  108-15.  For a concise summary of Kymlicka’s
argument, see Mark D. Rosen, “Illiberal” Societal Cultures, Liberalism, and American Constitutionalism, 12 J.
CO N TE M P. LEGA L ISSUES 803, 808-09 (2002).  Jeremy Waldron recently has made a similar point.   See Jeremy Waldron,
One Law for All?  The Logic of Cultural Accommodation, 59 WASH . &  LEE L. REV. 3, 7 (2002) (noting that when “the
policy behind [a] sta tute is in large part itself cultural” that “it surely should be open to the possibility that the same
behavior . . . might have a quite different cultural meaning to those” from another culture such that “an intelligent
application of the rule-of-law ideal seems to militate against the idea of a single rule  applying to everyone . . .”)
(emphasis in original).
      428See Taylor, supra note 424, at 43 (“the supposedly neutral set of difference-blind principles of the politics of equal
dignity is in fact a reflection of one hegemonic culture.  As it turns out, then, only the minority or suppressed cultures
are being forced to take alien form.”); K YMLICKA, supra note 423, at 108 (“Government decisions on languages, internal
boundaries, public holidays, and state symbols unavoidably involve recognizing, accommodating, and supporting the
needs and identities of particular  ethnic and national groups.  The state unavoidably promotes certain cultural identities,
and thereby disadvantages others.”).  
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in defining the political “we” to which they wish to belong.  This provides yet another prima facie
basis for Tailoring constitutional provisions.  
a.     Multicultural Liberal Theorists.  In separate works, philosophers Will
Kymlicka and Charles Taylor have argued that the foundational liberal principle of equality requires
government to take account of the systematic differences among people that account for the discrete
“groups” or “cultures” that may be found in a single country.426  True equality, they argue, requires
that  such identifiable groups be treated in ways that are fitted to their idiosyncratic  needs.
Subjecting groups that systematically differ from the majority to the same laws that apply to the
majority does not take account of the groups’s differentness and accordingly violates the principle
of equal treatment.427  In fact, the argument goes, applying one law to all is actually discriminatory;
because the majority’s approach almost invariably reflects the majority’s culture, applying it to non-
majority groups accordingly forces it to adopt the majority’s values.428  
The solutions that Taylor and Kymlicka propose take advantage of federalist systems’
      429Taylor, supra note 424, at 53; see also Taylor, supra note 424, at 61 (supporting the notion that “some variations
in the kinds of law we deem [constitutionally] permissible from one cultural context to another . . .”).
      430Id. at 52.  Elsewhere, however, Taylor argues that “[o]ne has to distinguish the fundamental liberties, those that
should never be infringed and therefore ought to be unassailably entrenched, on one hand, from privileges and immunities
that are important, but that can ber revoked or restricted for reasons of public policy – although one would need a strong
reason to do this – on the other.”  Id. at 59; see also id. at 61 (calling for “the invariant defense of certain rights” as
“distinguish[ed]” from “the broad range of immunities and presumption of uniform treatment that have sprung up in
modern cultures of judicial review.”).    Taylor is regrettably vague about what falls into the category of categorical
“fundamental” rights and  what is a rebuttable privilege or immunity.  Pildes theory provides a basis for critiquing
Taylor’s notion of categorical fundamental rights, see supra Part I.C(1).
      431KYMLICKA, supra note 423, at 37-38.
      432Id. at 109.
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capacities to vary the relevant “we.”  The solutions also support the notion that Tailoring might be
desirable.   First consider Taylor.  His analysis builds on the fact that the minority groups he believes
merit differential treatment are situated in geographically discrete territories; the Quebeckers live in
Quebec and Canada’s aboriginal people primarily live in discrete geographical areas.  Taylor
explicitly contemplates  “[t]he possibility for variation in [the] interpretation” of the Canadian
constitution and the Canadian Charter of Rights “in different parts of the country.”429  He argues that
“the standard schedules of rights might apply differently in one cultural context than they do in
another, that their application might have to take account of different collective goals. . .”430
Tailoring is a doctrinal mechanism that can accomplishing this insofar as it can accommodate
variations of what is constitutionally required across states or municipalities.  
Similarly, Kymlicka argues for “self-government rights” that “devolve powers to smaller
political units, so that a national minority cannot be outvoted or outbid by the majority on decisions
that are of particular importance to their culture . . .”431  For Kymlicka, equality requires that
“members of the minority have the same opportunity to live and work in their own culture as
members of the majority.”432  Kymlicka argues that the self-governing rights “might well involve
      433Id. at 168.  To be clear, Kymlicka does not suggest that this outco me is desirab le from a liberal perspective.
Rather, “[l]iberals in the majority group have to learn to live with this, just as they must live with illiberal laws in other
countries.”  Id.  In fact, Kymlicka argues that “any theory which does not accord substantial civil rights to the members
of minority cultures is seriously deficient from a liberal point of view.”  Id. at 164; see also id. at 165 .  He is particularly
critical of any internal limitations imposed by minority groups on their members that “limit the freedom of individual
members within the group to revise traditional practices.”  Id. at 153.  Kymlicka also argues that such things as gender-
based membership definitions violate liberal principles.  See id. at 165.  For an argument that liberalism should
accommodate some illiberal practices such as these on the part of illiberal minority communities, see Rosen, “Illiberal”
Societal Cultures, supra note 426, at 819-31.
      434See  KYMLICKA, supra note 423, at 173-92 (arguing that accommodating minority rights is consistent with
maintaining the solidarity necessary to preserve liberal democratic governments).
      435The only caveat is that the regime of differential application must allow the minority community sufficient room
to self-govern that it not “promote alienation and secessionist movements.”  Id. at 185.  For a discussion of one such
successful regime of differential application of shared principles in the United States, see Rosen, Of Tribal Courts, supra
note 29, at  511-84.
      436For some who are not, see supra note 425.
      437See   KYMLICKA, supra note 423, at 19. Native Americans, as well as natives of Puerto Rican and Guam, have been
accommodated by creating special  polities that do not constitute “states” or “municipalities.”  See KYMLICKA, supra note
423, at 29.  The question of whether these groups have been granted appropriate rights of self-governance lies beyond
the scope of this Article.
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exempting the national minority from federal bills of rights and judicial review.”433 If Kymlicka
supports exemption, it stands to reason that he also would endorse the differential application of
shared broad principles that Tailoring could provide.  After all, Kymlicka is concerned that
accommodating minority communities not undermine the mutual solidarity that is necessary to
maintain a stable liberal democracy,434 and solidarity is more likely under a regime of differential
application of shared principles than wholesale exemption from those principles.435  
Even if one were convinced by Taylor’s and Kymlicka’s arguments,436 it is not clear that there
are any groups in the United States today that would qualify as deserving beneficiaries of the special
accommodations they advocate.  Kymlicka argues that only “national minorities” – those “distinct
and potentially self-governing societies incorporated into a larger state” at some point in history –
are entitled to the rights of self-governance that can secure them the chance to survive, but not
groups that have voluntarily immigrated or groups that have been historically marginalized.437
Taylor’s argument would appear to justify differential treatment for a  broader array of groups, but
      438See TAYLOR, supra note 424, at 66 (justifying the protection of cultures in part on the basis that “all human cultures
that have animated whole societies over some considerable stretch of time have something important to say to all human
beings”).
      439For such an argument in relation to Kymlicka, see Rosen, “Illiberal” Societal Cultures, supra note 426, at 822-24.
      440JOHN RA LW S, POLITICAL LIBERALISM  62 (1994); see also id. at 196-97 (“Suppose that a particular religion, and
the conception of the good belonging to  it, can survive only if it controls the  machinery of the state . . . This religion will
cease  to exist in the well-ordered society of political liberalism.”).  
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it too seems to be tied to historical cultures.438  One could question whether these Canadian theorists
have adopted overly strict criteria for identifying deserving beneficiaries, perhaps owing to the
prominence of the Quebec and aboriginal paradigms that figure in their minds.439  In any event, their
analysis still is relevant even if their criteria are not altered.  Even if there currently are not deserving
beneficiaries within the United States, Taylor and Kymlicka provide justifications for
accommodating future peoples who might become part of the American political community in the
future, and Tailoring is a doctrinal mechanism by which these theorists’ normative claims can be
operationalized in the event there were deserving beneficiaries.  These are useful insights.
Taylor’s and Kymlicka’s arguments suggest that  Tailoring could be normatively desirable at some
point in the future, even if it presently is not.  Taylor’s and Kymlicka’s analyses thus underscore the
desirability of not understanding One-Size-Fits-All as a categorical imperative of either liberal
commitments or constitutional doctrine. 
b.     Rawlsian Political Liberalism.  The claim that Tailoring is sensible from
the perspectives of Kymlicka and Taylor is not difficult to establish because both these
multiculturalist theorists explicitly argue that select groups should be given extensive self-
governance powers.  The claim that Rawls also would be open to Tailoring is not as straightforward.
Rawls explicitly concludes that government cannot decide “basic questions of justice as [a] person’s,
or [ ] association’s, comprehensive doctrine directs,”440 and this would seem to foreclose the
      441See Rosen, Outer Limits, supra note 416.
      442I argue that Rawls’ first principle of justice is best achieved by a political structure that permits perfectionists a
place where they can self-actualize, see Outer Lim its, supra note 416, at 1090-93, and that Rawls’ conclusion that
perfectionists cannot be accommodated is based on a problematically contested theory of personhood and fails to achieve
the strong form of neutrality that accommodation provides, see id. at 1120-25.
      443See Outer Limits, supra note 416, at 1108-10.
      444See id. at 1091-1106.
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possibility of granting select groups with distinctive cultures extensive powers of self-governance
if, as Taylor and Kymlicka suggest, the very point of so doing is to enable the groups to rule
themselves in accordance with their distinctive cultural norms and values.   
Elsewhere I have critiqued at length this conclusion of Rawls’.441  I tried to show that
foundational Rawlsian premises are more fully achieved by taking account of flexibility inherent in
the federal political structure,442 which Rawls appears to ignore.443   The gist of my argument is that
people in an original position, not knowing whether they represented liberals (who do not want the
state to take positions on contested visions of the good life) or perfectionists (who think that
government must actively promote a vision of the good life if people are to fully self-actualize),
would choose to create a federal political structure where liberals could situate themselves in liberal
polities and perfectionists could live in perfectionist polities, subject to two caveats: that people in
either polity could freely exit and that no polity can undertake activities that threaten the well-
orderedness of general society.444 People  would not select the political structure Rawls suggests  –
where no perfectionist polities can exist – because that would be tantamount to saying that a person
in the original position, even though she knew that she might represent a perfectionist, would choose
a political structure in which she would be unable to self-actualize in the event she represented a
perfectionist, even though she could have chosen a structure in which she would have been able to
      445The full argument can be found in Outer Limits, supra note 439, at 1089-1125.   Professor Seth Kreimer critiqued
this argument of mine in Lines in the Sand: The Importance of Borders in Am erican Federalism,  150 U. PA. L. REV. 973,
1010-1013 (2002), and I responded to his criticisms in Extraterritoriality in Am erican Federalism, supra note 216, at
967-68 & n. 455. 
      446Stated differently, federalism’s capability of allowing multiple “we’s” to govern themselves as they largely wish
allows for the creation of a political structure that achieves a stronger form of neutrality – that “the state is not to do
anything that makes it more likely that individuals accept any particular conception rather than another unless steps are
taken to cancel, or to compensate for, the effects of policies that do this,” RAW LS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM , supra note 439,
at 193  – than Rawls imagines is possible.  See Rosen, Outer Limits, supra note 416, at 1124-25.
      447Id. at 1063.
      448For a similar view, see Robert C. Post, Democratic Constitutionalism and Cultural Heterogeneity, 25 AUSTRALIAN
J. LEG. PHIL. 185, 185 (2000)(“The enterprise of democratic constitutionalism rests upon the premise of collective
agency.  If we ask who makes a democratic constitution, the answer must be given in the first person plural . . . . The
collective agency of the people constitutes a ‘demos’ capable of ‘bestowing . . . democratic authority on a polity’”)
(quoting J.H.H. W eiler, Does Europe Need A Constitution?  Demos, Telos and the German Maastricht Decision, 1
EUROP. L. J. 219, 238 (1995)).
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self-actualize regardless of whether she  represented a liberal or a perfectionist.445  Such an assertion
violates the logic of the original position.
In short, my claim is that Rawls problematically overlooks federalism. As a result, he
envisions a political framework that is less just than is possible, as measured by his own criteria.446
Because my conclusions differ from Rawls’ in some very important respects, I refer to my analysis
as being “Rawlsian,” by which I mean that it is  inspired by Rawls’s principles.  I cannot, and do not,
claim that my approach is a straight-forward application of his theory.  I do profess, however, that
my approach is the best instantiation of his theory.447  
All this Rawlsian analysis is relevant to constitutional analysis because the Rawlsian method
is particularly suited to identifying democratic constitutional institutions.  Rawlsian analysis is social
contractarian –  aimed at identifying the powers that persons willingly would cede to a government
of their creation by means of the original position –  and democratic authority requires, at least, that
the government structure be one to which citizens hypothetically could be said to have consented.448
Tailoring constitutional guarantees in sub-federal polities (most likely sub-state polities)
where deserving perfectionists live can operationalize the above Rawlsian conclusion.
      449See Rosen, Radical Possibility, supra note 25, at 1007 & n. 317 (considering limits to the degree to which shared
principles can be differentially understood without undermining unity).
      450I provide such an analysis of the Establishment Clause in Rosen, Establishm ent, Expressivism, and  Federalism,
supra note 356, at 669-716.
      451See supra Part III.B.2.
      452451 U.S. 355, 363 (1981).
121
Constitutional guarantees can be Tailored to afford deserving political perfectionists greater leeway
to govern themselves, subject to the above-mentioned constraints of exit and well-orderedness.
Tailoring is suited to maintaining the social unity that is required to satisfy well-orderedness; unity
is provided by the common constitutional principles that would govern both the perfectionists and
others.  Varying applications of the principles, which would afford perfectionists greater leeway to
run their lives, need not undermine the commonality that joint allegiance to common principles
affords, though there surely would be limits on the degree of variation that could be tolerated.449
Once again, this Article is not the place to delve into the specifics of what constitutional provisions
could be Tailored, and what the doctrines would look like, under a Rawlsian approach.450  What
matters for present purposes is that a Rawlsian analysis provides prima facie support for Tailoring.
E.     Different Functions and Responsibilities.  A final respect in which the different levels
of government differ is with regard to their functions and responsibilities.  As shown above, one of
the areas of contemporary doctrine where Tailoring is found – the equal protection jurisprudence that
governs “special-purpose units” of  government – has been justified by the Supreme Court on this
very basis.451  Special-purpose units of government may have property-based franchise while
“general” governments may not because the former “affect[] definable groups of constituents more
than other constituents” by virtue of their unique functions.452 
More generally, each level of government’s distinctive functions  would be relevant to
      453This is a more generalized form of the argument with regard to the varying costs of prophylactic measured
discussed above.  See supra Part IV.A.2.  Like all other aspects of this Article’s analysis, this argument is premised on
a contestable  understanding of the role and content of constitutional doctrine. 
      454See discussion supra at p. 43
      455Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 504-05 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
      456Hampton v. Mow Sun W ong, 426 U.S. 88, 100 (1976) (emphasis supplied).
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constitutional doctrines that either in practice or effect employ a balancing test.453 The governmental
interest at stake by constitutionally proscribing the regulation of a field would be greater for the level
of government primarily or exclusively responsible for that subject matter.  This was one of the
arguments relied upon by Justices Jackson and Harlan454 for giving states greater leeway to regulate
speech.  Justice Harlan wrote as follows:
The Constitution differentiates between those areas of human conduct subject to the
regulation of the States and those subject to the powers of the Federal government.  The
substantive powers of the two governments, in many instances, are distinct.  And in every
case where we are called upon to balance the interest in free expression against other
interest, it seems important that we should keep in the forefront the question of whether
those interests are state or federal.  Since under our constitutional scheme the two are not
necessarily equivalent, the balancing process must needs often produce different results.
Whether a particular limitation on speech or press is to be upheld because it subserves a
paramount governmental interest must, to a large extent, I think, depend on whether that
government has, under the Constitution, a direct substantive interest, that is, the power to
act, in the particular area involved.455 
In another case, a majority of the Court identified a subject matter that was the federal
government’s unique responsibility  – setting customs policy – and suggested that this might give
rise to a unique due process doctrine.  Stated the Court, 
the two protections [the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ due process clauses] are not
always coextensive.  Not only does the language of the two Amendments differ, but more
importantly, there may be overriding national interests which justify selective federal
legislation that would be unacceptable for an individual State.456 
 
This reason for Tailoring – that the different levels of government have divergent
responsibilities – may  fall on receptive ears in today’s Court.  Contemporary commerce clause
jurisprudence, for example, turns on distinguishing what is “truly national” from what is “truly
      457United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000).
      458See Anne C. Dailey, Federalism and Families,  143 U. PA. L. REV. 1787 (1995); Judith Resnik, ‘Naturally’ Without
Gender: Women, Jurisdiction, and the Federal Courts,  66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1682 (1991).
      459Foreign relations comes to mind , though even this is not uncontroversial.  See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L.
Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L.
REV. 815 (1997) (arguing that customary international law at most rises to the level of state common law, but not federal
common law).  For  contrary views, see Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV.
1824 (1998); Gerald Neuman, 66 FO R DH A M  L. REV 371  (1997).
      460See supra Part III.B.
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local.”457  While many of the subject areas identified by the Court as falling into the latter category
might not be so readily characterized as such –  for instance, the federal government long has played
an important role in family law458 – some fields almost certainly fall primarily if not exclusively to
federal competence.459  Alternatively, even if it is not possible to identify many (or any) subjects that
are the exclusive domain of any single level of government, there might be broad agreement that
certain subjects are primarily the responsibility of one or the other level of government.  This might
suffice to have effects on the “balancing” of the government’s interest against the countervailing
concern protected by a particular constitutional guarantee. 
V.     COUNTERVAILING CONSIDERATIONS 
This final part analyzes three possible down-sides to Tailoring.  It shows that they are
considerations that weigh against Tailoring when taking account of Tailoring’s benefits and costs,
but that they are not reasons for categorically rejecting Tailoring. That Tailoring cannot be
categorically rejected is not surprising in light of the twin facts that constitutional law currently
contains some examples of Tailoring and many Justices have advocated expanding the instances of
Tailoring.460  
A.     Administrability and Judicial Discretion.   
Two related disadvantages of Tailoring were discussed earlier in relation to selective
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incorporation’s eclipse of fundamental fairness:  compared to the contemporary One-Size-Fits-All
regime, Tailoring would increase the room for judicial discretion and would be more difficult to
administer. The concern is that Tailoring would leave the sub-federal polities in the dark as to what
are their constitutional obligations.  Not only would the doctrines developed in the federal context
not necessarily apply to the States, but there might be doctrinal variations as between the States and
municipalities, and even across municipalities.  The United States Supreme Court hears only about
one hundred cases a year, and relieving the sub-federal polities of the obligation to abide by already-
developed constitutional doctrines in effect would leave them to their own devices. 
Two factors suggest that although these are very real countervailing considerations against
Tailoring, they are not categorical reasons to reject Tailoring. First, as purely descriptive matter, our
country’s constitutional jurisprudence does not systematically adopt the simplest of all possible legal
rules so as to maximize adminstrability and minimize judicial discretion.   Many constitutional
doctrines are complex.  The administrability difficulties they create presumably are justified by the
benefits that attend adopting them rather than a simple rule; complexity frequently is needed, and
doctrinally adopted, because of the complex mix of considerations that doctrine must mediate.  The
question accordingly becomes whether Tailoring is a doctrinal complication that is worth its costs.
Given the wide array of potential benefits of Tailoring examined in Part IV, it would be surprising
to conclude that any and all such benefits would be outweighed by  administrative and discretion-
augmenting costs.  Whether any of the systemic differences between the various levels of
government are adequate bases to support Tailoring accordingly can only be answered by
considering the costs and benefits that would attend the Tailoring of each particular constitutional
guarantee. 
      461This in no small measure is because federal law is reviewed not only by the Supreme Court, but also by lower
federal courts, and state courts, as well.  Courts aside from the Supreme Court similarly would have reviewing authority
under a Tailoring regime.  
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A second reason why these adminstrative and discretion-augmenting concerns are real costs
but not categorical reasons to reject Tailoring is that similar costs are borne all the time outside the
context of Tailoring.  Due to its small size, the Supreme Court is incapable of passing judgment on
the vast majority of federal law – constitutional, statutory, and regulatory – that is created.  Yet
virtually no one takes this as an argument that Congress categorically must legislate less or that
administrative agencies must make fewer rules.461 Rather, it is understood that large and increasing
quantities of law are a concomitant of a large and complex society that must be tolerated, even if
such a quantity of regulations invariably makes the legal system more complicated to administer and
increases judicial discretion.  Consistency accordingly suggests that  Tailoring’s administrative and
discretion-augmenting burdens at most are costs that weigh against Tailoring, but that they are not
legitimate bases for rejecting Tailoring as a per se matter.  
Another reason to reject the position that administrability and discretion costs render
Tailoring categorically undesirable is that the costs themselves are not fixed but are a function of
how Tailoring is operationalized.  Tailoring could be effectuated in a manner that significantly
reduces these costs.  One variable is the weight of the presumption that is attached to One-Size-Fits-
All.  The stronger the presumption, the fewer are the discretion and administrability costs. Second,
it could be decided to altogether forgo Tailoring as between certain polities. For example, the costs
relating to discretion and administrability would be reduced by not Tailoring as between states and
municipalities or across municipalities.  The diminished benefits of Tailoring in this limited fashion
might be worth it, as a pragmatic matter. 
      462See Mark D. Rosen, Should Un-American Foreign Judgments be Enforced?, 77 MINN. L. REV. xx (forthcoming Spring 2004);
Elijah Millgram, supra note 346, at 151-69; Scharffs, Problematics of Incommensurability,  supra note 346.
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Regardless of the quantum of the costs, the question arises as to how they are to be balanced
against the potential benefits of Tailoring identified in Part IV.  The answer is that choosing between
them is an eminently “political” process that is not reducible to a purely rational process, but that
simultaneously reflects and helps constitute the very character of our national political community.
This is so because none of the potential benefits of Tailoring is commensurable with the costs of
Tailoring; for example, it is not possible to translate both the benefit of accommodating the needs
of certain minority communities (a benefit according to Kymlicka and Taylor) and the costs of
increasing discretion and complicating administrability into numbers that can be compared on a
common scale.  Trading-off among incommensurable goods hence is not a process that can be
undertaken by a perfectly rational machine executing an algorithm, but involves subjective value
choices that reflect and shape the character of the decisionmaker.462  Choosing between One-Size-
Fits-All and Tailoring thus reflects a doubly subjective, political process: deciding which if any of
the potential benefits of Tailoring are to constitute actual benefits for purposes of constitutional
doctrine, and then determining how such benefits are to be traded off against the costs relating to
judicial discretion and administrability.
B.     The Nature of Our Political Union.   A profound potential challenge  is that Tailoring
would risk undermining our Constitution and tearing asunder our national political union.  The very
point of the Constitution, it might be argued, is to ensure the uniform protection of rights everywhere
in the country.  Such uniformity is what defines our national character.  Moreover, it might be
      463See Leonard G. Ratner, Majoritarian Constraints on Judicial Review: Congressional Control of Suprem e Court
Jurisdiction, 27 VILL. L. REV. 929, 941 (1982) (explaining the importance of there being a singular interpretation of
constitutional provisions).
      464See supra at Part I.B.1.
      465See supra Part I.B.
      466Given the very d ifferent constitutional limitations to  which the federal and state governments historically have been
subject, it would seem that there is no necessary link between constitutional uniformity across the federal and state
governments, on the one hand, and constitutionalism or our nation’s political union, on the other. The historical record
might be dismissed by the argument that having applied uniform standards is akin to letting the genie out of the bottle,
and that reversing the status quo would do damage to constitutionalism at this point in time.  But why should this be so?
It seems more likely that reversing course would be damaging only if there were not good reasons for doing so and not
as a categorical matter.
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claimed,  uniformity is a prerequisite for citizens’ respect for the Constitution.463 
These may be concerns that weigh against Tailoring, but they are not legitimate grounds for
categorically rejecting Tailoring.  Let us start the analysis by considering Tailoring across the federal
and state governments (“vertical Tailoring”).  There are several reasons why it is unlikely that the
health of the American Constitution rests on the federal and state governments being subject to
identical constitutional constraints.  First, it is incontrovertible that prior to the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Bill of Rights limited only the federal government, not the States. Even
after adoption of the Civil Rights Amendments, constitutional limitations continued to vary as
between the federal and sub-federal governments under the regime of fundamental fairness.464  It was
not until the 1960s, when the Court adopted the doctrine of selective incorporation, that
constitutional guarantees were systematically applied in identical measure to the federal and sub-
federal polities.465  Even if one prefers selective incorporation to the doctrines that preceded it, it is
hard to argue that American constitutionalism is contingent on a type of uniformity that was absent
during the majority of this country’s existence.466  The conclusion that American constitutionalism
is not dependent on such uniformity is definitively established by the fact that there are several
contemporary examples of vertical Tailoring, such as the equal protection doctrine that permits
      467See supra Part III.B.2.
      468See supra Part III.B.4.
      469See supra Part III.B.5. 
      470See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485  (1957).
      471Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 104 (1974).  For a more extensive discussion of the community standards
doctrine, see Mark D. Rosen, The Radical Possibility of Limited Community-Based Interpretation of the Constitution,
43 WM  &  MARY L. REV. 927,  995-97 (2002).
      472Hoover v. Byrd, 801 F.2d 740, 742 (5th Cir. 1986).
      473United States v. Peraino, 645 F.2d 548, 551  n.1 (6th Cir. 1981).
      474See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U .S. 57, 67 (1981).
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property-based franchise in certain local governments,467 dormant commerce clause doctrine,468 and
area-based and population-based apportionment doctrines.469 
The harder challenge is Tailoring across states or across municipalities –  what might be
called “horizontal Tailoring” across polities at the same hierarchical level.  A regime under which
the U.S. Constitution permitted New York to bar its  citizen from doing act “x” in New York but did
not permit New Jersey to similarly regulate its citizens undoubtedly would strike many as strange.
Nonetheless, is horizontal Tailoring categorically incompatible with American constitutionalism?
No.  This is proven by the fact that there already is some.  Consider the community standards
doctrine.  Obscene materials receive no First Amendment protection and accordingly can be freely
regulated,470  but what qualifies as obscene is determined on a place-by-place basis.471  The
community standards doctrine thus “permit[s] differing levels of obscenity regulation in such diverse
communities as Kerrville and Houston, Texas”472 with the result that “material may be proscribed
in one community but not in another” as a matter of constitutional law.473 Less analogous, but still
instructive, are the unique constitutional doctrines that apply in military enclaves.  For example,
although the Bill of Rights applies on military bases,474  it is black letter law that “the different
character of the military community and of the military mission requires a different application of
      475Parker v. Levy, 417 U .S. 733, 758 (1974); see also Goldman v. W einberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986) (“Our
review of military regulations challenged on First Amendment grounds is far more deferential than constitutional review
of similar laws or regulations designed for civilian society.”).
      476Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980) (upholding Air Force regulation requiring members of the service to obtain
approval from commanders before circulating petitions on Air Force bases).
      477Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 837-38 (1976).
      478See supra Part II.B.
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[constitutional] protections.”475  Thus, there can be prior restraints476 and bans on private citizens’
political speech477 in military enclaves that would not be permitted in states or municipalities.  The
community standards doctrine and military law strongly suggest that horizontal Tailoring is not
categorically incompatible with our constitutional order, for they are contemporary doctrines under
which the identical activity may be  constitutionally protected in one place (for instance, certain adult
magazines in San Francisco) but not in others (the same adult magazines in a more conservative
community such as Salt Lake City).  
These doctrines, however, are exceptional.  What would happen to our constitutional order
if  what was  constitutionally permissible more commonly varied from location to location, as might
happen under Tailoring? There would not seem to be anything inherent in constitutionalism that
requires, as an a priori matter, that such geography-sensitive constitutional doctrines be exceptional
rather than mainstream.  Constitutional rights that are “rights, simpliciter” by their nature are not
geography-sensitive whereas “rights against rules” may generate doctrines that are geography-
sensitive to the extent that conditions that are doctrinally relevant vary from place to place,478 and
I know of no basis for concluding that constitutionalism by its nature requires that “rights,
simpliciter” outnumber the “rights-against-rules.”  Indeed, as a descriptive matter, it seems to be the
case that most constitutional rights are of the “right-against-rules” variety. 
That jurisprudence does not preclude the mainstreaming of geography-sensitive constitutional
      479See supra at p. 37.
      480For instance, if heightened scrutiny for racial classifications reflects a concern that minorities’ interests are not
adequately represented in the legislative process due to widespread hostility, then racial classifications created in black-
majority municipalities ought to be subject to different scrutiny than classifications enacted in white-majority
municipalities.  See supra at p. 285.  Under this Ely approach to constitutional rights, different municipalities might
sufficiently different from one another to merit differential constitutional treatment. 
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doctrines does not mean that such a modification would be without effects on our constitutional
order.  Most importantly, it likely would change citizens’ views of constitutional law.  Change in and
of itself is not a bad thing, however, so it must be asked: how would citizens’ views change, and
would such a change be beneficial or harmful?  
Answering these questions first requires an understanding of what attitudes likely inform
citizens’ current expectation that constitutional doctrines are uniform nationwide.  A crucial
component, I imagine, is a widespread belief that constitutional rights by necessity are “rights,
simpliciter.” Once it is understood that many are not – and Tailoring, it should be recalled, is an
option only vis-a-vis those constitutional rights that are “rights-against-rules” rather than “rights,
simpliciter”479 – citizens’ receptivity to horizontal Tailoring is far more likely.  Why?  Since a
constitutional right of the “right-against-rule” variety means that what the Constitution permits to
be regulated is highly context-sensitive, the expectation of nationwide uniformity across all polities
of a similar type with regard to constitutional protections that are “rights-against-rules” reflects an
unrebuttable presumption that all such polities are identical for constitutional purposes. This
unrebuttable presumption of  identicality, which horizontal Tailoring rejects,480 is a less firm
foundation for uniform rights than is the “rights, simpliciter” conception of constitutional rights,
under which nonuniform constitutional rights are conceptually incoherent.  
What underlies the unrebuttable presumption of identicality that grounds the expectation of
nationwide uniformity of “rights-against-rules”?  The most plausible candidate is the belief that it
      481This is true, for example, of the multicultural theorists, Nozick, my reading of Rawls, and the law and economics
theorist Robert Cooter.  
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is the very nationwide uniform application of constitutional rules that helps to constitute our country
as a unified polity.  While this is a plausible conception of national identity, it by no means is the
only possibility.  Our country is extraordinarily heterogeneous, and several of the  approaches
explored in Part IV in essence reflect the view that our country’s very real diversity is better managed
by offering a menu of options, including  possible variations in what regulations are constitutionally
permitted  across polities of the same level.481  In short, the unrebuttable presumption of identicality
reflects not some deep and intrinsic need of constitutionalism, but instead mirrors only one of several
competing conceptions of our country’s national identity and the Constitution’s relationship to that
identity.  Whether horizontal Tailoring is desirable or not thus turns on normative commitments, not
the nature of constitutionalism. 
It follows that whether the change in citizens’ views of constitutional law that would
accompany the mainstreaming of geography-sensitive constitutional doctrine turns on contestable
normative commitments.  This is an issue that I cannot hope to resolve here in this Article.  It is
enough for present purposes to identify the contestable foundations on which One-Size-Fits-All rests.
Finally, it is important to recognize that even if the unrebuttable presumption of identicality were
forthrightly adopted as reflecting the preferable conception of our national identity, this would not
lead to the rejection of Tailoring generally, but only of horizontal Tailoring.
CONCLUSION
Although Supreme Court cases typically read as if constitutional principles self-evidently are
One-Size-Fits-All, this is not so.  Several contemporary constitutional doctrines fit the paradigm of
Tailoring, and many Justices have advocated that other constitutional principles be Tailored.
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Jurisprudentially, One-Size-Fits-All is not an intrinsic part of American constitutionalism.  Though
there are real costs that would attend the Tailoring of constitutional principles, they constitute
pragmatic concerns, not bases for categorically rejecting Tailoring.  The pragmatic analysis that
appropriately informs the choice between One-Size-Fits-All and Tailoring necessarily must take
account of Tailoring’s many potential benefits.   The potential benefits result from the fact that the
different levels of government systematically vary in important ways.  Consequently, a constitutional
limitation as applied to one level of government may have very different repercussions when applied
to another.  Whether any of Tailoring’s potential benefits is to count as an actual benefit, however,
is a function of the decisionmaker’s political preferences.  Determining how any such benefits are
to be traded-off against Tailoring’s costs requires yet another subjective, political choice since
Tailoring’s costs and benefits are technically incommensurable.
In the end, then, a choice must be made between One-Size-Fits-All and Tailoring, and the
decision invariably will be guided by contestable normative commitments.  This Article has not
sought to engage in the debate as to which normative commitment is superior, but has aimed to
highlight the nonaxiomatic and contestable assumptions that lie behind the One-Size-Fits-All
approach that typically is viewed as the doctrinal status quo.  The choice between One-Size-Fits-All
and Tailoring should not be made on the basis of a misperception of constitutional necessity.  Given
Tailoring’s many potential benefits, however, it seems wise to soften the categorical presumption
of One-Size-Fits-All to a rebuttable presumption so that the merits of One-Size-Fits-All versus
Tailoring can be examined in the incremental manner that is the common law’s wisdom.
